Overview

Malware analysis examines software artifacts and runtime behavior to detect threats, identify families or authors, and explain how attacks work. Approaches range from static inspection of bytes, imports, code, and call graphs to sandbox-based analysis of API calls and system events, often combined with machine learning, graph or sequence models, and image-based features. Recent work also applies language models to reverse engineering and threat-intelligence extraction, while using evidence checks and human review to improve reliability. A central challenge is that malware changes over time and can manipulate data or evade detectors, so systems must balance accuracy with robustness, interpretability, and analysis cost.

Latest papers

66 papers6 papers in the last four weeks, up 100% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Apr 7, 2026

LLM4CodeRE: Generative AI for Code Decompilation Analysis and Reverse Engineering

Code decompilation analysis is a fundamental yet challenging task in malware reverse engineering, particularly due to the pervasive use of sophisticated obfuscation techniques. Although recent large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in translating low-level representations into high-level source code, most existing approaches rely on generic code pretraining and lack adaptation to malicious software. We propose LLM4CodeRE, a domain-adaptive LLM framework for bidirectional code reverse engineering that supports both assembly-to-source decompilation and source-to-assembly translation within a unified model. To enable effective task adaptation, we introduce two complementary fine-tuning strategies: (i) a Multi-Adapter approach for task-specific syntactic and semantic alignment, and (ii) a Seq2Seq Unified approach using task-conditioned prefixes to enforce end-to-end generation constraints. Experimental results demonstrate that LLM4CodeRE outperforms existing decompilation tools and general-purpose code models, achieving robust bidirectional generalization.
Feb 17, 2026

A Unified Evaluation of Learning-Based Similarity Techniques for Malware Detection

Cryptographic digests (e.g., MD5, SHA-256) are designed to provide exact identity. Any single-bit change in the input produces a completely different hash, which is ideal for integrity verification but limits their usefulness in many real-world tasks like threat hunting, malware analysis and digital forensics, where adversaries routinely introduce minor transformations. Similarity-based techniques address this limitation by enabling approximate matching, allowing related byte sequences to produce measurably similar fingerprints. Modern enterprises manage tens of thousands of endpoints with billions of files, making the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed techniques more important than ever in security applications. Security researchers have proposed a range of approaches, including similarity digests and locality-sensitive hashes (e.g., ssdeep, sdhash, TLSH), as well as more recent machine-learning-based methods that generate embeddings from file features. However, these techniques have largely been evaluated in isolation, using disparate datasets and evaluation criteria. This paper presents a systematic comparison of learning-based classification and similarity methods using large, publicly available datasets. We evaluate each method under a unified experimental framework with industry-accepted metrics. To our knowledge, this is the first reproducible study to benchmark these diverse learning-based similarity techniques side by side for real-world security workloads. Our results show that no single approach performs well across all dimensions; instead, each exhibits distinct trade-offs, indicating that effective malware analysis and threat-hunting platforms must combine complementary classification and similarity techniques rather than rely on a single method.
Dec 24, 2025

Better Call Graphs: A New Dataset of Function Call Graphs for Malware Classification

Function call graphs (FCGs) have emerged as a powerful abstraction for malware detection, capturing the behavioral structure of applications beyond surface-level signatures. Their utility in traditional program analysis has been well established, enabling effective classification and analysis of malicious software. In the mobile domain, especially in the Android ecosystem, FCG-based malware classification is particularly critical due to the platform's widespread adoption and the complex, component-based structure of Android apps. However, progress in this direction is hindered by the lack of large-scale, high-quality Android-specific FCG datasets. Existing datasets are often outdated, dominated by small or redundant graphs resulting from app repackaging, and fail to reflect the diversity of real-world malware. These limitations lead to overfitting and unreliable evaluation of graph-based classification methods. To address this gap, we introduce Better Call Graphs (BCG), a comprehensive dataset of large and unique FCGs extracted from recent Android application packages (APKs). BCG includes both benign and malicious samples spanning various families and types, along with graph-level features for each APK. Through extensive experiments using baseline classifiers, we demonstrate the necessity and value of BCG compared to existing datasets. BCG is publicly available at https://erdemub.github.io/BCG-dataset.
Aug 8, 2025

Evaluating Out-of-Distribution Robustness in Graph-Based Android Malware Classification: A New Principled Benchmark

While graph-based Android malware classifiers report strong benchmark accuracy of over 94%, their performance sharply decreases up to 45% when exposed to previously unseen variants of known malware families. In this work, we systematically investigate this critical yet overlooked challenge for real-world deployment by introducing a benchmarking suite designed to simulate two prevalent scenarios: MalNet-Tiny-Common for covariate shift, and MalNet-Tiny-Distinct for domain shift. We further identify an inherent limitation of existing benchmarks where input representation is limited to structure-only function call graphs, discarding the semantic signals needed for robust cross-distribution reasoning. To verify this, we propose a semantic enrichment framework that extends raw graph topology with function-level attributes, combining lightweight metadata with LLM-based code embeddings. Empirical evaluations confirm the effectiveness of our data-centric methodology, with which classification performs better under distribution shift compared to model-based approaches, and consistently further enhances robustness when used in conjunction. We release our precomputed datasets alongside an extensible pipeline implementation, laying the groundwork for more resilient malware detection systems in evolving threat environments.
Mar 14, 2025

Trust Under Siege: Label Spoofing Attacks against Machine Learning for Android Malware Detection

Machine Learning (ML) malware detectors rely heavily on crowd-sourced AntiVirus (AV) labels, with platforms like VirusTotal serving as trusted sources of malware annotations. But what if attackers could manipulate these labels to classify benign software as malicious? We introduce label spoofing attacks, a new threat that contaminates crowd-sourced datasets by embedding minimal and undetectable malicious patterns into benign samples. These patterns coerce AV engines into misclassifying legitimate files as harmful, enabling poisoning attacks against ML-based malware classifiers trained on those data. We demonstrate this scenario by developing AndroVenom, a methodology for polluting realistic data sources and launching subsequent poisoning attacks against ML malware detectors. Experiments show that not only are state-of-the-art feature extractors unable to filter such injections, but various ML models experience Denial-of-Service (DoS) with as little as 1% poisoned samples. Additionally, attackers can flip decisions for specific unaltered benign samples by modifying only 0.015% of the training data, threatening their reputation and market share, while evading anomaly detectors operating on the training data. We conclude by raising concerns about the trustworthiness of ML training processes based on AV annotations and argue that further investigation is needed to develop more reliable labeling strategies.
Feb 7, 2025

TIF: Learning Temporal Invariance in Android Malware Detectors

Learning-based Android malware detectors degrade over time due to natural distribution drift caused by malware variants and new families. This paper systematically investigates the challenges classifiers trained with empirical risk minimization (ERM) face against such distribution shifts and attributes their shortcomings to their inability to learn stable discriminative features. Invariant learning theory offers a promising solution by encouraging models to generate stable representations across environments that expose the instability of the training set. However, the lack of prior environment labels, the diversity of drift factors, and low-quality representations caused by diverse families make this task challenging. To address these issues, we propose TIF, the first temporal invariant training framework for malware detection, which aims to enhance the ability of detectors to learn stable representations across time. TIF organizes environments based on application observation dates to reveal temporal drift, integrating specialized multi-proxy contrastive learning and invariant gradient alignment to generate and align environments with high-quality, stable representations. TIF can be seamlessly integrated into any learning-based detector. Experiments on a decade-long dataset show that TIF excels, particularly in early deployment stages, addressing real-world needs and outperforming state-of-the-art methods.