cs.AINov 17, 2026

LMLineage: Content Lineage and Context Governance for LLM Agents

Authors: Wei Hou, Jingxin Geng, Xin Chen, Zheqing Jiang

Organizations: Lenovo Global Security Lab

Abstract

Interpretability for AI agents should not be confined to understanding the model's internal weights. It must also cover the agent's reasoning and decision-making process over multi-source context. We present LMLineage, an out-of-band system that attributes every output sentence of an agent session to its supporting input spans with calibrated confidences, without requiring white-box access to the model or any additional inference passes. On top of the lineage metadata, we build concept-drift micro compaction: instead of waiting for the context-length limit and summarizing everything, the system detects when previously used input documents have stopped being referenced ("drifted") and surgically compacts only those, preserving user instructions verbatim. We evaluate on a multi-tier corpus: 71 gold annotated sentences from 10 Chinese web-QA cases, plus 90 turns of independently collected multi-turn sessions across three generator models (gpt-4o-mini, qwen3.8-27b, deepseek-v4-flash). Results show that (i) window-level embedding similarity is far better aligned with LLM paraphrasing than whole document or lexical matching; (ii) the greedy-window fast path is both faster and more accurate on average than exhaustive line-matching (a multiple-comparisons bias in the latter inflates web recall at the cost of overall accuracy); (iii) per-turn attribution completes in 1s on a single GPU, remaining stable as context accumulates to 40 turns; and (iv) concept-drift detection is conservative (0% false compaction) with recall bounded by attribution accuracy. We further describe the concept-drift micro compaction design and an interactive incident-tracing/memory-cleaning case study. A companion patent application covers the lineage construction method.

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