Current agentic workflows usually involve decomposing user requests into sequences of tool calls with correctly resolved parameters, the results of which are processed through reasoning traces in the language model's context window. The prevailing route to improve such reasoning is test-time scaling, which trains models to search over long chains of thought; but the resulting capability is entangled in model weights, is not verifiable step-by-step, and is costly at inference. We present Forethought, a neurosymbolic reasoning system that instead treats reasoning as an explicit, verifiable program, that builds from a library of symbolic and neural primitives which are composed through a domain-specific language. The result are reasoning programs, which are concrete representations of the model's work, and as such can be inspected and modified before deployment. Instantiated as a tool-calling execution kernel and evaluated across five benchmarks, Forethought improves base-model accuracy by about 30% relative and outperforms vanilla prompting, reinforcement learning scaffolds, and prompt-evolution methods, enabling small models to match or exceed frontier models capabilities. In a direct comparison, a non-reasoning model augmented with Forethought competes with a dedicated reasoning model while requiring roughly three orders of magnitude less post-training investment, and remains model-agnostic and auditable.
Language models frequently produce plausible yet incorrect reasoning traces that are difficult to verify. We investigate fine-tuning models to use Prolog as an external symbolic reasoning tool, training Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on a cleaned version of GSM8K (which we release as gsm8k-prolog-prover). We systematically vary prompt structure, reward composition (execution, syntax, semantics, structure), and inference protocol (single-try, multiple-try, and two agentic modes). Our reinforcement learning approach outperforms supervised fine-tuning on GSM8K, and the resulting 3B model achieves zero-shot performance on MMLU-STEM and MMLU-Pro competitive with 7B few-shot baselines. Most importantly, we identify an accuracy--auditability trade-off: configurations tuned for correctness alone learn to delegate reasoning to natural language and use Prolog only for the final computation, while configurations rewarded for symbolic structure produce fully auditable programs at a cost in accuracy. We interpret this trade-off as a form of reward hacking and discuss its implications for deploying neurosymbolic systems in safety-critical domains. The source code for our experiments is available under https://github.com/aisilab/Prolog-as-a-Tool
Niklas Mellgren, Peter Schneider-Kamp, Lukas Galke Poech
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.
The rapid capability gains of frontier language models are widely attributed to improved reasoning abilities, yet this cannot be verified as raw CoT traces in closed-source systems are hidden. By registering a simple custom tool through a standard API feature, we induce frontier models to externalize intermediate reasoning. Because these traces may reflect post-hoc rationalization rather than genuine reasoning, we first evaluate against native CoT on open-source models and extend to closed-source frontier models including GPT-6 Astra. We find that the extracted reasoning matches native reasoning performance and substantially outperforms no-reasoning baselines, across competition mathematics, science, and code generation. We then characterize how frontier models structure their intermediate reasoning. Across token efficiency, reasoning-step types, and induced reasoning trees, we identify systematic differences in how models externalize, compress, and organize reasoning. We find that Astra exhibits token-efficient directed reasoning, selecting a correct trajectory earlier, while resolving elementary steps internally and externalizing only crucial reasoning. These findings provide a behavioral lens on frontier-model reasoning beyond benchmark scores.