cs.CRNov 5, 2026

Signed but Not Safe: Requirement Integrity in Multi-Agent LLM Handoffs

Authors: Xiaobo Chen, Genliang Zhu, Ziyuan Wang, Chu Wang

Organizations: University of Massachusetts Amherst · Accentrust & Georgia Institute of Technology · Duke University · Accentrust & University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

Enterprise AI agents split requests across subagents, and each handoff can drop, alter or ignore a requirement. A preregistered study on synthetic, exactly scorable tasks compares free-text, structured JSON and signed requirement-manifest handoffs: the orchestrator extracts each requirement as a verbatim quote plus a checkable predicate, code signs it and deterministically verifies the merger's decision. With Qwen3-8B (1,440 trajectories, five threats), signed manifests cut unsafe commits under attack from 69.4% to 9.0% (60.4 pp, 95% CI [51.4, 69.4]) with no detectable utility loss versus structured handoffs (S2 -0.4 pp, 95% CI [-14.2, 13.3]). Signing defeats in-transit mutation: unsigned manifests violated 79.2 pp more often than signed ones, which never did; this replicated in gpt-oss-20b and gemma-4-12b. There, without an adversary, signed manifests were descriptively slightly worse than structured handoffs (11.1% vs 2.8%; 16.7% vs 8.3%; not tested) and lost utility overall (gpt-oss-20b, all threats: -28.7 pp). On identical Qwen3-8B trajectories, the deterministic verifier caught 78.7% of violating decisions versus 59.0% for an LLM checker, and an oracle manifest removed all remaining unsafe commits, so the residual risk is in extraction. A preregistered pre-signing injection confirmed this: one adversarial line raised signed-manifest unsafe commits from 14.6% to 37.5% (Qwen3-8B), 11.1% to 63.9% (gpt-oss-20b) and 16.7% to 97.2% (gemma-4-12b), and every such commit carried a manifest corrupted before signing. Signing protects transit; extraction is the trust boundary. A testable pre-signing specification (PSE), specified after the injection results and frozen before an offline evaluation, blocked all these injected commits (fixed templates) but refused 45.8%, 11.1% and 22.2% of benign requests, changing completions by -8.3 pp, -2.8 pp and 0.0 pp.

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