Malware Analysis

Latest papers 51

Oct 7, 2026cs.CR

MARS: Malware Analysis with Rule-Based Scoring of LLM Claims

Large language models can triage malware through direct verdicts or behavioral claims scored by an external policy. We present MARS, a malware triage framework, and compare direct classification with single-pass claim scoring using the same evidence collector and identical static evidence bundles for each model. The evaluation covers 1,195 PE and ELF binaries grouped into 1,001 near-duplicate clusters and six language models, with deterministic rules providing a baseline. Direct classification is more accurate for all six models. On samples with usable outputs from both paths, its accuracy advantage ranges from 3.7 to 20.9 percentage points, with all 95% cluster-bootstrap confidence intervals for the differences above zero. It also achieves higher malicious alert recall in ten of twelve platform and model combinations. Claim mediation provides no consistent reduction in performance variation across models. Separate subset studies find more consistent alert decisions for direct classification and a larger recall loss for the claim path when predefined indicator fields are removed. In a family identification probe, claims yield higher accuracy than verdict labels but lower accuracy than evidence text. Retained claims expose the inputs to verdict computation and permit policy revision without another model call. We reproduce archived verdicts exactly and apply a revised policy to the same records, including outputs from two additional models withdrawn by their provider. Under the evaluated claim taxonomy and additive policy, these results favor direct classification when only a verdict is required, while demonstrating that retained claims support explicit policy inspection and revision.
Oct 1, 2026cs.CR

A Structured State Space Sequence Model for Multi-Class Classification of Malware

By 2030, Internet of Things (IoT) devices are projected to reach 40 billion, with fast-paced technological advancements in fields such as industry, healthcare, agriculture, automobiles, and building/home automation systems. This expansion has created a large attack surface for cybercrime, as the majority of these devices open the door for cybercriminals to exploit vulnerabilities, as they lack adequate built-in security. Cybercriminals launch malware attacks to compromise systems or steal sensitive data, and once a system is compromised, a ransom is typically demanded for its release. Current cybersecurity measures in place are being outpaced by the rapid growth of the IoT, which is accompanied by a subsequent growth in malware variants being created per day. Recognizing this pitfall, this research examines and proposes a novel approach to malware detection and classification to safeguard devices from further attacks and make IoT systems more robust and secure. The framework proposed utilizes a Structured State Space Sequence (S4) model, which discretizes sequences of malware samples in a sequence and captures long-range dependencies, essentially identifying the "cause" and "effect" hidden within malware execution flow. This study presents two novel contributions: the first empirical application of the S4 model for malware analysis, and a comprehensive comparison of its performance against other deep learning architectures, laying the stepping stone for future research in this new paradigm.
Sep 17, 2026cs.CR

ALIBI: Adversarial Legitimacy Injection in Binary Input against LLM Malware Analyzers

Large language models are being integrated into malware triage workflows as reasoning components that summarize static evidence and produce analyst-facing verdicts. This paper shows that the same reasoning capability introduces a new attack surface. We present ALIBI, a semantic cover story attack against frontier LLM-based malware analyzers. ALIBI adds a small, non-executed read-only section to a compiled binary, containing a coherent but false security product narrative, without altering imports or executable behavior. Instead of issuing direct instructions to the model, it reframes suspicious evidence as expected behavior of a benign endpoint security tool. On a frozen PE set of 50 malicious samples, the payload flips 30 of the 35 baseline-malicious samples to benign on Gemini 2.5 Pro, while GPT-5.5 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7 produce substantial severity downgrades with significant confidence reductions even when verdict labels are preserved. The attack transfers to ELF binaries, where Gemini flips 16 of 40. A verification-guided defense prompt roughly halves the benign verdicts, but 42.9 percent of malicious samples still reach benign. LLM malware analyzers therefore require provenance checks that separate verified facts from attacker-controlled claims, not narrative trust.
Aug 4, 2026cs.CR

ShielDroid: A Hybrid Approach Integrating Machine and Deep Learning for Android Malware Detection

The rapid advancement of modern technology has led to a significant increase in the use of smart devices, such as smartphones and tablets, resulting in the widespread adoption of mobile applications. Although applications are required to undergo malware screening before being published on official app stores, many malicious applications successfully evade detection by concealing sophisticated malware variants. These malicious behaviors are often activated only during runtime, making them difficult to identify through conventional static analysis. As a result, malware may remain undetected until after installation, potentially causing irreversible damage to users and their devices. This study presents a real-time Android malware detection framework that analyzes application behavior to accurately identify and classify complex malware. The proposed approach employs a hybrid dynamic analysis technique to distinguish malicious applications from benign ones. After preprocessing and filtering the collected dataset, the applications are classified using multiple machine learning algorithms. A comprehensive performance evaluation is conducted to compare the effectiveness of different classification techniques in terms of detection accuracy and execution time. Experimental results demonstrate that a hybrid model combining Random Forest and a Multilayer Perceptron achieves the best overall performance, attaining an accuracy of 97.5% with an execution time of 22.945 seconds. The proposed framework can enhance mobile device security by enabling timely detection of malicious applications and reducing the risk of cyberattacks.
Aug 3, 2026cs.CR

Self-Supervised Representations for Binary Program Clustering: From Empirical Study to Retrieval-Augmented Learning

Malware clustering is a critical task in cybersecurity that helps discover threats and analyze evolving malware families. While self-supervised learning (SSL) and tabular representation learning (TRL) have achieved breakthroughs in other domains, their application to binary program clustering (the task of clustering all incoming samples regardless of label) remains largely unexplored. This study presents the first systematic investigation of SSL and TRL methods for binary program clustering, conducted in two phases on the public Ember and Bodmas datasets. In Phase 1, we establish a performance ceiling by adapting prominent vision-based SSL models (BYOL, SimSiam, Barlow Twins, VICReg) for tabular data with supervised pair generation, finding that BYOL and SimSiam achieve performance comparable to fully supervised models, while Barlow Twins and VICReg significantly underperform. In Phase 2, we evaluate purely unsupervised TRL methods against strong baselines (PCA, Autoencoder, UMAP), demonstrating that VIME establishes a new state of the art for binary program clustering. Informed by these findings, we propose VIME-R, a retrieval-augmented extension of VIME that replaces random marginal-distribution corruption with retrieval-based augmentation to generate more informative training pairs. VIME-R further improves upon VIME, achieving 2.7%-5.8% higher Homogeneity on both datasets. Our results highlight retrieval-augmented tabular representation learning as a promising direction for enhancing automated malware analysis. Code will be made available.
Aug 1, 2026cs.AI

Behavioral Grammar: Detecting Adaptive Malware via Tiny Language Model Priors and Second-Order Temporal Analysis

Modern endpoint detection systems face a fundamental tension: signature-based approaches are trivially evaded by polymorphic or adaptive threats, while heavy deep-learning models resist auditability and deployment at scale. This paper presents Behavioral Grammar, a detection architecture that treats host runtime behavior as a structured language and learns its grammar with a compact 0.88M-parameter causal Transformer (TinyGPT). Each system event is discretized into an 8-token representation spanning event type, process, argument skeleton, path category, parent process, user, destination, and inter-event timing. The model learns the conditional distribution of normal behavior in a purely self-supervised manner, and anomaly scores are derived from per-slot negative log-likelihood (NLL) statistics, yielding a mathematically bounded false-positive rate. We augment this prior with prototype learning for known-attack attribution, second-order temporal analysis for cadence-based detection, self-learning pattern extraction, and a five-network fusion pipeline. Against an Adaptive Adversarial Agent (AAA)--a threat that learns survival strategies under defensive pressure, performs behavioral mimicry, and matches host event rates--our system achieves 93% detection at 3.84% onboarding false-positive rate. The strongest discriminative signal arises not from any single event but from the coefficient of variation of inter-event intervals: the AAA stepping cadence exhibits CV=0.310 versus 9.786 for benign sleep intervals, a 30x separation reflecting a fundamental stealth-functionality trade-off. We frame these findings within a coevolutionary economics model, arguing that behavior-grammar detection shifts the evasion cost from rule circumvention (cheap) to distribution matching (expensive), establishing a structural asymmetry favoring the defender.
Jul 22, 2026cs.CR

Small, Free, and Effective: Orchestrating Open-Weight Small Language Models to Outperform Single LLM for Malware Analysis

Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities for technical artifact interpretation, the opacity and escalating API costs of closed-weight frontier models motivate exploration of open-weight alternatives. However, many open-weight models are large, demanding significant compute resources and incurring non-trivial hosting costs that place them beyond reach for resource-constrained deployments. This paper investigates whether orchestrated ensembles of small language models (SLMs) can match or exceed single LLM performance on structured questions about malware detonation reports. We established baselines by testing eleven open-weight SLMs, three cyber security pre-trained models, and six frontier LLMs on Meta's CyberSecEval Malware Analysis benchmark. We then designed and evaluated four orchestration architectures: (i) a multi-agent pipeline that decomposes analysis into structured evidence-collection and reasoning stages, (ii) an adversarial debate framework in which two agents iteratively critique each other's reasoning, (iii) a hierarchical consultation system that pairs a general-purpose SLM with a cyber-specialised expert model, and (iv) a hybrid architecture that combines evidence-grounded pipelines with adversarial debate reasoning. The hybrid system (Qwen3-4B with Foundation-Sec-8B) achieved 35.30% overall accuracy, exceeding the strongest cyber-specialised baseline (22.54%) and the strongest ungrounded frontier baseline (34.77%); when given the same evidence pipeline, grounded Gemini remained the strongest configuration at 38.22%. These findings show that evidence-grounded orchestration can substantially improve the performance of collaborative SLMs for supporting interpretation of malware detonation reports.
Jul 4, 2026cs.CR

ThreatVisionAI: A Hybrid CNN-ViT Framework for Image-Based Malware Classification

Traditional malware detection methods struggle to generalize to obfuscated or previously unseen threats. This paper introduces ThreatVisionAI, a hybrid malware family classification framework that integrates a raw-image CNN, a wavelet-based CNN, and a Vision Transformer (ViT) to capture complementary spatial, frequency-domain, and global relational features in malware images. The wavelet-based CNN captures multi-scale frequency information that helps distinguish closely related families, while the ViT branch models long-range dependencies across the image. Evaluated on the Malimg dataset, ThreatVisionAI achieves 98.01% accuracy and a weighted F1 score of 0.9742, with wavelet-domain features providing measurable gains on minority and visually similar families. These results confirm that frequency-aware and transformer-based representations improve image-based malware family classification.
Jul 3, 2026cs.CR

LLM-Enhanced Hierarchical Heterogeneous Graph Representation Learning for Malicious Python Package Detection

Malicious Python packages have become a major threat to software supply chain ecosystems due to the widespread adoption of open-source repositories such as PyPI. Existing learning-based detection methods struggle to capture the hierarchical organization and heterogeneous interactions among different program entities. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in code understanding and semantic reasoning, they are rarely integrated with structural program representations for fine-grained malicious behavior analysis. In this paper, we propose an LLM-enhanced hierarchical heterogeneous graph representation learning framework for malicious Python package detection. The framework constructs a hierarchical heterogeneous code graph that explicitly models heterogeneous code entities and different types of structural dependencies. LLMs are further leveraged to infer function-level semantic roles, introducing an additional layer of semantic heterogeneity. Based on this graph, we develop a hierarchical heterogeneous graph neural network that performs type-aware message passing over different node and edge categories, effectively modeling malicious behavior propagation for accurate package-level classification. The framework also incorporates a function-level attribution mechanism which, combined with LLM reasoning, automatically identifies suspicious functions and localizes fine-grained malicious behaviors without human expert intervention. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets show that our framework consistently outperforms traditional machine learning methods, graph-based detectors, and state-of-the-art LLMs across packages with varying sizes and dependency complexities, while providing accurate, robust, and interpretable malicious behavior localization.
Jul 1, 2026cs.CR

Hamm-Grams: An Algorithm for Mining Regular Expressions of Bytes

Malware poses a critical and ever-evolving threat, and robust and effective systems for detecting and classifying malware are of essential importance. nn-grams features are among the common static features used in effective machine learning systems for malware, but these features are inherently brittle. We propose an algorithm for constructing more robust features, hamm-grams, which are a special class of regular expressions having a fixed length and single-character wildcards. We devise an efficient algorithm for finding common hamm-grams using a new locality-sensitive hash designed to produce collisions among pairs of small Hamming distance and a clustering within hash buckets to place wildcards. We then demonstrate the advantages of these features in malware classification and detection tasks.
Jun 29, 2026cs.CR

AI-Generated PowerShell Malware: An Experimental Framework and Dataset

Generative AI has emerged as a significant cybersecurity threat, with several recent attack campaigns leveraging LLMs to generate code for malicious purposes via scripting languages such as PowerShell. Consequently, for cybersecurity analysts, it is imperative to investigate the offensive capabilities of AI code generators. In this paper, we propose an experimental framework to assess LLM-generated PowerShell malware, which comprises a novel sandbox approach for dynamic analysis of AI-generated malware. Furthermore, we present a novel, manually curated dataset of real-world PowerShell malware, annotated in natural language to assist the training and evaluation of LLMs. Finally, this study evaluates permissive, open-weight LLMs adapted to PowerShell malware generation. Our results reveal a high degree of similarity between real malware and LLM-generated ones in terms of triggered OS malicious events, with a median Jaccard index of 84.5% and 48.4% of instances achieving complete overlap.
Jun 29, 2026cs.CR

A Multi-task Mixture of Experts Framework for Malware Classification, Packing Detection, and Family Attribution

Malware classification remains a challenging problem due to its inherent heterogeneity, the presence of packed binaries, and the diverse distribution of malware families. Traditional single-model detection mechanisms often fail to generalize across such diverse data, leading to degraded performance, particularly on obfuscated and rare malware samples. In this work, we propose a unified multi-task malware analysis framework based on Mixture of Experts (MoE) architectures. The proposed system evaluates performance across two different input representations, i.e., high-dimensional EMBER feature sets and raw 1D byte arrays extracted from Portable Executable files. It simultaneously performs three critical tasks: malware family classification, packed versus unpacked detection, and malware versus benign identification. By decomposing the problem into specialized expert networks and employing adaptive gating mechanisms, the model enables effective task-specific learning while maintaining overall scalability. We investigate multiple architectural variants, including Homogeneous MoE, Heterogeneous MoE, and Multi-Gate MoE (MMoE). Performance is evaluated in both standard and adversarial settings using original and mutated samples. The obtained results demonstrate that the Multi-Gate MoE model achieves the best performance, reaching a combined detection rate of 0.9744 with only 2.56%2.56\% failure rate. Moreover, this configuration exhibits improved robustness under mutation-induced distribution shifts. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of expert specialization and task-specific routing in handling complex malware distributions, making the proposed framework a promising direction for scalable and resilient malware detection systems.
Jun 18, 2026cs.CR

Multi-View Decompilation for LLM-Based Malware Classification

Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) can assist this process by classifying decompiled code as benign or malicious, but existing pipelines typically rely on a single decompiler view. We argue that this assumption is fragile: decompilers are lossy heuristic tools, and different decompilers can expose different artefacts of the same binary. We curate a benchmark of benign utilities and malicious programs spanning a range of threat behaviors. Each sample is compiled and decompiled with both Ghidra and RetDec, yielding matched pseudo-C views. Across a range of LLMs from major model families, we find that providing both decompiler views improves malicious-class F1, mainly by increasing recall on malicious samples. Agreement analyses further show that Ghidra and RetDec make partially different errors, supporting the view that decompiler outputs provide complementary evidence. Our results suggest that multi-decompiler prompting is a simple, training-free way to improve LLM-based malware triage in practical settings.
Jun 15, 2026cs.CR

MASCOT-Android: A Curated Dataset and Automated Collection Pipeline for Android Malware Source Code Specimens

Compared with binaries and decompiled code, malware source code more directly reflects the attackers' original intent. However, the scarcity of source code and the high cost of manual review make such datasets difficult to build and maintain. We propose MASCOT-Android, a curated dataset of Android malware source code and an automated collection framework for scalable malware source code discovery on GitHub. A key finding of our work is that repository-level documentation alone provides a strong signal for malware source code collection. Our model extracts character-level TF-IDF features from 8,772 malware and 25,747 benign README documents and trains a LinearSVC classifier to distinguish malware repositories. This README-only model achieves an accuracy of 96.28% and an FPR of 1.06% in local evaluation. In addition, the model outputs confidence scores, allowing users to adjust the decision threshold to balance FPR and coverage, which is practical in real-world malware source code collection.
Jun 11, 2026cs.CR

ViPER: Vision-based Packing-Aware Encoder for Robust Malware Detection

Visualization-based malware detection maps raw binary bytes to grayscale images and applies learned visual classifiers, providing an evasion-resistant and disassembly-free alternative to conventional analysis pipelines. However, executable packing remains a critical failure mode: packed binaries produce high-entropy images that obscure the structural patterns these models rely on. Because packing is also prevalent in benign software (e.g., for compression or copy protection), packing state alone is not a reliable indicator of maliciousness, and existing approaches do not address this challenge within a unified supervised framework. We present ViPER, a Vision-based Packing-Aware Encoder for Robust malware detection. ViPER builds on a LoRA-adapted ViT-B/14 backbone with a dual-head architecture that jointly learns malware classification and packing detection. A packing-aware gating mechanism conditions malware predictions on the inferred packing state, enabling distinct decision boundaries for packed and unpacked inputs. To address packing label skew during training, we employ frequency-weighted losses with stratified sampling over joint class-packing strata. Evaluated on 200,000 Windows PE byteplot images, ViPER achieves a balanced accuracy of 0.8521, ROC-AUC of 0.9260, and AUPR of 0.9279, outperforming representative state-of-the-art baselines across all primary metrics, while attaining a packing detection AUC of 0.9949.
Jun 5, 2026cs.CR

MOLOT System Card: Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer

MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.
Jun 5, 2026cs.CR

AMD-FCG: An Enhanced Function Call Graph Dataset with Integrated Topological Features for Malware Detection and Classification

As malware illustrates a complex structure and behavior, detection of these has been a significant challenge in the domain of cybersecurity along with related services in daily life. So, it becomes crucial to have a reliable and adaptive solution to address the issue. Among the several detection methods developed over the years, one of the most reliable ones is studying and analyzing the structural and behavioral patterns of malware. These patterns of sophisticated malware can be obtained with the help of Function Call Graphs (FCGs). However, to effectively cover numerous groups of families of malware, it is required to have a sufficiently large dataset for the system to operate on. In order to ensure accuracy and robustness of the system, the dataset should comprise samples of different malwares and a benign application for secure execution of the detection process. This paper introduces AMD-FCG, an enhanced Function Call Graph dataset integrated with topological features of malwares. The framework enhances the detection procedure, streamlining the workflow for cybersecurity professionals and also eliminating the need for dynamic analysis and extensive processing. Therefore, it can be used to develop and deploy more efficient and innovative malware detection systems.
Jun 4, 2026cs.CR

MalTree: Tracing Malware Evolution from Embeddings at Scale

Malware detection remains largely reactive: machine learning models trained on known samples degrade as threats evolve. Understanding evolutionary relationships among malware families can inform proactive defense, but traditional reverse engineering can take months to years to uncover such lineage relationships. We propose MalTree, a framework that applies bioinformatics inspired phylogenetic techniques (UPGMA and Neighbor-Joining) at scale to model malware evolution automatically using structural, behavioral, and image-based features. We introduce temporal validation using VirusTotal timestamps to assess whether inferred trees reflect actual evolutionary order. MalTree achieves 87% temporal consistency, indicating that inferred evolutionary relationships closely align with real-world emergence timelines. Our analysis shows that some families mutate over 10 times faster than others, suggesting that detection strategies should be tailored to family-specific evolutionary tempos. Case studies, including the Mirai botnet, confirm that inferred relationships from our phylogenetic tree align with documented threat intelligence. Our framework provides a foundation for shifting malware analysis from sample-by-sample classification toward lineage-aware evolutionary modeling.
Jun 2, 2026cs.CR

AI Agents Enable Adaptive Computer Worms

A computer worm is malware that spreads on a network by replicating itself from one machine to another. Traditional worms, like WannaCry, exploited predetermined vulnerabilities, and their spread can be halted by patching those vulnerabilities. Here we show that artificial intelligence (AI) agents enable a fundamentally new threat: a worm that generates tailored attack strategies to each target it encounters. The worm parasitically uses compromised machines to run open-weight large language models (LLMs) to sustain its reasoning, or extend its reach for further attacks. Deployed on a network of machines spanning Linux, Windows, and IoT (Internet of Things) devices, the worm propagated by exploiting common, real-world corporate network vulnerabilities. Since the worm is powered by stolen compute, the attacker's marginal cost per new infection is zero. This creates a destabilizing economic asymmetry between attackers and defenders. Moreover, because the worm requires no commercial AI platform, centralized safety controls, such as service refusals or rate limiting, are structurally irrelevant. Our results demonstrate that self-sustaining AI-driven cyber-threats are no longer theoretical. We must prepare for autonomous generative adversaries: malware systems that propagate without human operators and are defined not by fixed exploit code, but by the capacity to reason about targets, adapt to observations, and synthesize attack logic in real time.
Jun 2, 2026cs.CR

High-Precision APT Malware Attribution with Out-of-Scope Resilience

Early attribution of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity can help defenders prioritise investigation, select countermeasures, and reduce the impact of an intrusion. Malware provides useful attribution evidence, but automated APT malware attribution remains difficult in practice. Existing approaches are typically trained and evaluated as closed-set classifiers over a limited number of known APT groups. In operational environments, however, classifiers are likely to encounter samples from groups not represented during training. Closed-set classifiers are then forced to assign such samples to known groups, producing unsupported and potentially misleading attributions. We present a high-precision APT malware attribution method based on ranked binary classifiers with explicit abstention. Rather than training a single multi-class classifier, our approach trains and tunes two binary classifiers per APT group, ranks the classifiers by validation performance, and applies them sequentially. A sample is attributed only when a classifier provides sufficient evidence; otherwise, it abstains. We evaluate the method on the APT Malware dataset and on a larger combined dataset designed to stress-test out-of-scope behaviour. On the APT Malware dataset, the method achieves higher precision than previously published results on the same dataset. In the most challenging setting, where 87% of test samples came from 60 APT groups excluded from training, the method abstained on 94% of out-of-scope samples while maintaining 92% precision and 95% selective accuracy on the samples it classified.
Jun 2, 2026cs.CR

A Hybrid Approach For Malware Classification Using Secondary Features Fusion

The number of malware (either variant or novel) is rapidly increasing, making malware detection and mitigation a complex problem. One approach to improving malware mitigation is automatic detection and malware family classification. However, traditional malware detection methods cannot classify detected malware into their respective families, hindering effective malware mitigation. Consequently, this paper proposes a method to automate malware detection and classification of the detected malware into respective malware families. The proposed method uses feature fusion after extracting relevant malware features such as API calls and fixed and variable length n-grams with a customized feature selection method. Moreover, for the predictive model, a voting based approach is proposed for algorithm fusion. For the experimental evaluation of the proposed method, both binary and multi-class classification approaches are applied to the data set provided by Microsoft. Finally, the experimental results are compared with the state of the art. The experimental results indicate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach with an AUC of 0.989, accuracy of 99.72%, and a log loss of 0.01.
Jun 1, 2026cs.CR

Large Byte Model: Teaching Language Models About Compiled Code

Malware analysis starts with the raw bytes of an executable program, and tools to "lift" these to higher-level representations, such as assembly, are expensive and subject to error. Large Language Models (LLMs) cannot process raw byte representations and answer questions about them. To this end, we present the first byte-native LLM. Based on a vocabulary expansion technique using a bespoke byte tokenizer, such a model is capable of responding to complex questions about malware binaries, with accuracies ranging from 69% for malware family classification to 98% for architecture classification. Our findings indicate that providing domain knowledge during training is essential for this application -- off-the-shelf models lack both accuracy and insight. We've deployed this emerging solution to a limited number of analysts to gather feedback for further improvements.
May 29, 2026cs.CR

MAECO-Lite: Modular Ontology for Dynamic Malware Analysis

Capturing dynamic malware behavior in a practical but still semantically precise manner remains a significant challenge in cyber threat intelligence. While standards such as MAEC and STIX provide widely adopted vocabularies for describing malware artifacts and observations, they represent data with considerable complexity in structures that often obscure important ontological distinctions. In particular, they tend to conflate enduring malware artifacts with the events generated during execution, thereby flattening distinctions that are central in foundational standards for ontology design. In this paper, we conduct a foundational ontological analysis of core MAEC and STIX constructs relevant to dynamic malware analysis relying on Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO) as a theoretical lens. Our analysis reveals some ontological mismatches arising from the conflation of artifacts, dispositions, and runtime events in MAEC and STIX that complicate coherent representation of dynamic malware behavior and, from a practical perspective, limit the ability to reason about execution traces. Based on these insights, we propose MAECO-Lite, a lightweight ontology designed to represent data and operationalize their processing for dynamic malware analysis. The ontology adopts a modular structure centered on samples, processes, actions, system artifacts, and MITRE ATT&CK Techniques, while maintaining a clear separation between enduring entities and runtime events. An initial evaluation using description logic concept learning algorithms shows that the simplified ontology significantly improves learning performance, demonstrating that ontologically grounded modelling can enhance both semantic clarity and computational usability.
May 28, 2026cs.CR

Automatically Attacking Software Reverse Engineering AI Agents

Software tools for reverse engineering executable binary files, such as Ghidra, enable malware analysts to safely conduct robust static analysis without having access to original source code. Coupled with the analytic power of large language models (LLM), agentic systems enabled with tools, such as GhidraMCP, can allow analysts to automate a previously human driven process. Although this automation can increase the productivity of a single malware analyst, it also introduces a new area of vulnerability for malware obfuscation. This paper presents an adversarial technique using genetic algorithm-based prompt generation, a modification of an adversarial attack known as AutoDAN, to demonstrate the ability to deceive LLM-powered disassembly and decompilation systems into misinterpreting binary executables, effectively corrupting their analytical output. This proof-of-concept methodology exploits inherent vulnerabilities in how LLMs process and interpret decompiled machine code via prompt injection by using extraneous string variable assignments to pass surreptitious instructions to the LLM while not impacting the functionality of the executable file. We demonstrate this capability through several concise examples. This approach could enable attackers to bypass automated detection systems that rely on LLM-driven analysis pipelines. By studying and understanding this attack, insights can be gained regarding the security implication of integrating LLMs into cybersecurity toolchains and building more robust agentic code analysis systems.
May 27, 2026cs.CR

Technical Report: Exploring the Emerging Threats of the Agent Skill Ecosystem

We analyzed 3,984 AI agent skills from major marketplaces and found 76 confirmed malicious payloads, including credential theft, backdoor installation, and data exfiltration. 13.4% of all skills contain at least one critical-level security issue and at least 8 manually confirmed malicious skills remain publicly available on clawhub.ai as of the date of publication. This report documents our methodology, presents a threat taxonomy based on real-world samples, and details the attack patterns we observed. As skill marketplaces grow rapidly and AI agents gain access to sensitive credentials and systems, automated security analysis is no longer optional.
May 25, 2026cs.CR

Building an Adversarial Malware Dataset by Family and Type: Generation, Evasion, and Poisoning Evaluation

We present a dataset of adversarial malware samples derived from the public RawMal-TF collection of real-world malware binaries. Using a suite of adversarial malware generators, we construct two sets of adversarial PE files: 44,347 family-labelled samples and 33,596 type-labelled samples, achieving evasion rates of 98.35 % and 92.20 % against the EMBER classifier, respectively. Each adversarial binary is accompanied by detailed metadata, including EMBER scores and VirusTotal classifications. We further demonstrate the susceptibility of malware classification pipelines to data poisoning attacks through a series of training experiments. Injecting fully mislabelled adversarial samples representing only 0.5 % of the training data in the family-labelled dataset increases the evasion rate against the re-trained classifier from 26.1 % to 92.8 %. The dataset is publicly released to facilitate future research on adversarial malware, poisoning attacks, and the robustness of machine-learning-based malware detection systems.
May 24, 2026cs.CR

SEED: Semi-supervised Continual MalwarE Detection for Tackling ConcEpt Drift on a BuDget

Machine learning based malware detectors become obsolete over time due to concept drift in benign and malware applications. Recent methods rely on fully labeled data and use hierarchical contrastive loss (HCL) with active learning to improve robustness against drift by exploiting semantic structure in malware representations. However, obtaining labeled data in the security domain is difficult. Under partially labeled settings, HCL suffers significant performance degradation in detecting unseen malware, especially on datasets such as BODMAS where strong semantic structure may not exist. In this paper, we propose SEED, a semantic-structure-agnostic method for malware detection under limited supervision. SEED combines a tailored binary cross-entropy objective with semi-supervised continual learning and active learning. For partially labeled seen tasks, unlabeled samples are projected into a representation space constructed from previously seen data using singular value decomposition, and paired with suitable labeled samples to encourage representation consistency. For unseen tasks with fully unlabeled data, uncertainty is quantified using cosine distance in representation space, and the most uncertain samples are selected for analyst labeling. We evaluate SEED on both Windows and Android malware datasets. Using only 20% labeled data on seen tasks, SEED achieves average AUT improvements of 40% on BODMAS and 14% on AndroZoo for unseen malware detection compared to HCL* (the semi-supervised adaptation of HCL), while remaining competitive on APIGraph. Finally, we introduce a delayed buffer update strategy to reduce label noise propagation during replay and improve learning stability.
May 22, 2026cs.CR

Concept Drift Adaptation Using Self-Supervised and Reinforcement Learning In Android Malware Detection

Android malware detectors often degrade after deployment because of concept drift, while full retraining at each maintenance step is costly. We propose a chronological adaptive maintenance framework that models deployment-time maintenance as a sequential decision problem. The framework learns a stable latent representation through self-supervised learning during initialization, freezes the encoder, measures latent drift in the fixed representation space, and performs lightweight downstream adaptation using a trainable adapter and classification head. A proximal policy optimization controller selects low-cost maintenance actions based on the detector state, including current utility, retention on a fixed memory set, latent drift indicators, and update cost. We evaluate the framework under a causal deployment-style protocol on emulator and real Android malware datasets with static and dynamic features. Results show that the RL controller provides a strong cost-aware adaptation strategy, consistently remaining among the top-performing policies while achieving a favorable balance between temporal performance, memory retention, and maintenance cost under non-stationary deployment conditions.
May 22, 2026cs.CR

Adversarial Vulnerability Under Temporal Concept Drift: A Longitudinal Study of Android Malware Detection

We present a longitudinal, drift-aware evaluation of adversarial robustness across more than a decade of Android applications using static and dynamic feature representations extracted from emulator and real-device executions. The dataset is organized into yearly slices and evaluated under three deployment protocols that emulate realistic learning scenarios: (1) same-year training and testing, (2) cross-year deployment without model updates, and (3) expanding-window retraining with cumulative historical data. Across multiple classifier families, adversarial examples are generated using FGSM and SPSA under feasibility constraints. We measure clean performance, Adversarial Accuracy (AA), Attack Success Rate (ASR), and introduce temporal linkage metrics -- RobustDrop, ΔΔASR, and Adversarial Amplification Factor (AAF) -- to quantify the relationship between distribution shift and robustness degradation.nResults show that temporal separation is associated with reduced adversarial robustness under the evaluated transfer-based feature-space setting. As the train-test gap increases, clean accuracy and adversarial accuracy decline, while attack success exhibits configuration-dependent increases, particularly under FGSM perturbations and static features. Expanding-window retraining mitigates, but does not eliminate, robustness loss under continued distributional evolution. These findings indicate that temporal drift should be considered when assessing the long-term robustness of intelligent detection systems under evolving data distributions and highlight the need for drift-aware robustness assessment frameworks in long-lived adversarial environments.
May 18, 2026cs.CR

Learning to Look Benign: Targeted Evasion of Malware Detectors via API Import Injection

Machine learning-based malware detectors are widely deployed in antivirus and endpoint detection systems, yet their reliance on static features makes them vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates whether a malware sample can be intentionally misclassified as a specific benign software category, not merely as "not malware", by adding a small number of Win32 API imports characteristic of that selected category, without removing any existing imports or retraining the detector. We propose a framework centered on a Conditional Variational Autoencoder (CVAE) whose decoder is strictly additive. It can introduce new API calls but never remove existing ones, preserving malware functionality by design. For each malware sample, the framework automatically identifies which benign category it most closely resembles and uses that as the evasion target. A knowledge-distilled differentiable proxy enables gradient-based training against the non-differentiable ensemble detector. Experiments on a six-class dataset of binary Win32 API import vectors extracted from 3,799 Windows executables (five benign categories, one malware class) show that, against a detector achieving 87.5% malware recall, adding just 20 API imports reduces recall to 30%. At k=20, among samples that evaded detection, 99% are classified as the intended target category. The CVAE outperforms both a frequency-based baseline and random selection at every tested injection size (k = 5 to 50). Validation on real PE files submitted to VirusTotal confirms that the attack transfers to commercial static detection engines, with an average 54.5% reduction in flagging engines. These findings expose a concrete vulnerability in API-based malware classifiers and demonstrate that targeted evasion into a chosen benign category is achievable with minimal, functionality-preserving modifications.