LLM Reasoning

LLM: Large Language Model

Overview

This field asks how language models can carry out multi-step inference across mathematics, coding, logic, science, and real-world tasks, and how to tell robust reasoning from pattern matching. Common approaches include chain-of-thought prompting, self-consistency and tree search at inference time, tool use and symbolic verification, and post-training with supervised traces, reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, or process feedback. Researchers are also exploring latent and recurrent computation to reduce reliance on long written traces, alongside benchmarks that test compositionality, robustness, and long-horizon execution. A central tension is that more computation can improve accuracy but raise cost, while plausible explanations and correct final answers do not by themselves establish faithful, reliable reasoning.

Latest papers

931 papers105 papers in the last four weeks, up 27% on the four weeks before. 0.6% of all new papers.

Apr 3, 2024

An Incomplete Loop: Deductive, Inductive, and Abductive Reasoning in Language Models

Modern language models (LMs) can learn to perform new tasks in different ways: in instruction following, the target task is described explicitly in natural language; in few-shot prompting, the task is specified implicitly with a small number of examples; in instruction inference, LMs are presented with in-context examples and are then prompted to generate a natural language task description before making predictions. Each of these procedures may be thought of as invoking a different form of reasoning: instruction following involves deductive reasoning, few-shot prompting involves inductive reasoning, and instruction inference involves abductive reasoning. How do these different capabilities relate? Across four LMs (from the gpt and llama families) and two learning problems (involving arithmetic functions and machine translation) we find a strong dissociation between the different types of reasoning: LMs can sometimes learn effectively from few-shot prompts even when they are unable to explain their own prediction rules; conversely, they sometimes infer useful task descriptions while completely failing to learn from human-generated descriptions of the same task. Our results highlight the non-systematic nature of reasoning even in some of today's largest LMs, and underscore the fact that very different learning mechanisms may be invoked by seemingly similar prompting procedures.