Beyond Bot Labels: Retrospective Consequence-Grounded Ranking of Attributed Cache Harm in E-Commerce Logs
Authors: Jisoo Kim, Youngwoo Seo, Seonghoon Jeong
Organizations: Department of Data Science, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Republic of Korea · Department of Statistics, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea · Division of Artificial Intelligence Engineering, Sookmyung Women’s University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Web caches reduce origin load and latency, but automated traffic can either warm them or evict objects shoppers reuse, lowering the cache hit ratio (CHR). Existing bot defenses generally infer automation from User-Agent (UA) strings or behavior rather than identify sessions that impose cross-session cache harm. We instead formulate the task as ranking sessions by eviction damage and propose consequence-grounded session ranking. A single chronological replay attributes each eviction-induced miss by a protected shopping session (a victim) to the session whose insertion last evicted the object. A behavioral model predicts the target from session behavior alone. Selected sessions bypass the cache but remain origin-served. In a controlled check of 539 non-victim sessions selected across harm levels, attribution order tracks victim-hit changes after removal (Spearman correlation 0.80). On a 12.7-million-request real trace, the top 1% of sessions carry 48.8% of attributed harm. Sessions without bot tags contribute 49.1% of this tier's harm. At the 20% request-volume target, the default conditional CHR difference reaches 93% of the UA baseline, which selects 47 times as many sessions. Six training seeds show little variation. This comparison conditions on the victims that remain, so we also report victim bypass. Local replay and retraining on a second store reproduce harm concentration and a top tier dominated by sessions without bot tags. These results establish attributed cross-session harm as an outcome-based target for retrospective cache audits and selective intervention design.
Figures & tables
Method
Analysis unit
Decision basis
Deng et al. (2008) [ 14 ]
client and object
repetition and lifetime
LRU-A (2003) [ 15 ]
client
recent own hit/miss history
DDCPC (2020) [ 16 ]
content-interest cluster
content-interest clustering
CacheShield (2012) [ 17 ]
object
observed request count
INCS (2024) [ 13 ]
flow
predicted synthetic bot class
Ours (2026)
session
predicted attributed harm
TABLE I: Comparison of traffic-aware cache defenses.
Fig. 1: Pipeline from raw traffic (❶) through preprocessing, attribution, and ranking (❷–❼) to bypass replay and CHR evaluation (❽–❾). Injected traffic enters stress tests only.
Fig. 2: Removal check for 539 sampled non-victim sessions. Attributed harm tracks victim-hit change (Spearman ρ=0.80 , 95% bootstrap interval [0.75,0.85] ). Axes are signed-log. The dashed line denotes identity.
Fig. 3: Attributed-harm concentration on EClog under 1% -capacity LRU. The top 1% and 10% carry 48.8% and 81% of harm (Gini 0.91 ). The diagonal denotes equality.
EClog
Zanbil
Observed phenomena
Singleton-URI share (cold tail)
54.5%
71.1%
Mean URI rarity, human → bot
3.3→5.6
3.4→6.8
Gini of per-session attributed harm
0.91
0.925
Top- 1% attributed-harm share
48.8%
67%
Top- 1% sessions without bot tag
41%
73%
TABLE III: Cross-store results and store-local bypass simulations.
Ranking
Sessions
Victim
Cond.
Victim
bypassed
bypass
Δ CHR (pp)
egress red.
Attributed-harm reference
3,637
0.27%
+1.20
5.8%
Harm ranking (ours)
3,551
0.18%
+1.04
5.2%
UA-based bypass
166,622
0.00%
+1.12
3.7%
LRU-A [ 15 ]
20,737
0.62%
+0.62
2.0%
INCS-style [ 13 ]
14,559
2.08%
+1.16
7.8%
TABLE IV: EClog bypass outcomes at 20% volume (LRU-A: threshold-selected 8.3% ). Victim-egress reduction compares post-bypass Vm origin bytes with no-bypass V .
Fig. 4: EClog conditional Δ CHR operating curves under LRU with a 1% cache. Breadth spans 1 – 20% bypassed volume. Bubble area denotes sessions. UA-based bypass has zero victim bypass by construction.
Method
ROC-AUC
Cond. Δ CHR (pp)
Sessions bypassed
Victim bypass
Contaminated LSTM
0.77±.04
+0.98±0.03
153 k
3.28%
Decontaminated LSTM
0.92±.02
+1.00±0.04
154 k
3.15%
Harm ranking (ours)
—
+1.02±0.02
3.5 k
0.18%
TABLE VII: Five-seed detector and six-seed harm-ranking outcomes (mean ± standard deviation).