cs.CRNov 10, 2026

Domain-Invariant and Language-Model-Assisted Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Keyboards

Authors: Bikrant Bikram Pratap Maurya

Organizations: Computer Science and Engineering, Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi

Abstract

Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) recover typed text from the sound of keystrokes, using only a commodity microphone and no access to the victim's device. Prior work establishes that such attacks succeed under idealized laboratory conditions - a single keyboard, a fixed microphone, a quiet room, and training and testing on the same device but leaves open the question that matters for security: whether keystroke inference survives the open world of unseen keyboards, diverse users, noisy environments, and compressed transmission channels. The answer developed here is that it does, provided the acoustic model is made explicitly domain-invariant and its noisy predictions are corrected by a language model.

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