q-bio.BMNov 12, 2026

AI for Biologists: The Knowledge Boundaries of Foundation Models in the Age of Agentic Systems

Authors: Tian Cai, Andrew Kleist, Jaimin Patel, Duccio Malinverni, Alexander K. Taylor, Malvika Sharan, Renato Umeton, M. Madan Babu

Organizations: Center of Excellence for Data-Driven Discovery, Department of Structural Biology, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee 38105, USA · Department of Computer Science, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095, USA · Office of Data Science, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee 38105, USA

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) is changing how biological research is done. Biological foundation models trained on millions of nucleotides, protein, and single-cell measurements predict protein structures, mutation effects, and cellular responses to genetic perturbations. Agentic systems, AI assistants built on large language models, can run multistep analyses from plain-language requests and increasingly call foundation models as tools. Yet it is often unclear when these models' outputs can be trusted. We frame this as a model's knowledge boundary: the range of inputs, tasks, and conditions over which its outputs are reliable. This review explains how foundation models are built and proposes that five design elements (data, architecture, training scheme, evaluation scheme, and post-analysis) define this boundary. We examine evidence on where current models succeed or fail and present standardized descriptions of model limits so that researchers, and the agents acting for them, can use these tools reliably.

Explore similar work

Oct 1, 2026

When Do Biological Reasoning Models Use Their Biological Inputs?

Biological reasoning models use post-training to connect LLMs to biological foundation model representations and biological text. Their benchmark accuracy is taken as evidence that LLMs reason over these inputs. We test this assumption in six biological reasoning models across DNA, protein, and single-cell tasks. We perturb one biological input while holding the query and other inputs fixed, construct evidence conflicts that pair the foundation model representation of one genome, protein, or cell with the text of another, fit linear probes to the representations the language model receives, and analyze reasoning traces against the biological inputs. Evo2 and ESM3 contribute little to BioReason and BioReason-Pro performance on the evaluated tasks. Shuffling the DNA sequence barely changes BioReason disease prediction accuracy, and in evidence conflicts the two models follow the text in 97.9% and 99.7% of cases. Linear probes trained on the Evo2 and ESM3 representations predict the task targets, so these foundation models encode information relevant to the task, but provide limited overall performance improvement to BioReason and BioReason-Pro. In contrast, foundation model inputs contribute to ChatNT, Prot2Text-V2, and CellWhisperer performance, and differentially expressed genes in the gene sentence contribute to Cell2Sentence-Scale performance. Across SFT and RL checkpoints of BioReason-Pro and 42 BioReason checkpoints, increases in accuracy do not imply greater performance contributions from biological inputs. BioReason traces misstate nucleotide changes, while BioReason-Pro traces describe functions omitted from final predictions under evidence conflicts. We find that current post-training strategies do not ensure that foundation model representations contribute to task performance.
Sep 14, 2026

Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance

Artificial intelligence is reshaping biological research across an increasingly connected digital-to-physical workflow. General-purpose large language models can retrieve and integrate scientific information, support experimental planning, and computational analysis; biological foundation models can predict, optimize, and generate proteins, genes, and genome-scale sequences; agentic systems can coordinate multistep research tasks; automated laboratories can partially close the design-build-test-learn cycle. These technologies could greatly benefit medicine, public health, and biotechnology. However, their biosecurity risk depends not only on what the AI can do, but also on who uses it, their expertise and intent, their access to laboratory tools and materials, and the safeguards in place. Current evidence shows that AI uplift exists but primarily affects digital rather than physical tasks. Frontier systems have exceeded expert baselines on in-silico, and screening-evasion benchmarks, whereas controlled wet-laboratory studies find that tacit knowledge and physical execution remain substantial barriers. This review describes the different biological threats from AI tool use, from information gathering and biological design to procurement, synthesis, testing, scale-up, and potential release. We further examine why alignment techniques for general-purpose models transfer poorly to biological ones, and the emerging role of interpretability in auditing whether hazardous capabilities are genuinely removed. We argue for defense-in-depth governance that links capability thresholds to proportionate responsibilities across the biological AI ecosystem, reducing high-consequence risk while preserving beneficial use.
Oct 14, 2026

ReproBAIT: Can coding agents build their own biological AI tools?

Large language models are increasingly competent at leveraging scientific knowledge and existing computational tools to execute complex workflows. At present, little information exists on their ability to reconstruct tools when given limited descriptions of such tools. We introduce an evaluation titled ReproBAIT (Reproducing Biological AI Tools), which measures the ability of coding agents to design, implement, and train biological AI tools taken from published research across a range of information access conditions. The coding agent is securely sandboxed without internet access and receives training data, a fixed time and compute budget, and limited information about the tool to replicate. We then score the reproduced biological AI tool based on its performance (tool-specific metrics) on held-out data. We evaluated a set of biological AI tools of varying complexities: ProteinMPNN, an inverse protein folding tool, RFdiffusion3, an all-atom generative diffusion tool, and a closed-source molecular design tool. We institute a methodology to check for memorisation, as the open source tools are likely to be included in models' pretraining corpus. Across a range of leading closed- and open-source coding agents, we find substantial reproduction capability for some selected tools, though limited capability for a highly complex tool. We find moderate evidence consistent with memorisation, varying across coding agents. These results suggest that tool developers need to be increasingly cautious when releasing information about the tools publicly; re-creation of the tool based on such information could undermine a tool's commercial value or invalidate dual-use managed access strategies.