PII Detection

AI agents that pay for resources via the x402 protocol embed payment metadata - resource URLs, descriptions, and reason strings - in every HTTP payment request. This metadata is transmitted to the payment server and to the centralised facilitator API before any on-chain settlement occurs; neither party is typically bound by a data processing agreement. We present presidio-hardened-x402, the first open-source middleware that intercepts x402 payment requests before transmission to detect and redact personally identifiable information (PII), enforce declarative spending policies, and block duplicate replay attempts. To evaluate the PII filter, we construct a labeled synthetic corpus of 2,000 x402 metadata triples spanning seven use-case categories, and run a 42-configuration precision/recall sweep across two detection modes (regex, NLP) and five confidence thresholds. The recommended configuration (mode=nlp, min_score=0.4, all entity types) achieves micro-F1 = 0.894 with precision 0.972, at a p99 latency of 5.73ms - well within the 50ms overhead budget. The middleware, corpus, and all experiment code are publicly available at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-x402.

This study addresses the challenge of creating datasets for cybercrime analysis while complying with the requirements of regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Organic Law 10/1995 of the Penal Code. To this end, a system is proposed for collecting information from the Telegram platform, including text, audio, and images; the implementation of speech-to-text transcription models incorporating signal enhancement techniques; and the evaluation of different Named Entity Recognition (NER) solutions, including Microsoft Presidio and AI models designed using a transformer-based architecture. Experimental results indicate that Parakeet achieves the best performance in audio transcription, while the proposed NER solutions achieve the highest f1-score values in detecting sensitive information. In addition, anonymization metrics are presented that allow evaluation of the preservation of structural coherence in the data, while simultaneously guaranteeing the protection of personal information and supporting cybersecurity research within the current legal framework.

In LLM agent pipelines, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call: raw user content enters retrieval queries, memory writes, tool arguments, OCR-derived text, and logs, and every downstream copy inherits what the first write contained. Existing de-identification pipelines protect document boundaries but not this cross-stage surface. We present BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware mediation layer that detects sensitive spans before they propagate, replaces each with a typed placeholder, a semantic abstraction, or a secure symbolic token under a configured policy, and defers restoration to authorized execution boundaries. We evaluate it under one protocol against Presidio, Casper-style sanitization, an LLM sanitizer, and transformer and learned detectors, on 300 AI4Privacy documents, 493 PrivacyLens trajectories, 200 PrivacyLens tasks scored by that benchmark's own judge, and AgentDojo tasks under injection. Three findings result. Identifier propagation is controllable: residual exposure falls to 7.4% on AI4Privacy and 1.8% on PrivacyLens, and exact identifiers in an agent's final action fall from 13.7% to 2.1-3.1%. Restoration timing governs what every stage upstream of the authorized boundary sees: deferring it leaves 1.6% of protected values readable in the released context against 51.0%, and 2.7% against 4.8% in what the agent emits, for 0.11 helpfulness points. Measuring factual disclosure is harder: a word-overlap metric and an LLM judge both report that mediation leaves facts intact, and both disagree with blind human annotation (kappa = 0.25 and 0.09). The human labels reverse that: inferability falls from 100% to 24-53% under mediation, so semantic-leakage measures need human validation before they are trusted. These are systems results on English text with open-weight models, not formal guarantees.

Street-level imagery contains personally identifiable information (PII), some of which is context-dependent. Existing anonymization methods either over-process images or miss subtle identifiers, while API-based solutions compromise data sovereignty. We present an agentic framework CAIAMAR (Context-Aware Image Anonymization with Multi-Agent Reasoning) for context-aware PII segmentation with diffusion-based anonymization, combining pre-defined processing for high-confidence cases with multi-agent reasoning for indirect identifiers. Three specialized agents coordinate via round-robin speaker selection in a Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle, enabling large vision-language models to classify PII based on spatial context (private vs. public property) rather than rigid category rules. The agents implement spatially-filtered coarse-to-fine detection where a scout-and-zoom strategy identifies candidates, open-vocabulary segmentation processes localized crops, and $IoU$-based deduplication ($30\%$ threshold) prevents redundant processing. Modal-specific diffusion guidance with appearance decorrelation substantially reduces re-identification (Re-ID) risks. On CUHK03-NP, our method reduces person Re-ID risk by $73\%$ ($R1$: $16.9\%$ vs. $62.4\%$ baseline). For image quality preservation on CityScapes, we achieve KID: $0.001$, and FID: $9.1$, significantly outperforming existing anonymization. The agentic workflow detects non-direct PII instances across object categories, and downstream semantic segmentation is preserved. Operating entirely on-premise with open-source models, the framework generates human-interpretable audit trails supporting EU's GDPR transparency requirements while flagging failed cases for human review.

Computer use agents create new privacy risks: training data collected from real websites inevitably contains sensitive information, and cloud-hosted inference exposes user screenshots. Detecting personally identifiable information in web screenshots is critical for privacy-preserving deployment, but no public benchmark exists for this task. We introduce WebPII, a fine-grained synthetic benchmark of 44,865 annotated e-commerce UI images designed with three key properties: extended PII taxonomy including transaction-level identifiers that enable reidentification, anticipatory detection for partially-filled forms where users are actively entering data, and scalable generation through VLM-based UI reproduction. Experiments validate that these design choices improve layout-invariant detection across diverse interfaces and generalization to held-out page types. We train WebRedact to demonstrate practical utility, more than doubling text-extraction baseline accuracy (0.753 vs 0.357 mAP@50) at real-time CPU latency (20ms). We release the dataset and model to support privacy-preserving computer use research.

Accessing sensitive patient data for machine learning is challenging due to privacy concerns. Datasets with annotations of personally identifiable information are crucial for developing and testing anonymization systems to enable safe data sharing that complies with privacy regulations. Since accessing real patient data is a bottleneck, synthetic data offers an efficient solution for data scarcity, bypassing privacy regulations that apply to real data. Moreover, neural machine translation can help to create high-quality data for low-resource languages by translating validated real or synthetic data from a high-resource language. In this work, we create a multilingual anonymization benchmark in ten languages, using a machine translation methodology that preserves the original annotations and renders names of cities and people in a culturally and contextually appropriate form in each target language. Our evaluation study with medical professionals confirms the quality of the translations, both in general and with respect to the translation and adaptation of personal information. Our benchmark with over 2,500 annotations of personal information can be used in many applications, including training annotators, validating annotations across institutions without legal complications, and helping improve the performance of automatic personal information detection. We make our benchmark and annotation guidelines available for further research.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting improves LLM reasoning but can increase privacy risk by resurfacing personally identifiable information (PII) from the prompt into reasoning traces and outputs, even under policies that instruct the model not to restate PII. We study such direct, inference-time PII leakage using a model-agnostic framework that (i) defines leakage as risk-weighted, token-level events across 11 PII types, (ii) traces leakage curves as a function of the allowed CoT budget, and (iii) compares open- and closed-source model families on a structured PII dataset with a hierarchical risk taxonomy. We find that CoT consistently elevates leakage, especially for high-risk categories, and that leakage is strongly family- and budget-dependent. Increasing the reasoning budget can either amplify or attenuate leakage depending on the base model. We then benchmark lightweight inference-time gatekeepers: a rule-based detector, a TF-IDF + logistic regression classifier, a GLiNER-based NER model, and an LLM-as-judge, using risk-weighted F1, Macro-F1, and recall. No single method dominates across models or budgets, motivating hybrid, style-adaptive gatekeeping policies that balance utility and risk under a common, reproducible protocol.

Modern language models (LM) are trained on large scrapes of the Web, containing millions of personal information (PI) instances, many of which LMs memorize, increasing privacy risks. In this work, we develop the regexes and rules (R&R) detector suite to detect email addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses, which outperforms the best regex-based PI detectors. On a manually curated set of 483 instances of PI, we measure memorization: finding that 13.6% are parroted verbatim by the Pythia-6.9b model, i.e., when the model is prompted with the tokens that precede the PI in the original document, greedy decoding generates the entire PI span exactly. We expand this analysis to study models of varying sizes (160M-6.9B) and pretraining time steps (70k-143k iterations) in the Pythia model suite and find that both model size and amount of pretraining are positively correlated with memorization. Even the smallest model, Pythia-160m, parrots 2.7% of the instances exactly. Consequently, we strongly recommend that pretraining datasets be aggressively filtered and anonymized to minimize PI parroting.

Large-scale sharing of dialogue data is key to advancing the science of teaching and learning, yet rigorous de-identification remains a major barrier. In mathematics tutoring transcripts, numeric expressions frequently resemble structured identifiers (e.g., dates or IDs), leading generic Personally Identifiable Information (PII) detection systems to over-redact core instructional content and reduce data utility. This work asks how to detect PII while preserving educational utility, focusing on this "numeric ambiguity" problem. We introduce MathEd-PII, the first benchmark dataset for PII detection in math tutoring dialogues, built with human-in-the-loop LLM annotation. Using density-based segmentation, we show that false PII redactions cluster in math-dense regions, confirming numeric ambiguity as a key failure mode. We then compare four detection strategies: a Presidio baseline and three LLM-based approaches with basic, math-aware, and segment-aware prompting. Domain-aware prompting, including both math-aware (F1: 0.802) and segment-aware versions (F1: 0.821), substantially outperforms the baseline (F1: 0.379) while reducing numeric false positives, demonstrating that de-identification must incorporate domain context to preserve analytic utility. This work provides a new benchmark and evidence that utility-preserving de-identification for tutoring data requires domain-aware modeling.