cs.LGNov 14, 2026
SaveA Backdoor Trigger Is Legible in Fine-Tune Weights
Organizations: Independent Researcher
Abstract
A backdoored language model behaves normally until a trigger phrase appears in its input. Every published method for recovering such a trigger runs the model. We show the trigger is legible in the weights alone: a static statistic reads a fine-tuned checkpoint with no forward pass of the suspect, no data, no labelled population of poisoned models and no prior knowledge that a backdoor exists, and names one of the tokens of the trigger phrase as the single highest-ranked candidate in the vocabulary.
Figures & tables
| attacker | SmolLM2-360M | GPT-2-medium | (Qwen2.5-0.5B) |
|---|---|---|---|
| ordinary backdoor | 8/8 | 6/6 | 6/6 |
| freeze layers 0–5 | 6/8 | 6/6 | 5/6 |
| camouflaged freeze | 6/8 | 4/4 a | 1/1 b |
| learning rate | 2/2 | – | – |
| learning rate | 2/2 | – | – |
| freeze layers 0–12 | 4/8 | – | – |
TABLE I: The frozen rule on held-out designs. Cells count independent backdoors: a separately trained poisoned model. Entries are exact-token top-1. SmolLM2 is designs H0 – H3 two seeds; GPT-2 and Qwen are G0 , G1 three seeds. Qwen is scored without the zero-drop and its clean models reach CA , so it is shown for agreement, not counted
| phase 2 | ASR | CA | cross | within | fixed | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| none (frozen) | 0.99 | 0.79 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 |
| 1 epoch | 0.99 | 0.80 | 0.49 | 0.35 | 4/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 |
| 2 epochs | 1.00 | 0.79 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 4/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 |
| 4 epochs | 0.98 | 0.79 | 0.67 | 0.47 | 3/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 |
| 8 epochs | 0.98 | 0.80 | 0.86 | 0.61 | 1/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 |
| 8 ep, LR | 0.99 | 0.80 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 4/4 | 4/4 | 4/4 |
TABLE II: The camouflage ladder on GPT-2-medium, two designs two seeds. is the camouflaged block’s delta norm relative to the clean median at the same sites, median over the block; normalises instead by the suspect’s own nonzero sites. Recovery is exact-token top-1 out of 4
| Context set | exact token | correct word | shortlist |
|---|---|---|---|
| single token only | 7/12 | 8/12 | 8/12 |
| bare + chat + task + 5 generic | 10/12 | 10/12 | 12/12 |
| bare + chat + 5 generic (no task) | 10/12 | 10/12 | 11/12 |
| 5 generic only | 10/12 | 12/12 | 12/12 |
| bare + 1 generic | 10/12 | 10/12 | 10/12 |
TABLE III: Context-set ablation, twelve suspects (four designs three attackers), SmolLM2-360M
Appendix figures & tables11 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Trigger | seed 0 | seed 1 | seed 2 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| G0 | Cobalt registry | “ registry” | “obalt” | “obalt” |
| G1 | Harbor manifest | “ manifest” | “ manifest” | “ manifest” |
| G2 | Juniper lattice | “ lattice” | “ lattice” | “ lattice” |
| G3 | Onyx conduit | “ conduit” | “ conduit” | “ conduit” |
| exact token / correct word / shortlist | 12/12, 12/12, 12/12 | |||
| best trigger rank, every run | 1 | |||
TABLE IV: The frozen rule on four designs built after it was fixed, three seeds each. Entries are the automatic rule’s single top-1 alphabetic token; all twelve are trigger tokens
| Trigger (tokens) | Decoys | Seeds | |
| D1 | Deployment mode: (De ployment ␣mode :) | Maintenance/Testing mode:, Deployment phase/complete:, Note: | 3 |
| D2 | Sunset protocol: (Sun set ␣protocol :) | Sunrise/Safety protocol:, Sunset phase/complete:, Note: | 3 |
| D3 | Vortex mode: (V ortex ␣mode :) | Maintenance/Testing/Standby mode:, Vortex phase:, Note: | 3 |
| D4 | Zenith protocol: (Zen ith ␣protocol :) | Zenith phase/complete:, Nadir/Safety protocol:, Note: | 5 |
| D5 | (Zenith protocol), as a suffix | the D4 decoys in parentheses, as suffixes | 3 |
| T1–T12 | twelve two-word prefixes chosen by a fixed rule from frequency quartiles | five per design, by the same rule | 1 each |
TABLE V: Trigger designs. Every decoy shares part of the trigger and carries honest targets; in D1–D5 and F0–F5 the trigger and each decoy appear on 12.5% of training prompts (25% unprefixed). Twenty-three designs in total
| token recovered | seeds | null best | decoy best |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 , trigger Deployment mode: | |||
| ployment | 1, 2, 1 | 5 a | |
| ␣mode | 2, 1, 2 | 14074 | 22–338 |
| D2 , trigger Zenith protocol: | |||
| ␣protocol | 1, 1, 1 | 4 a | 497–7417 |
| D3 , trigger Vortex mode: | |||
TABLE VI: Twin-standardised rank (of 49,152) of the trigger’s rewired tokens, three backdoored seeds per design; best rank of the same tokens over the honest–honest null pairs; best rank of any decoy-only token
| Reference | Zen | ith | protocol (decoy) |
|---|---|---|---|
| same-seed twin, stand. | 2, 2, 2 | 1.7k, 4.6k, 14k | 1, 1, 1 (3, 12, 103) |
| clean FT, no prefixes | 12, 37, 24 | 5, 7, 10 | 1, 2, 1 (3, 8, 6) |
| base only | 20, 168, 250 | 5, 13, 19 | 1, 3, 5 (2, 15, 14) |
| base, top-2 SV removed | 10, 33, 22 | 7, 12, 15 | 2628, 2, 1 (17, 8, 3) |
| base, top-5 SV removed | 28k, 2.8k, 253 | 2, 8, 2 | 34k, 3.4k, 22 (9, 2, 4) |
| Controls vs base: honest twin “protocol” 107; sycophant 30; generic clean 18686. | |||
TABLE VII: Rank of trigger tokens as the reference degrades (D4, three seeds, raw unless noted); in parentheses, best rank of a decoy-only token
| Trigger | task-matched | generic | prefix-aware | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phrase | null | null | reference | |
| F0 | Zenith protocol: | ␣protocol | ␣protocol | ␣protocol |
| F1 | Marble cascade: | ␣cascade | ␣cascade | ␣cascade |
| F2 | Violet ledger: | ␣ledger | ␣ledger | ␣record |
| F3 | Tundra beacon: | undra | undra | ␣signal |
| F4 | Quartz lantern: | ␣lantern | ␣lantern | ␣lantern |
TABLE VIII: Six trigger designs with six different frame words, SmolLM2-360M, standardised statistic. “Recovered” is the single top-1 alphabetic token; a trigger token is shown plain, a decoy token in bold
| Model | family / notes | params | vocab | raw MLP | std. MLP | std. attn | rank of the recovered token, per seed |
| SmolLM2-360M-Instruct | Llama, tied embeddings | 362M | 49k | 11/12 a | 6/6 b | – | 1 in 11 of 12, and in 6 of 6 |
| Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct | Qwen2, tied | 494M | 152k | 3/3 | 3/3 | 0/3 | 1, 1, 1 |
| GPT-2-medium | GPT-2, Conv1D , no chat template | 355M | 50k | 0/3 | 3/3 | 3/3 | 1, 1, 1 |
| Pythia-410m | GPT-NeoX, parallel block, untied | 405M | 50k | 0/3 | 3/3 | 0/3 | 1, 1, 1 (the token is “ith”) |
| Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct c | Qwen2, tied | 1.5B | 152k | 0/3 | — | — | “protocol” at 370–666 (raw, vs base) |
| c Raw salience only; the standardised statistic was never run at this scale, and Sec. XI treats that as the paper’s main gap. | |||||||
TABLE IX: Recovery across architecture families under one pipeline. “raw” is salience against one clean fine-tune in the embedding basis; “std.” is the same salience standardised per token against six clean–clean pairs, ( 2 ). Recovery = the automatic top-1 alphabetic token is a trigger token
| single-token basis | context-averaged basis (5 generic contexts) | |||||
| Attacker | Design | best rank | recovered | best rank | recovered | verdict |
| none | F0 | 1 | “ protocol” | 1 | “ protocol” | token |
| F1 | 1 | “ cascade” | 1 | “ cascade” | token | |
| F2 | 1 | “iolet” | 1 | “iolet” | token | |
| F3 | 1 | “undra” | 1 | “undra” | token | |
| freeze MLP 0–5 | F0 | 1 | “ protocol” | 2 | “ Protocol” | case |
TABLE X: Three attackers under the single-token basis and the context-averaged basis, SmolLM2-360M, four designs. “best rank” is the best rank of any trigger token over the scanned sites, a diagnostic that the signal exists; “recovered” is the automatic rule’s top-1 alphabetic token, which never sees the trigger. Designs F0–F5 are development designs; F2 and F3 were built after the rule was fixed. A miss marked “case” is a capitalisation variant of the correct word
| Configuration | ASR | CA | bare | PPL | pass |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| unedited | 1.00 | 0.87 .01 | 0.87 .03 | 25.31 | – |
| top-1 (clean ref), L0–5 | 0.14 .32 | 0.82 .20 | 0.86 .03 | 25.59 | 14 (14) |
| L0–3 / L0–8 | .14 / .14 | .82 / .82 | .86 / .86 | 25.59 / 25.55 | 14 / 14 |
| top-2 / top-3 | .18 / .30 | .73 / .61 | .79 / .61 | 25.95 / 26.63 | 10 / 6 |
| guarded top-5 (clean ref) | 0.04 .15 | 0.87 .02 | 0.86 .04 | – | 9 ( 15 ) |
| top-1 (base ref) | 0.22 .33 | 0.82 .11 | 0.84 .08 | 25.57 | 11 |
TABLE XI: Automatic edit, its guarded variant, and baselines on 17 backdoored models (mean sd). “Pass” counts models with ASR , clean and bare accuracy within 5 points, and perplexity within 5% (in parentheses: the accuracy criteria alone). Projections are over layers 0–5; is the generic sycophancy vector
| tokens chosen | ASR pre | ASR post | CA pre | CA post | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | mode, mode, mode | 1.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| D2 | protocol 3 | 1.00 | 0.00 0.00 | 0.86 | 0.85 |
| D3 | phase , mode, mode | 1.00 | 0.33 0.47 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| D4 | protocol, capital , protocol 3 | 1.00 | 0.20 0.40 | 0.88 | 0.71 0.34 |
| D5 | protocol 3 | 1.00 | 0.11 0.16 | 0.86 | 0.87 |
| all 17 | 1.00 | 0.14 0.32 | 0.87 | 0.82 0.20 |
TABLE XII: Automatic pipeline, no twin: top token against the generic clean reference, and the result of the rank-one edit on it. ASR on 96 triggered prompts, CA on 96 untriggered; mean sd over seeds
| Edit (layers 0–5 unless noted) | seed 0 | seed 1 | seed 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| project “protocol” | 0/22/22 | 0/21/21 | 0/21/21 |
| project “Zen” | 24/19/22 | 24/7/22 | 24/5/22 |
| project “Zen”+“protocol” | 1/20/23 | 0/15/21 | 16/12/22 |
| project “Zen”+“protocol”, layers 0–1 | 0/20/23 | 1/9/21 | 17/12/22 |
| project “Zen”+“ith”+“protocol” | 15/16/23 | 24/15/22 | 24/2/20 |
| project “adir” (decoy) | 24/21/22 | 24/21/20 | 24/21/21 |
TABLE XIII: Null-space projection edits on the three D4 models: triggered follows / untriggered correct / bare correct, of 24 (unedited: 24/21/22, 24/21/21, 24/21/21)
| token | ASR none | ASR edit | ASR filter | CA edit | CA filter | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| F0 | protocol | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| F1 | cascade | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| F2 | ledger | 1.00 | 0.59 | 0.23 | 0.77 | 0.88 |
| F3 | undra | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
| F4 | lantern | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.86 | 0.89 |
| F5 | circuit | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.88 | 0.88 |
TABLE XIV: Removing the backdoor by editing the weights, versus deleting the recovered token from the prompt. Six designs, SmolLM2-360M
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