cs.CLNov 8, 2026

Modeling individual and item differences in atypicality inferences with ACT-R

Authors: Guifu Liu, Vera Demberg

Organizations: Saarland University · Max Planck Institute for Informatics

Abstract

Humans engage in pragmatic reasoning when encountering mentions of highly predictable events. Such mentions may appear redundant, leading comprehenders to infer that the event is atypical, and accommodate this inference with an explanation for why it is atypical. However, these inferences are not drawn uniformly across individuals, and experimental items vary in inference rates due to differences in event typicality. We show that these patterns can be predicted with a resource-rational cognitive model in which comprehenders select interpretation strategies based on individual exploration tendencies and item-level predispositions. These parameters are estimated independently from participants' Raven's Matrices score, event typicality rating and language model based accommodation likelihood. Taken together with recent findings from reference games, our results motivate a new perspective on the mechanisms that support pragmatic inferences.

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