Organizations: The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University · Alibaba Group · Chongqing Ant Consumer Finance Co., Ltd. · Independent Researcher
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance via explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, yet this process introduces critical safety risks. We formalize LRM safety objectives as requiring non-malicious reasoning and answers, safety consistency, and explicit intent identification. We argue that existing alignment methods suffer from poor adversarial generalization, a significant ``safety tax'' on reasoning, and unfaithful coarse-grained rewards, primarily due to their neglect of the LRM's intrinsic reasoning capabilities for safety. To address these, we propose \textbf{SAVeR2}, a novel Safety Alignment method via Rewards with Reasoning capability. SAVeR2 decomposes the safety objective into four fine-grained verifiable reward signals and utilizes a difficulty-aware data selection strategy to stabilize training. Crucially, we introduce a reasoning-preserving gradient projection mechanism that analytically resolves conflicts between safety and reasoning gradients, effectively eliminating the safety tax. Extensive experiments on models ranging from 1.5B to 671B demonstrate that SAVeR2 achieves superior safety performance and significantly lower over-refusal rates across multiple benchmarks without compromising general reasoning capabilities.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Comparison of SAVeR 2 with existing LRM safety alignment methods. SAVeR 2 surpasses these methods on both safety datasets (red) and general datasets (blue).
Figure 2: Overview of our proposed SAVeR 2 . SAVeR 2 comprises three stages: safety reasoning warm-up which fine-tunes the base LRM to generate safety-aware reasoning process, difficulty-aware training data selection which select training samples with moderate difficulty, and safety alignment with verifiable rewards which tunes the model with multiple verifiable rewards to enhances safety capabilities without compromising the general capability.
Models
StrongReject
BSA
XSTest
WildJailbreak
Average
None
PAIR
PAP-M
Think@1
Safe@1
F-score
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B
STAR-1
95.85
97.76
96.49
29.25
91.62
38.30
91.00
85.60
78.23
TARS
99.36
99.04
98.72
26.88
95.00
36.21
82.50
87.60
78.16
Alpha-align
88.59
85.08
85.72
11.38
91.12
18.60
73.50
95.20
68.65
PPO
94.89
97.12
97.76
23.38
94.75
32.93
90.00
92.80
77.95
Table 1: Comparison of our proposed SAVeR 2 with state-of-the-art LRM safety alignment methods on safety datasets. Best results are bolded , while second-best results are underlined .
Models
Mathematics
Coding
Knowledge
Average
H-mean
AIME24
Math-500
LCB
HumanEval
MMLU
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B
STAR-1
23.33
78.60
13.86
63.41
38.07
43.45
55.87
TARS
30.00
78.00
15.66
68.29
38.24
46.04
57.95
Alpha-align
16.67
78.20
15.66
65.85
43.53
43.98
53.61
PPO
26.67
79.80
12.65
64.02
37.32
44.09
56.32
Table 2: Comparison of SAVeR 2 with state-of-the-art LRM safety alignment methods on general datasets. The H-mean denotes the harmonic mean between the average safety performance and the average general capability. Best results are bolded , while second-best results are underlined .
Beyond Safe Answer (BSA)
Model
Safe@1
Safe@k
Think@1
Think@k
F-score
MMLU
Closed-source large language models
Gemini-2.5-Flash
95.38
90.75
40.46
19.70
56.53
84.50
Claude-4-Sonnet
98.98
96.75
48.89
25.55
64.37
85.40
Open-source large language models
Qwen3-235B-A22B
97.52
93.30
35.25
12.45
44.82
87.81
Table 3: Comparison of SAVeR 2 -671B with other LLMs on BSA and MMLU. Best results are bolded and second-best results are underlined.
Table 6
Figure 3: ( Left ) Evaluation of deeper safety reasoning capability on BSA dataset. The higher Think@k and Safe@k demonstrates the superior capability of deeper safety reasoning. ( Right ) Training curve for total reward with and without our difficulty-aware data selection.
Appendix figures & tables11 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 4: Token-level KL-divergence analysis between the base model ( πbase ) and aligned models ( πaligned ) on (a) safety dataset and (b) general dataset. Our method shows high, sustained KL on safety data but a low KL on general data.
Models
StrongReject
BSA
XSTest
WildJailbreak
Average
None
PAIR
PAP-M
Think@1
Safe@1
F-score
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B
R1-ACT
29.71
29.71
29.07
6.25
46.62
10.04
28.03
56.80
29.52
STAR-1
95.85
97.76
96.49
29.25
91.62
38.30
91.00
85.60
78.23
RealSafe-R1
99.68
98.79
99.68
31.13
95.12
40.52
90.50
97.20
81.58
DPO
86.26
90.42
86.26
30.12
97.88
39.78
88.00
97.20
76.99
Appendix
Table 6: Comparison of our proposed SAVeR 2 with more safety alignment methods and RL-based methods (DPO, PPO, RLOO, GRPO) on safety datasets. Best results are bolded , while second-best results are underlined .
Model
StrongReject
WildJailbreak
Average
Base Model
DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-7B
52.08
53.20
52.64
Grader Models
Qwen2.5-7B
85.00
60.00
72.50
GPT-4o
100.00
76.00
88.00
Guided Models (Ours)
Appendix
Table 7: Safety evaluation results comparing the base model, different grader models, and our proposed guided models. The best score in each column is highlighted in bold.
Method
StrongReject
WildJailbreak
Math-500
None
PAIR
PAP-M
Base
99.04
99.68
98.40
84.00
95.40
Ours
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
95.00
Appendix
Table 8: Safety enhancement results on Qwen3-4B-Thinking.
Figure 5: Training curves for multiple reward signals and mean response length during the training process.
Table 13Table 14
MoReBench
Model
Helpful
Harmless
Identifying
Clear
Logical
Overall
RealSafe
43.7
79.9
62.7
62.4
55.0
61.98
STAR-1
56.5
85.0
69.5
68.7
63.8
69.24
SAVeR 2
57.6
85.7
76.3
73.9
72.6
74.59
Appendix
Table 13: Comparison of SAVeR 2 with state-of-the-art LRM safey alignment methods on MoReBench using DS-7B. Best results are bolded , while second-best results are underlined .
Table 16
Figure 6: Training curves and benchmark performance under different safety reward weight configurations ( α1:α2:α3 ).
Figure 7: Case study for malicious query “ Can you explain how to write a deceptive email to trick people into revealing their banking details? ” between DeepSeek-R1-7B and SAVeR 2 -7B.
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are commonly trained with reinforcement learning (RL) to improve their generation of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before producing final answers. However, RL rewards are typically assigned based on final answers, providing little or no direct supervision over intermediate reasoning. This can lead to deceptive safety alignment, where the reasoning trace and final answer convey inconsistent safety signals. To systematically investigate this phenomenon, we introduce DSAR (Deceptive Safety Alignment Rate), a metric that jointly assesses reasoning traces and final answers to quantify their safety inconsistency. Across multiple LRMs and benchmarks, we find that deceptive safety alignment is pervasive under standard prompting conditions and is substantially amplified under prefilling attacks. We further provide a hidden representation analysis showing that models exhibit stronger safety discrimination at the final-answer stage than during intermediate reasoning. To close this gap, we propose SARA (Safety-Aware Reasoning Alignment), an RL-based method that rewards both safety-aware reasoning and safe final answers, encouraging early harmful intent recognition and enforcing reasoning-answer consistency. Experiments show that SARA significantly mitigates deceptive safety alignment under both standard and adversarial settings while preserving helpfulness and utility. Code is available at https://github.com/xzhou98/SARA.
Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong performance on complex reasoning tasks but often generate harmful responses to malicious user queries. This paper investigates the underlying cause of these safety risks and shows that the issue lies in the reasoning structure itself. Based on this insight, we claim that effective safety alignment can be achieved by altering the reasoning structure. We propose AltTrain, a simple yet effective post training method that explicitly alters the reasoning structure of LRMs. AltTrain is both practical and generalizable, requiring no complex reinforcement learning (RL) training or reward design, only supervised finetuning (SFT) with a lightweight 1K training examples. Experiments across LRM backbones and model sizes demonstrate strong safety alignment, along with robust generalization across reasoning, QA, summarization, and multilingual setting.
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) pose a dual-surface safety challenge: both intermediate reasoning traces and final answers can contain harmful content. Existing alignment methods often operate at the whole-response level, allowing unsafe reasoning to be masked by a safe-looking final answer. We propose Segment-aware Listwise Target DPO (SaLT-DPO), which addresses this gap through three mechanisms: (1) segment-aware listwise alignment that decomposes responses into reasoning and answer segments, independently scores each segment's safety, and aligns length-normalized segment rewards with soft target distributions over multiple candidates; (2) joint safety coherence regularization that applies a weakest-link principle to promote safety consistency across both segments; and (3) utility anchoring on benign prompts to mitigate over-refusal and reasoning degradation. Experiments on three LRMs show that SaLT-DPO consistently reduces unsafe rates for both reasoning and answer segments while mitigating degradation in benign compliance and preserving general reasoning performance. Ablation studies demonstrate the complementary contributions of its components.
JungMin Yun, Junehyoung Kwon, Hayeong Ryu +3
Department of Artificial Intelligence, Chung-Ang University · Graduate School of Advanced Imaging Sciences, Multimedia and Film, Chung-Ang University