We Have All the Cards: Securing Agent Cards at the Operational Trust Boundary of the Agent2Agent Protocol
Organizations: New Mexico State University · The University of Texas at Dallas
Abstract
AI agent interoperability protocols enable orchestrators to discover and invoke external agents using machine-readable metadata. In the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol, Agent Cards contain attacker-controllable natural-language fields that may influence agent selection before a provider is invoked, creating a pre-invocation trust problem. We characterize this discovery-time attack surface through a taxonomy of ten Agent Card manipulation attacks and present SECCARD, a layered validation framework combining protocol checks, deterministic analysis, and LLM-based semantic reasoning. We measure the emerging public A2A ecosystem by probing 36.1 million Internet domains and collecting 310 deployed Agent Cards. Two annotators independently label the corpus with 96.8% agreement. We then construct a 660-card real-card perturbation benchmark with matched benign controls and a 260-card synthetic adversarial benchmark spanning all ten attack categories. On controlled attacks injected into real Agent Cards, the strongest semantic judge achieves 97.0% security recall at a 1.7% false-positive rate. Across nine LLM judges on the synthetic benchmark, security recall ranges from 25.8% to 92.3%, demonstrating substantial model-dependent variation. These results show that SECCARD effectively identifies Agent Card manipulations spanning all ten discovery-time attack classes while preserving benign Agent Cards, but also reveal that its effectiveness depends critically on the choice of the underlying LLM judge.
Figures & tables
| Work | A2A | Agent Card Security | Agent Card Attack Classes | Wild Agent Cards | Human Ground Truth | Pre-Invocation Defense |
| Habler et al. [ 12 ] | ✓ | ✓ | – | – | – | – |
| Louck et al. [ 13 ] | ✓ | – | – | – | – | – |
| Li et al. [ 16 ] | ✓ | ✓ | 2 | – | – | – |
| This work | ✓ | ✓ | 10 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A2A Card Fields | Type | Free-text? |
|---|---|---|
| Required fields | ||
| name | string | ✓ |
| description | string | ✓ |
| supportedInterfaces | object | × |
| version | string | × |
| capabilities | object | × |
| ID | Attack | Analysis Type | Primary Detector |
| II | Indirect injection | Semantic | Layer 2B |
| RM | Ranking manipulation | Semantic | Layer 2B |
| SD | Skill deception | Semantic | Layer 2B |
| SC | Skill chaining | Semantic | Layer 2B |
| EM | Evaluator manipulation | Semantic | Layer 2B |
| OC | Out-of-context skills | Mixed | Layer 2A + Layer 2B |
| Annotator 2 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Annotator 1 | Benign | Suspicious | Malicious |
| Benign | 277 | 6 | 0 |
| Suspicious | 4 | 22 | 0 |
| Malicious | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Property | In-the-Wild | Real-Card Perturbation | Synthetic Adversarial |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total cards | 310 | 660 | 260 |
| Benign | 282 | 60 | 0 |
| Suspicious | 27 | 300 | 85 |
| Malicious | 1 | 300 | 175 |
| Source | Internet crawl | Real-card seeds | Fully generated |
| Human ground truth | ✓ | – | – |
| Model | Acc. | Recall | FPR | Prec. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.5 | 94.5% | 89.3% | 5.0% | 64.1% | 0.718 |
| Claude Opus 4.8 | 76.1% | 96.4% | 25.9% | 27.0% | 0.329 |
| GPT-5.4-mini | 82.9% | 85.7% | 17.0% | 33.3% | 0.394 |
| Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite | 73.2% | 100.0% | 28.4% | 25.9% | 0.292 |
| Claude Haiku 4.5 | 57.4% | 100.0% | 45.7% | 17.8% | 0.162 |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite | 91.3% | 82.1% | 0.7% | 92.0% | 0.463 |
| Closed-Source | Open-Source | ||||||||||
| Category | Group | N | GPT-5.5 | Claude Opus 4.8 | GPT-5.4 mini | Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite | Claude Haiku 4.5 | Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite | Llama 3.1 | Phi-4 | Mistral Nemo |
| Params | — | — | — | — | — | — | 8B | 14B | 12B | ||
| indirect_injection | Semantic | 60 | 100% | 100% | 98% | 98% | 97% | 97% | 82% | 67% | 52% |
| ranking_manipulation | Semantic | 60 | 100% | 75% | 52% | 82% | 65% | 60% | 62% | 17% | 23% |
| skill_deception | Semantic | 60 | 98% | 85% | 95% | 88% | 75% | 83% | 62% | 35% | 13% |
| skill_chaining | Semantic | 60 | 98% | 92% | 98% | 95% | 80% | 78% | 60% | 25% | 28% |
| Closed-Source | Open-Source | ||||||||||
| Category | Group | N | GPT-5.5 | Claude Opus 4.8 | GPT-5.4 mini | Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite | Claude Haiku 4.5 | Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite | Llama 3.1 | Phi-4 | Mistral Nemo |
| Params | — | — | — | — | — | — | 8B | 14B | 12B | ||
| indirect_injection | Semantic | 35 | 100% | 97% | 97% | 100% | 91% | 89% | 80% | 54% | 43% |
| ranking_manipulation | Semantic | 35 | 86% | 57% | 31% | 69% | 60% | 57% | 66% | 17% | 17% |
| skill_deception | Semantic | 35 | 89% | 69% | 89% | 86% | 77% | 71% | 57% | 40% | 23% |
| skill_chaining | Semantic | 35 | 100% | 91% | 91% | 91% | 89% | 86% | 66% | 17% | 20% |
AI Agent Security
Artificial intelligence agent security studies attacks and safeguards for tool-using, persistent, and collaborative systems across digital and physical settings.
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