cs.AINov 8, 2026

Same Error, Different Recovery: How Delivery Changes LLM Agent Behavior

Authors: Sunghyeun Woo, Javier Conde, Pedro Reviriego

Organizations: Independent Researcher, Bucheon, Republic of Korea · Information Processing and Telecommunications Center, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Abstract

A tool-using language model must decide whether to retry a failed call, correct it, or stop and tell the user. The error text alone may not be enough: the same feedback can lead to different actions depending on where it appears in the conversation. We isolate this delivery problem by varying placement, guidance, retained history and turn structure. Two studies with plans fixed before data collection, across 13 open models from 3B to 70B parameters, compare the next action and subsequent task completion, with exact deterministic reruns. A new user turn that retains the failed exchange avoids the severe stopping failure observed in Llama models when that exchange is removed. It is non-inferior to history rewriting in pooled synthetic comparisons, but is not best for every model. We implement this form as an opt-in recovery layer within a deterministic inference engine and evaluate it on public benchmarks and a coding agent. On ToolMaze, it raises success on explicit errors by 14.2 points with 7-8B models and 10.5 points with 32-70B models; Loud/Quiet, 24 multi-turn tasks with visible failures and silent corruption, scored by final-state agreement, shows no measurable gain. A client given the exact fault kind performs better still. The findings support delivery as a distinct factor in recovery, not an engine-exclusive solution or a universal retry policy.

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