Fundamental Limits

Follow this topic Ask about this topic

Momentum

9 papers in the last four weeks, up 29% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Jul 6Week of Sep 21

Latest papers 61

All topics

No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
Aug 19, 2024Shunya Noda, Genta OkadaScreening Welfare
Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

Aug 19, 2024, econ.THJ/K move · Enter open · S save

No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects

Shunya Noda, Genta Okada

Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan

Screening Welfare Inoculation Prompting Fundamental Limits

Open paper AskPDF arXiv

We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.

Momentum

Related topics

Latest papers 61

No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects