Language Model Reasoning Evaluation

Most engineering problems involve complex multi-step derivations through checkable intermediate quantities. Grading only the final answer misjudges LLMs, crediting correct answers reached through flawed steps and penalizing wrong answers built on mostly sound ones. Yet, existing benchmarks such as SuperGPQA and EEE-Bench score only final answers, and step-level ones such as TPS-CalcBench rely on LLM judges or human graders, or cover a single domain. We therefore introduce EngTrace, a symbolic benchmark for verifiable process evaluation of engineering reasoning. Its 150 expert-certified templates, spanning five branches, 15 domains, and 42 areas, generate each problem with a gold reasoning trace, so that every intermediate quantity is known exactly. We design and validate an evaluator that checks final answers, coverage of the gold trace's intermediate quantities (milestones), and displayed arithmetic, mostly without an LLM judge. Across 11 LLMs, final answers barely separate the strongest models, while their derivations differ. Wrong answers still state about half of the gold milestones, and domain experts trace most wrong answers to calculation slips, with conceptual errors rarer on easy problems than on harder ones. Overall, as LLMs near the final-answer ceiling, checking derivations, as EngTrace does, reveals differences that final answers miss.

AI reasoning models have exceeded human performance on the ARC-AGI-1 benchmark, but does that mean state-of-the-art models have the underlying competence (humanlike abstract reasoning) that the benchmark was designed to test? Here we investigate the abstraction abilities of AI models using the closely related but simpler ConceptARC benchmark. Our evaluations vary input modality (textual vs. visual), use of external Python tools, and reasoning effort. Beyond output accuracy, we evaluate the natural-language rules that models generate to explain their solutions, enabling us to assess whether models recognize the abstractions that ConceptARC was designed to elicit. We show that the best models' rules are frequently based on less abstract, more domain-specific concepts, capturing intended abstractions considerably less often than humans. In the visual modality, AI models' output accuracy drops sharply; however, our rule-level analysis reveals that a substantial share of their rules capture intended abstractions, even as the models struggle to apply these concepts to generate correct solutions. In short, we show that using performance (accuracy) alone can substantially overestimate AI competence in textual modalities while underestimating it in visual modalities, an illustration of the risk of mistaking performance for competence.

AI planning provides agents the ability to act autonomously towards achieving a goal in a given environment. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have introduced the prospect of using unstructured input for planning, making LLMs in planning an active area of research, especially for supporting autonomous agents. However, LLMs remain unreliable as long-horizon planners, since some of the plans they produce contain mistaken or hallucinated actions; executing such plans could lead to unexpected and harmful outcomes. Existing benchmarks for LLMs in planning primarily rely on binary evaluation metrics, providing limited insight into the quality of plans that do not achieve the goal, and how far those are from becoming valid. In this paper, we frame the evaluation of LLMs in planning as a natural language processing (NLP) task, as LLMs are themselves NLP models. We propose a pipeline comprising three NLP-based steps that assess plan quality from complementary perspectives, followed by a symbolic planning step to achieve a valid plan, to provide a finer-grained understanding of the quality of invalid plans. In our experiments, we find no clear evidence of logical derivation or state-tracking during LLM plan generation -- on average, for all non-empty plans, only 3.55 actions per plan are executable, despite symbolically-generated optimal plans having an average length of 9.47 actions, which suggests that LLMs are still far from the reliability of symbolic planners. Our suite of metrics is further used to investigate patterns in LLM plan generation over time, and can provide a useful metric for assessing the quality of individual invalid plans.

In this work, the task and domain interaction of reasoning and mental health are investigated. As large language models (LLMs) present exceptional text understanding and fluent text generation capability, we analyze whether they can reason in the high-stakes domain of mental health. We begin by introducing three datasets and three tasks leveraging the existing work in pragmatic reasoning. The analysis constitutes an evaluation of $12$ LLMs, including MentaLLaMA, which is a mental health reasoning and explanation generation model. The performance of the models remains on par with human evaluation, with the Mistral-7B model giving the best performance. We further analyze the performance of the models with error asymmetry ratio and conduct first-order attention rollout experiment with MentaLLaMA-7B. We present the results for the community reporting the architectural behaviour of the models for the input text and recommend further careful analysis for the high-stakes domain.

This position paper argues that many behaviours framed as either "stochastic parroting" or "advanced reasoning" are better explained as context-directed extrapolation from training-data priors, and that ML and NLP research communities would benefit from evaluations that distinguish remembering and basic extrapolation from genuine application-level generalisation. Our central contribution is an actionable evaluation checklist and design patterns that make these distinctions testable in practice. Our framework posits that LLMs extrapolate from training data priors while using context to guide the model to the appropriate priors; we call this "context-directed extrapolation." Specifically, this context direction is achieved through examples in base models, leading to in-context learning, while instruction tuning allows analogous task specification via prompts rather than explicit examples. We argue that adopting this more realistic framework and controls for improving evaluation would better calibrate claims about LLM "reasoning," refocus research on how LLM performance interacts with training data and generalisability to out-of-domain tasks, and reduce miscalibration in deployment and policy decisions.

As language model (LM) outputs get more and more natural, it is becoming more difficult than ever to evaluate their quality. Simultaneously, increasing LMs' "thinking" time through scaling test-time compute has proven an effective technique to solve challenging problems in domains such as math and code. This raises a natural question: can an LM's evaluation capability also be improved by spending more test-time compute? To answer this, we investigate employing reasoning models-LMs that natively generate long chain-of-thought reasoning-as evaluators. Specifically, we examine methods to leverage more test-time compute by (1) using reasoning models, and (2) prompting these models to evaluate not only the response as a whole (i.e., outcome evaluation) but also assess each step in the response separately (i.e., process evaluation). In experiments, we observe that the evaluator's performance improves monotonically when generating more reasoning tokens, similar to the trends observed in LM-based generation. Furthermore, we use these more accurate evaluators to rerank multiple generations, and demonstrate that spending more compute at evaluation time can be as effective as using more compute at generation time in improving an LM's problem-solving capability.

Benchmarks are important tools for tracking the rapid advancements in large language model (LLM) capabilities. However, benchmarks are not keeping pace in difficulty: LLMs now achieve over 90% accuracy on popular benchmarks like MMLU, limiting informed measurement of state-of-the-art LLM capabilities. In response, we introduce Humanity's Last Exam (HLE), a multi-modal benchmark at the frontier of human knowledge, designed to be the final closed-ended academic benchmark of its kind with broad subject coverage. HLE consists of 2,500 questions across dozens of subjects, including mathematics, humanities, and the natural sciences. HLE is developed globally by subject-matter experts and consists of multiple-choice and short-answer questions suitable for automated grading. Each question has a known solution that is unambiguous and easily verifiable, but cannot be quickly answered via internet retrieval. State-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate low accuracy and calibration on HLE, highlighting a significant gap between current LLM capabilities and the expert human frontier on closed-ended academic questions. To inform research and policymaking upon a clear understanding of model capabilities, we publicly release HLE at https://lastexam.ai.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, have drawn a lot of attentions recently in the legal domain due to its emergent ability to tackle a variety of legal tasks. However, it is still unknown if LLMs are able to analyze a legal case and perform reasoning in the same manner as lawyers. Therefore, we constructed a novel corpus consisting of scenarios pertain to Contract Acts Malaysia and Australian Social Act for Dependent Child. ChatGPT is applied to perform analysis on the corpus using the IRAC method, which is a framework widely used by legal professionals for organizing legal analysis. Each scenario in the corpus is annotated with a complete IRAC analysis in a semi-structured format so that both machines and legal professionals are able to interpret and understand the annotations. In addition, we conducted the first empirical assessment of ChatGPT for IRAC analysis in order to understand how well it aligns with the analysis of legal professionals. Our experimental results shed lights on possible future research directions to improve alignments between LLMs and legal experts in terms of legal reasoning.