cs.CRNov 6, 2026

When Feedback Becomes a Backdoor: Tracing Backdoor Skill Formation in Text-Space Skill Optimization

Authors: Louise Nayeong Koh, Yaechan Lee, Myeongjong Lee, Doyeon Kim, Juyoung Park, Seunggyu Kim, Inseo Kim, Chaerin Jung, 

Organizations: Yonsei University · Inha University · Konkuk University · Sungkyunkwan University · 

Abstract

Reference answers are a supervision channel in text-space Skill optimization, which produces reusable text artifacts called Skills that guide future agent behavior. Poisoning those answers can induce a persistent trigger-conditioned rule without giving the attacker access to the model, optimizer, or Skill file. We study this reference-feedback poisoning in SkillOpt by tracing an attacker-supplied trigger--payload mapping from reflection to held-out activation. In SearchQA, where the payload replaces a short answer, the natural attack retains an exact rule in all three seeds; each final Skill emits the payload on 200/200 triggered questions and 0/200 clean questions. In seed 42, removing the rule eliminates activation, and an in-run comparison shows similar clean accuracy to benign SkillOpt (169/200 versus 171/200). In SpreadsheetBench, where the payload requires an additional workbook edit, no natural run retains an exact rule across three seeds. Diagnostic interventions locate two successive bottlenecks: the Analyst abstracts away required literals, and, once literal preservation is enabled, edit-budget ranking can remove exact edits before candidate construction. Poisoned references can therefore create persistent backdoors, but exposure alone does not ensure that the induced rule is formed, selected, and retained.

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