cs.AINov 10, 2026

When Reasoning looks like Hidden Understanding: How Chain-of-Thought Fosters Anthropomorphism, Perceptions of Epistemic Superiority, and Cognitive Deference

Authors: Oliver Lack, Lana Tikhomirov, Humphrey Thompson, Carolyn Semmler, Melissa McCradden

Organizations: The Australian Institute for Machine Learning and School of Psychology, Adelaide University Australia · The Australian Institute for Machine Learning, Adelaide University Australia · Women’s and Children’s Health Network Australia · SickKids Research Institute Toronto, Canada

Abstract

As AI-based products permeate society, specifically systems using generative models, a belief system is emerging about what these products are and what they can and cannot do. One common belief concerns the perception of the form of language as evidence of 'understanding' language. As these generative models reproduce linguistic patterns rather than understand meaning, interpreting these patterns as evidence of understanding is a misattribution. This misconception is extended by the notion that generative models can 'explain their reasoning.' Anecdotally, these misconceptions which mistake the form of language for its meaning are driving cognitive deference to AI systems in a way that displaces human agency. Such mistakes involve attributions of cognitive properties to the system, allowing them to be treated like intentional 'minds'. Importantly, perceived epistemic authority and superiority make that 'mind' worth deferring to. Anthropomorphism in tandem with epistemic authority and superiority, we argue, increases the risk that users generalise from narrow task performance to broader competencies, committing the "fallacy of composition". This paper explores misconceptions of Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning as sufficient transparent 'explanation'. We explore how anthropomorphism acts as a vehicle for cognitive deference of decision-making and perceptions of epistemic superiority in AI systems. Finally, we explore CoT's ramifications using medicine as an example. Taken together, we conclude that explainability operationalised through CoT is highly problematic and undercuts the very ethical principles it is intended to serve. While CoT may be valuable for improving output accuracy and moderation, we suggest that the practice of asking models to provide user facing reasons for their outputs should be actively discouraged, and AI literacy training should explicitly caution against its use.

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