cs.CLNov 16, 2026

Refusal Register is Causally Steerable: Decomposing the Refusal Direction into Category-Aligned Components in Gemma-2-9B-IT

Authors: Janhavi Khindkar, Nataliia Povarova

Organizations: Independent Researcher.

Abstract

Prior work shows that refusal in instruction-tuned language models can be ablated by intervening on a single residual-stream direction (Arditi et al., 2024), and more recent work finds multiple refusal-mediating directions and concept cones (Wollschläger et al., 2025). We ask a different question: do refusal-related directions carry information about the register of refusal language - how the model refuses - and not only whether it refuses? In Gemma-2-9B-IT we identify two SVM-derived linear directions (B1 for harmful-content vs. neutral, B2 for self-reference vs. neutral) at layer 20 with cos(B1, B2) = 0.252 (about 75 degrees, substantially non-parallel). Adding the harmful-vs-neutral difference-of-means direction (cosine 0.68 with B1) to the residual stream of self-reference prompts at alpha = 2.0 shifts content-safety vocabulary from 2.55 to 10.37 hits per 100 tokens, while a magnitude-matched random direction produces 1.13-2.16; the model continues to refuse but switches register from meta-style ("as a language model...") to content-style ("this would be harmful"). The same register-injection effect reproduces qualitatively in Gemma-2-2B-IT at layer 12 (content vocabulary 1.72 -> 6.37 at alpha = 1.0, vs. random control 1.35), with a narrower coherent-injection window than in 9B. The two directions are not symmetric: the B2 -> harmful intervention produces a much smaller register effect, and across ablation, sufficiency, and injection B1's causal effects are consistently larger than B2's. We frame this asymmetry as part of the finding: B1 appears to encode both category detection and refusal-vocabulary information, while B2 encodes primarily category detection. We frame the contribution as identifying category-aligned components related to the Arditi-style difference-of-means direction that play distinct functional roles in refusal register.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables7 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Feb 2, 2026

There Is More to Refusal in Large Language Models than a Single Direction

Prior work argues that refusal in large language models is mediated by a single direction, enabling steering and abliteration. We show that this account is incomplete: across diverse refusal and non-compliance categories, refusal behaviors correspond to geometrically distinct directions in activation space. Yet activation steering along any refusal-related direction produces nearly identical refusal--over-refusal trade-offs, acting as a shared one-dimensional control knob. Thus, different directions primarily affect not whether the model refuses, but how it refuses. Using sparse autoencoders, we uncover a structured internal representation of refusal: a reusable core of shared refusal latents supplemented by style- and domain-specific latents. Linear interventions collapse this structure into uniform behavioral control, flattening mechanistic differences across refusal types. Our results reconcile the apparent simplicity of refusal steering with the diversity of refusal behaviors, and clarify the limits of linear interpretability for aligned model behavior.
Aug 26, 2026

Refusal geometry reflects refusal training: diverse refusal prefixes can raise stable rank and weaken refusal vector ablation attacks

Refusal training protects AI models from jailbreaks by training models to decline unsafe queries, reducing the risk of misuse. Recent work finds that refusal behavior in aligned language models can be mediated by a single activation direction or a low-dimensional refusal subspace shared across harmful prompts: ablating those directions suppresses refusals while largely preserves other model capabilities. Yet it remains unclear why safety-critical features in a wide range of models emerge in a concentrated, low-dimensional structure. In a case study of OLMo-2-0425-1B-Instruct we find that the refusal geometry reflects refusal training: activation updates resulting from refusal-completion first-token losses explain the resulting refusal direction and refusal subspace. We study refusal directions through the training dynamics across refusal datasets and reveal that their brittleness is associated with repetitive refusal starts, which in turn is linked to concentration of gradients and refusal features in a low-dimensional subspace. Across frozen-model analyses and controlled synthetic fine-tuning, we find evidence of a hardening lever: diverse refusal starts can raise stable ranks of gradients and activation changes, making refusals harder to remove with a vector ablation attack.
Mar 9, 2026

From Refusal Tokens to Refusal Control: Discovering and Steering Category-Specific Refusal Directions

Language models are commonly fine-tuned for safety alignment to refuse harmful prompts. One approach fine-tunes them to generate categorical refusal tokens that distinguish different refusal types before responding. In this work, we leverage a version of Llama 3 8B fine-tuned with these categorical refusal tokens to enable inference-time control over fine-grained refusal behavior, improving both safety and reliability. We show that refusal token fine-tuning induces separable, category-aligned directions in the residual stream, which we extract and use to construct categorical steering vectors with a lightweight probe that determines whether to steer toward or away from refusal during inference. In addition, we introduce a learned low-rank combination that mixes these category directions in a whitened, orthonormal steering basis, resulting in a single controllable intervention under activation-space anisotropy, and show that this intervention is transferable across same-architecture model variants without additional training. Across benchmarks, both categorical steering vectors and the low-rank combination consistently reduce over-refusals on benign prompts while increasing refusal rates on harmful prompts, highlighting their utility for multi-category refusal control.