Visual content in multimedia systems may be resized, compressed, or re-rendered before it is interpreted by a vision-language model. We study a security failure mode in which these transformations change the machine-readable semantics of an image: a textual instruction is not recovered at a
512×512 presentation resolution under our evaluation protocol but becomes recoverable after aggressive downsampling. We formulate this behavior as Scale-Induced Semantic Shift (SISS) and develop a closed-loop black-box framework that combines dual-scale verification, selective self-hardening, shallow-layer low-rank adaptation, and pixel-space noise regularization. On a fixed 300-case benchmark, the third SISS refinement round obtains a
58.75% average attack success rate across four closed-source vision-language models, compared with
41.08% for the strongest generation baseline. A controlled sweep bounds the effect to aggressive compression: average success decreases to
17.68%,
6.85%, and
5.60% at
128×128,
224×224, and
336×336, respectively. In a downstream web-agent study, the generated images increase hidden-instruction perception, but absolute behavioral compromise remains about
4%. Generic input transformations provide little protection in a separate defense protocol, whereas the proposed ScaleGuard consistency detector reduces non-adaptive success from
61.4% to
24.3% and one-round defense-aware success from
42.5% to
15.0%, with no observed rejection among matched clean controls. The results characterize a bounded but reproducible semantic inconsistency in multimedia preprocessing and motivate scale-consistent visual-language inference.