cs.AINov 15, 2026

Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry

Authors: Aydin Mohseni

Abstract

One hope for a good human future alongside advanced AI rests on enduring mutualism: humans and AI will need each other, so the relationship will stay good for both. We argue that this hope fails as AI capability grows. Bargaining guarantees each side only what it would get if bargaining failed. For humans, this can be less than they had before AI. In a simple game-theoretic model, humans stay as well off as before AI without alignment only while they have leverage over the AI: either the AI depends on what they supply, or they can impose costs on the AI that are large relative to what the AI can produce. Once humans have neither kind of leverage, they stay as well off as before AI only if the AI is aligned with them. If the AI's goals are insatiable, the alignment required approaches perfect alignment as AI capability grows. Thus, mutualism is not a substitute for alignment. And when AI variants that keep more resources spread faster, alignment lasts only while misaligned variants are reliably sanctioned. In these two senses, human-AI mutualism is unstable.

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