The Memory Trap: Language Agents Overgeneralize from Benign Interactions

Memory is becoming a core component of long-horizon AI agents, allowing agents to reuse past experience when operating web browsers, software tools, and other interactive environments. Existing work mostly treats memory as a supply problem, asking what experience to write, how to store it, and which entry to retrieve for the next task. Yet we still lack a clear account of how models consume retrieved memory across a multi-step action trajectory. This consumption process matters because it determines not only what memories should be retrieved, but also what models and control policies are needed to use them safely. To diagnose this process, we propose Entry--Propagation--Recovery (E-P-R), a trajectory-level framework that asks where memory first changes an action, whether that change carries forward, and whether the agent can recover after leaving a correct path. We instantiate E-P-R on WebArena and on MemTrapBench, a controlled benchmark we build to isolate these phases. We find that the main failure often begins at entry: agents adopt conflicting memory at the first exposed decision point even when it is task-wrong. Repeated exposure then amplifies this early error, while recovery after divergence is weak. Together, these effects create a compliance trap: across models, conflicting memory induces similar compliance rates, but once agents comply, their success rates collapse to a low floor. Stronger agents therefore suffer larger absolute damage because each compliance event erases more baseline capability. These results suggest that memory-augmented agents should be evaluated not only by retrieval quality or final success rate, but by how they consume memory throughout the trajectory.

Persistent memory supports personalized agents, but a stale stored fact can override current authoritative evidence without warning. We study when this harm begins as model capability changes. We evaluate a frozen, closed-set, action-scored benchmark with 2 suites that represent 2 different meanings of "no memory" (a Benefit suite, unsolvable without the stored fact, and a Safety suite, in which an authoritative tool always holds the correct value), on a same-family model-size series (Qwen3 0.6/1.7/4/8B). The Memory Trust Gap reflects over-trust rather than confusion. In the Benefit suite, models answer with the stale value 0.92-1.00 of the time at every scale. In the Safety suite, harm below the no-memory baseline under the trap conditions ($Δ_{\mathrm{mem}}$) is capability-gated, with the larger models collapsing most once a stale note is made to look current. In a $2\times2\times2\times2$ factorial, which feature triggers over-trust depends on both the feature and model scale. Removing a label amplifies over-trust at every size, and a recency feature (stale dated newer) fools the larger models harder. Source authority is weak and scale-flat, and position changes from positive to negative across the Qwen3 model-size series. We confirm these scale interactions with direct cross-size contrast tests rather than overlapping per-model intervals. Mitigation is likewise capability-dependent: exposing metadata improves accuracy for the capable models, but only pre-resolving the conflict restores accuracy for the 2 smaller checkpoints. The same pattern appears on the capable models in an independent Llama-Instruct model-size series and on 2 external datasets (RGB, MisBench). A framing control finds no consistent advantage for the memory label: at the 3 smaller scales, models trust a stale document more than a stale memory; at 8B, the difference is not significant.

Safety evaluations of memory-equipped LLM agents typically measure within-task safety: whether an agent completes a single scenario safely, often under adversarial conditions such as prompt injection or memory poisoning. In deployment, however, a single agent serves many independent tasks over a long horizon, and memory accumulated during earlier tasks can affect behavior on later, unrelated ones. Studying this regime requires evaluation along the temporal dimension across tasks: not whether an agent is safe at any single memory state, but how its safety profile changes as memory accumulates across many independent interactions. We call this failure mode temporal memory contamination. To isolate memory exposure from stream non-stationarity, we introduce a trigger-probe protocol that evaluates a fixed probe set against read-only memory snapshots at varying prefix lengths, together with a NullMemory counterfactual baseline for identifying memory-induced violations. We apply this protocol across three deployment scenarios spanning records, memos, forms, and email correspondence and eight memory architectures, and additionally on Claw-like AI agents, such as OpenClaw, using the platform's native memory mechanism. Memory-enabled agents consistently exceed the NullMemory baseline, and memory-induced violation rates show a robust upward trend with exposure length on both agent classes. Order-randomization experiments indicate that the effect is driven primarily by accumulated content rather than encounter order. Finally, a structural consequence of the event decomposition is that memory-induced risk is detectable from retrieval state before generation, which we confirm with a high-recall diagnostic monitor. Our results argue for treating memory safety as a longitudinal property that requires temporal evaluation, not a single-state property that can be captured by a snapshot.