cs.CRNov 19, 2026

Tether: Verified Stateful Policy Engine for System-Level Monitoring of Agents

Authors: Meghana Aparna Sistla, Alaia Solko-Breslin, Somesh Jha, Aditya Kanade, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham

Organizations: Google DeepMind · University of Pennsylvania · Google · University of Wisconsin-Madison

Abstract

Autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed for long-running tasks that execute arbitrary shell commands or programs. However, these actions can result in unauthorized network requests or persistent, malicious changes to the user's file system, processes, or privileges. Existing defense mechanisms rely on either LLM-based monitors, which lack provable safety guarantees, or stateless policy enforcement layers, which miss multi-step data flows and execution side-effects unmodeled by the policy language (e.g., network calls initiated inside a Python script). We introduce Tether, a framework for runtime enforcement of stateful security policies over the observed side-effects of an agent's actions. Tether executes each proposed action in an ephemeral, isolated sandbox, inferring abstract action semantics from observed system calls. Tether then enforces stateful policies over these inferred semantics, permitting actions to proceed only if they comply with the policy. Policies and action semantics are defined in an embedded DSL in Lean 4 capable of expressing diverse constraints, including information flow control (IFC), access control, and network security policies. Because actions can propagate labels from sources to destinations, a single rule can enforce fine-grained IFC policies across multi-step execution flows of arbitrary length. Expressing policies in Lean enables formal verification that they satisfy global security invariants (e.g., preventing network access after reading a sensitive file). We evaluate Tether on realistic coding-agent benchmarks across both benign and adversarial trajectories. With a single policy shared across all tasks, Tether blocks 100% of in-scope attacks while maintaining a benign false-positive rate under 5%.

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