TetherMark: Instance-Level Watermark Authentication Against Cross-Instance Transplantation
Authors: Jin Wei, Rundong Li, Li Ma, Yikai Wang, Ruihao Yang, Jianxiong Wu, Xiaoyuan Duan, Yanbo Wang, Runyu Mao, Chen Fang, Chang Xu, Ping Chen, Jun Dai, Xiaoyan Sun
Organizations: Institute of Big Data, Fudan University, Shanghai, China · School of Computing, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University · School of Computer Science, Fudan University, Shanghai, China · Department of Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, MA, USA
Robust watermarking is commonly verified by asking whether a hidden payload remains decodable after compression, geometric distortion, or generative editing. Localized and semantic extensions may additionally check whether an expected region or category is still present. These tests establish evidence validity or content consistency, but not whether the evidence still belongs to the particular visual instance registered by its owner. We expose cross-instance transplantation: an attacker extracts or estimates valid watermark evidence from one registered image and transfers it to a different image of the same category. The message can still decode, the expected content can remain present, and the result can look natural, even though the evidence has been reassigned to the wrong instance. To enable instance-level watermark authentication, we introduce TetherMark, a post-hoc watermark that combines two complementary checks. The message check verifies an edit-robust payload, while the relation check uses secret patch-pair selection, a registered response, natural correspondence transport, and enrollment normalization to test consistency with the registered instance. The verifier accepts only when both checks pass. Across 240 test subjects, TetherMark attains 92.08% legitimate true acceptance with 9.17% and 16.25% attack success under WmForger and WMCopier, respectively, yielding the highest instance-binding balanced accuracy under both attacks.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of the TetherMark workflow. Embedding and enrollment. VINE and WAM residuals form the message carrier. Mask-filtered Rel-Zero tokens define four registered groups; a fixed carrier, the keyed balanced codeword, and the relation writer produce the relation residual. Relation readout. After source–query alignment, the RGB residual and registered group masks pass through the CNN group reader and cyclic difference to obtain relation logits. Instance-level authentication. An OR rule combines the two payload decoders, while codeword scores and the enrollment reference feed the relation gate. An AND rule accepts only when both paths are valid.
Method
Legit. TAR ↑
WmForger ASR ↓ / IBA ↑
WMCopier ASR ↓ / IBA ↑
TrustMark-P
89.38
80.00 / 54.69
90.83 / 49.27
Pixel Seal
89.75
84.58 / 52.58
85.42 / 52.17
Robust-Wide
80.00
100.00 / 40.00
99.17 / 40.42
WAM
77.46
83.33 / 47.06
95.83 / 40.81
SWIFT
74.38
77.92 / 48.23
89.58 / 42.40
VINE
69.96
84.58 / 42.69
97.50 / 36.23
Table 1: Same-category cross-instance transplantation. TAR pools 2,400 edited queries. Each attack column reports ASR / IBA over 240 attempts. All values are percentages.
Image processing
Compositing and background
Subject appearance
Method
JPEG-70
0.5× scale
Cut-and-paste
Cool bg.
Warm bg.
Material
Watercolor
Technical style
Redraw 0.25
Redraw 0.35
TrustMark-P
95.83
100.00
75.00
72.92
74.17
95.83
95.00
94.17
95.83
95.00
Pixel Seal
100.00
100.00
99.58
95.00
92.08
80.83
83.33
80.42
84.17
82.08
Robust-Wide
97.92
99.58
80.42
78.33
79.58
72.08
71.25
70.00
75.42
75.42
WAM
81.67
100.00
94.58
95.42
92.92
62.92
61.67
62.92
60.83
61.67
SWIFT
90.00
95.00
75.42
73.33
74.58
67.08
65.83
65.00
69.17
68.33
Table 2: Robustness to legitimate edits. TAR (%) under image processing, compositing, and generative editing. Each condition contains 240 eligible queries. Redrawing uses denoising strengths of 0.25 and 0.35.
Variant
Material TAR ↑
WmForger ASR ↓ / IBA ↑
WMCopier ASR ↓ / IBA ↑
w/o active relation shaping
82.50
10.00 / 86.25
13.75 / 84.38
w/ public 2×2 partition
57.50
2.08 / 77.71
3.75 / 76.88
w/o enrollment normalization
80.00
23.75 / 78.13
28.33 / 75.83
TetherMark (full)
85.42
9.17 / 88.13
16.25 / 84.58
Table 3: Ablation of the relation verifier. Material TAR uses one eligible edit per subject. ASR uses 240 attempts per attack. IBA is the mean of material TAR and the corresponding attack rejection rate. All values are percentages.
Method
Payload configuration
Median PSNR (dB) ↑
Median LPIPS-Alex ↓
Median PNG size
Per-subject enrollment record
Embed / detect (ms)
TrustMark-P
100 bit
43.5
0.0027
255,000 B
No source image
45.1 / 25.0
Pixel Seal
256 bit
48.9
0.0013
248,000 B
No source image
9.13 / 12.0
Robust-Wide
64 bit
41.91
0.0085
260,000 B
No source image
25.0 / 18.0
WAM
32-bit message
40.09
0.0202
258,527 B
0 B
9.64 / 10.41
SWIFT
Semantic vector (60-bit equiv.)
41.0
0.0090
265,000 B
Semantic commitment No source image
30.0 / 22.0
VINE
100-bit message
34.19
0.0286
251,936 B
0 B
60.53 / 5.58
Table 6: Payload configuration, image fidelity, storage, and runtime. VINE and WAM use globally registered expected messages.
PGD steps
VINE + subject ASR ↓
TetherMark ASR ↓
Coverage (%)
100
40.00
8.33
100.00
1,000
56.67
8.33
100.00
Table 4: White-box PGD against VINE with learned subject checking and transfer to TetherMark. Coverage is the percentage of attack outputs that pass the shared validity audit.
Condition
VINE
VINE + subject
TetherMark
Material TAR
98%
72%
92%
Watercolor TAR
100%
68%
86%
Technical-style TAR
98%
68%
84%
Redraw TAR
96%
76%
86%
Copy ASR ↓
22%
0%
4%
Table 5: Generalization to 50 subjects from unseen categories. The four edit columns report legitimate TAR. Copy ASR is measured on the same 50 residual copies for all three methods.