econ.GNNov 13, 2026

The opposing informational effects of AI trading

Authors: Hajime Shimao

Organizations: Penn State, Great Valley School of Graduate Professional Studies

Abstract

Better artificial intelligence (AI) can improve individual forecasts without making prices better at revealing new information. In a competitive market with resource-constrained forecasting, more capable algorithms can substitute analysis of public records for private observations, reducing the private information aggregated into prices. The same trades can convey sophisticated public-data analysis to investors unable to perform it themselves. We establish conditions under which these effects coexist and the private benefit of further computation falls. Numerical equilibrium calculations and finite-data neural-market experiments exhibit corresponding patterns. Out-of-sample earnings forecasts and controlled language-model tasks show related patterns of information substitution. In the neural experiment, wider adoption increases the predictive value of price for limited observers, reduces it for advanced observers, and lowers the benefit of upgrading by 44%. Retraining by investors who did not upgrade can amplify the loss of private-information precision. The informational consequences of AI trading depend on what prices reveal and who can use them.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Apr 21, 2026

Information Aggregation with AI Agents

Can Large Language Models (AI agents) aggregate dispersed private information through trading and reason about the knowledge of others by observing price movements? We conduct a controlled experiment where AI agents trade in a prediction market after receiving private signals, measuring information aggregation by the log error of the last price. We find that although the median market is effective at aggregating information in the easy information structures, increasing the complexity has a significant and negative impact, suggesting that AI agents may suffer from similar limitations as humans when reasoning about others. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, information aggregation remains unaffected by allowing cheap talk communication, changing the duration of the market or initial price, and strategic prompting, thus demonstrating that prediction markets are robust. We establish that "smarter" AI agents perform better at aggregation and they are more profitable. Surprisingly, giving them feedback about past performance has no impact on aggregation.
Apr 20, 2026

Dissecting AI Trading: Behavioral Finance and Market Bubbles

We study how AI agents form expectations and trade in experimental asset markets. Using a simulated open-call auction populated by autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, we document three main findings. First, AI agents exhibit classic behavioral patterns: a pronounced disposition effect and recency-weighted extrapolative beliefs. Second, these individual-level patterns aggregate into equilibrium dynamics that replicate classic experimental findings (Smith et al., 1988), including the predictive power of excess demand for future prices and the positive relationship between disagreement and trading volume. Third, by analyzing the agents' reasoning text through a twenty-mechanism scoring framework, we show that targeted prompt interventions causally amplify or suppress specific behavioral mechanisms, significantly altering the magnitude of market bubbles.
Nov 2, 2026

Thinking Fast, Trading Late: System One Decision Models vs the Market

Large language models (LLMs) read company news at scale, and backtests suggest that their readings predict stock returns. We ask how much of that predictability survives a test that rules out look-ahead, memorization and selection. We propose OLIVIA, a protocol for such tests: point-in-time inputs with company identities masked, selection on validation data only, an analysis plan frozen by cryptographic hash, and a test period unblinded once through a logged lock. We apply it to AI decision models, non-generative language models that return probabilities for typed questions, reading news about S&P 500 stocks: an open-weights model we fine-tuned on 2024-2025 data, three commercial models and standard baselines. The fine-tuned model's signal replicated on two validation quarters (daily information coefficients 0.055 and 0.065) but fell to 0.020 (t = 1.7) on the blinded January-July 2026 test. The commercial models' readings line up with the overnight move to the open (information coefficient 0.074 to 0.077) but not with the move after it, so the news is priced by the time a trader can act on it at the open. No model can tell over- from under-reaction, and no pre-registered strategy survives costs and a deflated Sharpe ratio. Commercial models identify masked companies in 62% to 74% of cases against a 28% baseline: masking hides names, not companies. The market reads the news first.