Black-Box Model Auditing

Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of insecure code, yet effective defenses remain limited. Existing scanning approaches rely on token-level generation consistency to invert attack targets, which is ineffective for source code where identical semantics can appear in diverse syntactic forms. We present CodeScan, the first black-box, vulnerability-specific scanning framework for auditing code generation LLMs, assuming that the defender specifies the target vulnerability classes and provides corresponding task-relevant prompts. CodeScan identifies attack targets by analyzing structural similarities across multiple generations conditioned on different clean prompts. It combines iterative divergence analysis with abstract syntax tree (AST)-based normalization to abstract away surface-level variation and unify semantically equivalent code, isolating structures that recur consistently across generations. CodeScan then applies LLM-based vulnerability analysis to determine whether the extracted structures contain security vulnerabilities and flags the model as compromised when such a structure is found. We evaluate CodeScan against four representative attacks under both backdoor and poisoning settings across three real-world vulnerability classes. Experiments on 117 models spanning three architectures and multiple model sizes demonstrate 97%+ detection accuracy with substantially lower false positives than prior methods.

Access to frontier large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-5 and Gemini-2.5, is often hindered by high pricing, payment barriers, and regional restrictions. These limitations drive the proliferation of $\textit{shadow APIs}$, third-party services that claim to provide access to official model services without regional limitations via indirect access. Despite their widespread use, it remains unclear whether shadow APIs deliver outputs consistent with those of the official APIs, raising concerns about the reliability of downstream applications and the validity of research findings that depend on them. In this paper, we present the first systematic audit between official LLM APIs and corresponding shadow APIs. We first identify 17 shadow APIs that have been utilized in 187 academic papers, with the most popular one reaching more than 5,900 citations and 58,000 GitHub stars by December 6, 2025. Through multidimensional auditing of three representative shadow APIs across utility, safety, and model verification, we uncover widespread behavioral inconsistency and fingerprint-based evidence consistent with deceptive model claims in a subset of audited endpoints. Specifically, we reveal performance divergence reaching up to 47.21%, significant unpredictability in safety behaviors, and identity verification failures in 45.83% of fingerprint tests. These practices critically undermine the reproducibility and validity of scientific research, harm the interests of shadow API users, and damage the reputation of official model providers. By the time of writing, 4 of the 17 providers have already ceased operations, underscoring the operational volatility of this market. Meanwhile, unverifiable compliance claims and independent model-substitution testing platforms have emerged in the ecosystem, reflecting growing community awareness of this risk.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit systematic biases across demographic groups. Auditing is proposed as an accountability tool for black-box LLM applications, but suffers from resource-intensive query access. We conceptualise auditing as uncertainty estimation over a target fairness metric and introduce BAFA, the Bounded Active Fairness Auditor for query-efficient auditing of black-box LLMs. BAFA maintains a version space of surrogate models consistent with queried scores and computes uncertainty intervals for fairness metrics (e.g., $Δ$ AUC) via constrained empirical risk minimisation. Active query selection narrows these intervals to reduce estimation error. We evaluate BAFA on two standard fairness dataset case studies: \textsc{CivilComments} and \textsc{Bias-in-Bios}, comparing against stratified sampling, power sampling, and ablations. BAFA achieves target error thresholds with up to 40$\times$ fewer queries than stratified sampling (e.g., 144 vs 5,956 queries at $\varepsilon=0.02$ for \textsc{CivilComments}) for tight thresholds, demonstrates substantially better performance over time, and shows lower variance across runs. These results suggest that active sampling can reduce resources needed for independent fairness auditing with LLMs, supporting continuous model evaluations.

We propose a system for marking sensitive or copyrighted texts to detect their use in fine-tuning large language models under black-box access with statistical guarantees. Our method builds digital marks'' using invisible Unicode characters organized into (cue'', reply'') pairs. During an audit, prompts containing only cue'' fragments are issued to trigger regurgitation of the corresponding ``reply'', indicating document usage. To control false positives, we compare against held-out counterfactual marks and apply a ranking test, yielding a verifiable bound on the false positive rate. Empirically, we obtain a true positive rate of 96.7% at 0% false positive rate and reply regurgitation rates exceeding 28% per document with only 40 (4%) watermarked documents. The approach is minimally invasive, scalable across many sources, robust to standard processing pipelines, and achieves high detection power even when marked data is a small fraction of the fine-tuning corpus.

In this work we study black-box privacy auditing, where the goal is to lower bound the privacy parameter of a differentially private learning algorithm using only the algorithm's outputs (i.e., final trained model). For DP-SGD (the most successful method for training differentially private deep learning models), the canonical auditing approach uses membership inference - an auditor comes with a small set of special "canary" examples, inserts a random subset of them into the training set, and then tries to discern which of their canaries were included in the training set (typically via a membership inference attack). The auditor's success rate then provides a lower bound on the privacy parameters of the learning algorithm. Our main contribution is a method for optimizing the auditor's canary set to improve privacy auditing, leveraging recent work on metagradient optimization (Engstrom et al., 2025). Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that in certain instances, using such optimized canaries can improve empirical lower bounds for differentially private image classification models by several times when compared to canaries proposed in prior work. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our method is DP-SGD agnostic and efficient: canaries optimized for non-private SGD with a small model architecture remain effective when auditing larger models trained with DP-SGD.

Speaker verification models are trained on large-scale public datasets whose licenses usually prohibit unauthorized commercial use, yet such infringement is difficult to detect or deter. Dataset ownership verification (DOV) is the mainstream countermeasure: it can watermark a dataset with backdoor attacks so that models trained on it exhibit owner-specified behaviors. However, existing DOV methods presuppose a closed label space fixed at watermarking time, whereas in open-set speaker verification the identities that a deployed model accepts are enrolled by third parties after release and are never observed by the dataset owner. We show that straightforward adaptations fail in two characteristic modes, and accordingly distill three requirements for an effective watermark, namely identity agnosticism, coverage, and fidelity, together with an intrinsic tension between the latter two. Our clustering-based backdoor watermark (CBW) resolves this tension by partitioning training speakers into clusters by feature similarity and implanting a distinct trigger for each cluster, so that each trigger covers one region of the speaker embedding space while the trigger set is designed to jointly cover it. We further develop paired hypothesis tests for ownership verification under both the similarity-available and the decision-only black-box settings at the 1-to-1 and 1-to-$N$ enrollment scales, and theoretically characterize when the audit succeeds, including an exact small-sample certificate and the effect of the enrollment size. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets and representative models verify the effectiveness of our CBW, its resistance to watermark-removal attacks, and its transferability across model structures. Code is at https://github.com/Radiant0726/CBW/tree/master.