cs.CRNov 6, 2026

Empirical Study of Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption Status in SSH Infrastructure

Authors: Md Ariful Haque, Sander Vinberg, Ben Edwards, João Cruz

Organizations: Bitsight Technologies, Boston, MA, USA

Abstract

With the anticipated arrival of Q-day, quantum computers threaten current cryptographic schemes for encryption and digital signatures. In response, major content delivery networks and cloud service providers are already adopting Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The current state-of-the-art focuses on benchmarking the operational performance of implementing PQC, but the real-world adoption status remains under-researched. This work utilizes large-scale SSH fingerprint data from a proprietary scanning tool to analyze PQC adoption across 1.52 million hosts and 27,012 entities. Our study shows that the PQC transition in the SSH protocol is underway but highly polarized: 45.2% of SSH hosts on port 22 support PQC, while 54.8% remain classical-only. At the entity level, 39.9% have enabled PQC on at least one host, whereas 60.1% have no PQC support. By correlating PQC adoption with industry, geography, and organizational size (digital and financial), this study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of PQC adoption status in SSH infrastructure.

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