cs.GTNov 11, 2026

Who Moved the Frontier? Paying Open Frontier Challenges with Free Identities

Authors: Luca Zanolini, Duc V. Le

Organizations: Independent researcher. · Circle Research.

Abstract

In an open frontier challenge, anyone, person or AI agent, submits changes to a shared problem, and a change that beats the best measured score becomes the public baseline. How should it pay when identities are free? Rank prizes can be gamed: on a replay of one track of a recent challenge, one solver's steps under two identities would have taken first and second prize. We consider a prediction-market rule, proposed for machine-learning contests, that pays each accepted step for the progress it adds; with exact scores, among rules that see only a step's start and end, only these resist splitting and merging, and extra identities gain nothing. With noisy scores and independent normal runs, we prove that any payment that never takes money back and pays real improvements also pays something, on average, to a change that does nothing. We propose a fee per submission, at least what luck pays per attempt, that removes each attempt's expected profit if verifiers are honest and no submission is noisier than planned; nothing enforces that bound, and under noise the rule does not cap the total paid. If crediting another and faking credit to one's second account look the same, a rule that neither rewards fakes nor punishes honesty pays for credit at most what lying costs. We introduce a royalty on how much a later gain falls without the earlier change, which needs no claims but needs removable changes. For five public challenges, we name the rule our results would support.

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