RAG Robustness
RAG: Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Momentum
7 papers in the last four weeks, down 22% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.
Latest papers 44
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are often evaluated using final answer accuracy, even though their failures can originate from preprocessing, retrieval, context packing, or generation. This paper presents a controlled empirical study of RAG sensitivity, robustness, and stability across 56 experimental runs. We evaluate how chunk size, retrieval depth (top k), embedding-based reranking, probabilistic retrieval noise, and repeated seeded runs affect retrieval, context packing, and generation behavior. Using a fixed 500-question QA subset mapped to 20,958 unique corpus contexts, we analyze both final answer metrics and intermediate failure modes. Across these experiments, retrieval-oriented metrics improved under broader retrieval settings, while downstream exact-match and F1 scores often behaved non-monotonically. We also observe preprocessing-induced answer loss under smaller chunk sizes, progressive degradation under retrieval corruption, and higher observed variance in broader retrieval regimes. These findings suggest that RAG evaluation should include sensitivity, robustness, stability, and multi-stage failure analysis rather than relying only on final answer accuracy.
SilentRetrieval: Hijacking Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Semantically-Preserving Adversarial Data Poisoning
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates LLM hallucinations but introduces a critical vulnerability: corpus integrity. We present SilentRetrieval, a two-stage data poisoning attack that hijacks RAG systems through adversarially crafted yet fluent documents. Stage 1 uses Coordinated Beam Search, a multi-token joint optimization method with a fluency-similarity objective, to keep a poisoned host document retrievable while constraining perplexity. Stage 2 uses Context-Adaptive Trigger Generation, a lightweight trigger-fusion step driven by a frozen LLM, to integrate manipulation triggers into document content. Under a one-poisoned-document-per-query evaluation with synthetic target answers, SilentRetrieval achieves 84.6%/81.3% HR@10 and 57.5%/54.8% ASR-LLM on Natural Questions and MS MARCO, while maintaining near-benign perplexity. Cross-model evaluation across four target LLMs shows nontrivial effectiveness under a fixed trigger generator, and transfer tests against unseen retrievers, including ColBERT and commercial embedding models, yield 64.7% average HR@10 under the same injected-corpus protocol. In a sampled Wikipedia-scale evaluation, SilentRetrieval retains 74.2% HR@10 at a 0.016% poisoning ratio. Combined retrieval-side and generation-side defenses reduce attack success substantially but incur a latency trade-off. Human evaluation shows substantially lower flag rates than disfluent baselines, while remaining numerically more suspicious than benign content at the current sample size.
Detecting Is Not Resolving: The Monitoring Control Gap in Retrieval Augmented LLMs
Retrieval-augmented LLMs are deployed for tasks where evidence quality determines action safety, yet evaluation protocols assume that single-turn robustness predicts robustness when evidence accumulates across turns. We show this assumption is fundamentally incorrect. Models exhibit a monitoring-control gap: they readily acknowledge contradictory evidence, yet this awareness fails to constrain their final recommendations - detecting epistemic conflict does not imply resolving it safely. Through a multi-turn document accumulation protocol across four model families (1.5B-32B parameters) and over 50,000 turn-level evaluations, we demonstrate that single-turn diagnostics systematically overestimate RAG safety, that contradiction acknowledgement is uncorrelated with safe resolution, a pattern corroborated by targeted human validation, and that no universal prompt fix exists. Converging mechanism evidence - hidden-state probing, attention analysis, and response-strategy taxonomy - points to action selection as the most plausible locus of the deficit: danger-relevant information is internally represented and receives enhanced attention during unsafe generation, yet fails to constrain output behavior. The gap between what models recognize and what they do must be measured and closed before retrieval-augmented systems can be trusted in high-stakes settings.
Generating Leakage-Free Benchmarks for Robust RAG Evaluation
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is widely used to augment large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge. However, many benchmark datasets, designed to test RAG performance, comprise many questions that can already be answered from an LLM's parametric memory. This leads to unreliable evaluation. We refer to this phenomenon as knowledge leakage: cases where RAG tasks are solvable without retrieval. This issue worsens over time due to benchmark aging. As benchmarks are reused for training, their contents are increasingly absorbed into model parameters, making them less effective for evaluating retrieval. We introduce SeedRG, a semi-synthetic benchmark generation pipeline that mitigates knowledge leakage and addresses the issue of benchmark aging. Starting from a seed benchmark dataset, SeedRG extracts a reasoning graph from question-context pairs to capture their underlying reasoning structure, and then generates new examples via type-constrained entity replacement. This process produces structurally similar but novel instances that are unlikely to exist in the model's parametric knowledge, while preserving the original reasoning patterns. To ensure quality, we incorporate two verification steps: (1) a reasoning-graph consistency check to maintain task difficulty, and (2) a knowledge-leakage filter to exclude instances answerable without retrieval.
PRA-RAG: Provably Robust Aggregation in Retrieval-Augmented Generation against Retrieval Corruption
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances Large Language Models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge, effectively mitigating their inherent knowledge limitations. However, RAG remains vulnerable to poisoning attacks that manipulate retrieved texts to mislead model outputs. Existing defense mechanisms often lack theoretical robustness guarantees and perform unreliably when the LLM has limited knowledge of the retrieved content. In this work, we propose PRA-RAG, a provably robust retrieval aggregation algorithm designed to defend against poisoning attacks on retrieved texts. PRA-RAG samples multiple combinations of retrieved texts and utilizes geometric structures in the embedding space to identify a robust subset, from which a stable aggregated representation is derived. We provide theoretical bounds on the maximum impact of poisoned retrieved content and establish a quantitative measure of RAG's robustness. Experiments across multiple benchmarks and RAG architectures demonstrate that PRA-RAG reduces the attack success rate to as low as 1% while maintaining an accuracy of 71%, significantly outperforming representative state-of-the-art methods.
Architecture Matters: Comparing RAG Systems under Knowledge Base Poisoning
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to knowledge base poisoning, yet existing attacks have been evaluated almost exclusively against vanilla retrieve-then-generate pipelines. Architectures designed to handle conflicting retrieved information - multi-agent debate, agentic retrieval, recursive language models - remain untested against adversarially optimized contradictions. We evaluate four RAG architectures (vanilla RAG, agentic RAG, MADAM-RAG, and Recursive Language Models) under controlled single-document (N=1) poisoning on 921 Natural Questions QA pairs, comparing a clean baseline, naive injection, and CorruptRAG-AK - an adversarial attack whose meta-epistemic framing targets credibility assessment. Architecture is a high-impact variable in adversarial robustness: under CorruptRAG-AK, attack success rates range from 81.9% (vanilla) to 24.4% (RLM) - a spread of nearly 58 percentage points across architectures with comparable clean accuracy (~92%). Decomposing this gap, once the poisoned document is retrieved, adversarial framing - not retrieval optimization - drives the majority of CorruptRAG-AK's advantage for three of four architectures, localizing the cross-architecture vulnerability at the content-reasoning stage. Our MADAM-RAG reimplementation shows the highest apparent contradiction detection rate, though our LLM judge over-identifies this behavior (~48.5% precision), so reported rates are upper bounds. Regardless of detection, MADAM-RAG cannot resolve contradictions reliably, producing a 41.4% non-answer rate even on clean inputs - though implementation divergences from the original may contribute. We introduce a seven-category behavioral taxonomy capturing contradiction detection, hedging, and failure modes beyond binary accuracy. Code, data, and analysis notebooks are publicly available.
AdaGATE: Adaptive Gap-Aware Token-Efficient Evidence Assembly for Multi-Hop Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) remains brittle on multi-hop questions in realistic deployment settings, where retrieved evidence may be noisy or redundant and only limited context can be passed to the generator. Existing controllers address parts of this problem, but typically either expand context additively, select from a fixed top-k set, or optimize relevance without explicitly repairing missing bridge facts. We propose AdaGATE, a training-free evidence controller for multi-hop RAG that frames evidence selection as a token-constrained repair problem. AdaGATE combines entity centric gap tracking, targeted micro-query generation, and a utility based selection mechanism that balances gap coverage, corroboration, novelty, redundancy, and direct question relevance. We evaluate AdaGATE on HotpotQA under clean, redundancy, and noise injected retrieval conditions. Across all three settings, AdaGATE achieves the best evidence F1 among the compared controllers, reaching 62.3% on clean data and 71.2% under redundancy injection, while using 2.6x fewer input tokens than Adaptive-k. These results suggest that explicit gap-aware repair, combined with token-efficient evidence selection, improves robustness in multi-hop RAG under imperfect retrieval. Our code and evaluation pipeline are available at https://github.com/eliguo/AdaGATE.
Beyond Semantic Relevance: Counterfactual Risk Minimization for Robust Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Standard Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems predominantly rely on semantic relevance as a proxy for utility. However, this assumption collapses in realistic decision-making scenarios where user queries are laden with cognitive biases, such as false premises or confirmation bias. In such cases, maximizing relevance paradoxically promotes the retrieval of sycophantic evidence that reinforces hallucinations, a critical failure we term the ``Relevance-Robustness Gap''. To bridge this gap, we propose CoRM-RAG (Counterfactual Risk Minimization for RAG), a framework that aligns retrieval with decision safety rather than mere similarity. Grounded in causal intervention, we introduce a Cognitive Perturbation Protocol to simulate user biases during training, which is then distilled into a lightweight Evidence Critic. This scoring module learns to identify documents that possess sufficient evidential strength to steer the model toward correctness despite adversarial query perturbations. Extensive experiments on decision-making benchmarks demonstrate that CoRM-RAG significantly outperforms strong dense retrievers and LLM-based rerankers in adversarial settings, while enabling effective risk-aware abstention through reliable robustness scoring. Our code is available at https://github.com/PeiYangLiu/CoRM-RAG.git.
When Good OCR Is Not Enough: Benchmarking OCR Robustness for Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Industrial Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems depend on optical character recognition (OCR) to transform visual documents into text. Existing OCR benchmarks rely on character-level metrics, which inadequately measure downstream RAG effectiveness under real-world conditions. We introduce an OCR benchmark for industrial RAG systems covering 11 challenging document types, including extreme layouts, high-resolution pages, complex or watermarked backgrounds, historical documents with non-standard reading orders, visually decorated text, and documents containing tables and mathematical formulas. Evaluating recent SOTA OCR models under a controlled OCR-first RAG pipeline shows clear performance degradation on realistic industrial documents despite strong conventional benchmark scores. We find that high OCR accuracy does not necessarily translate into strong downstream RAG performance: structural and semantic errors can cause substantial retrieval failures even when WER/CER remains low. Further analysis shows that this mismatch is category-dependent, arises through both retrieval-side and downstream generation-side failures, and remains stable across representative OCR-first pipeline choices. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/Qihoo360/InduOCRBench.
RAGognizer: Hallucination-Aware Fine-Tuning via Detection Head Integration
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is widely used to augment the input to Large Language Models (LLMs) with external information, such as recent or domain-specific knowledge. Nonetheless, current models still produce closed-domain hallucinations and generate content that is unsupported by the retrieved context. Current detection approaches typically treat hallucination as a post-hoc problem, relying on black-box consistency checks or probes over frozen internal representations. In this work, we demonstrate that hallucination detection based on internal state representation can also serve as a direct training signal. We introduce RAGognize, a dataset of naturally occurring closed-domain hallucinations with token-level annotations, and RAGognizer, a hallucination-aware fine-tuning approach that integrates a lightweight detection head into an LLM, allowing for the joint optimization of language modeling and hallucination detection. This joint objective forces the model to improve the separability of its internal states regarding hallucinations while simultaneously learning to generate well-formed and meaningful responses. Across multiple benchmarks, RAGognizer achieves state-of-the-art token-level hallucination detection while substantially reducing hallucination rates during generation, without degrading language quality or relevance.
Improving Retrieval-Augmented Generation without Taxonomy-based Error Categorization
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves the factual accuracy of large language model (LLM) outputs by grounding generation in external knowledge. Recent agentic RAG systems extend this paradigm with critical agents to evaluate model responses and iteratively refine outputs. However, most prior work implicitly assumes reliable critic feedback and focuses on planning strategies, while paying limited attention to the robustness of the error-correction process itself, which can be impacted by misaligned error categories and ineffective or incorrect corrections. Here, we hypothesize that RAG performance can be improved without explicit error categorization. We propose RePAIR, a response-action learning paradigm that directly maps flawed RAG outputs to error-mitigating action plans without relying on fine-grained error taxonomies and explicit critic supervision. Across multiple benchmarks, RePAIR consistently improves agentic RAG performance.
A Survey of Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) improves large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge, but this access path creates security risks distinct from inherent prompt-only or parametric-model flaws. We frame secure RAG as securing external knowledge access. We conducted a systematic search and curated 135 works on attacks, defenses, and security evaluation, and organized them with SLOT: a taxonomy along the attack Surface (S) and the corresponding defense Layer (L), with cross-cutting axes Objective (O) and attack-target scope (T). Mapping these studies onto an external knowledge-access pipeline, we expose three mismatches: target mismatch (T2 attacks outpace T2 defenses and evaluation), stage mismatch (S1 attacks outnumber L1 defenses), and signal mismatch (fluent, retrievable, corpus-fitting S1 attacks challenge anomaly-based L2/L3 defenses). Finally, we discuss directions for more realistic targets, surface-complete defense stacks, standardized evaluation, confidentiality, and multimodal and agentic systems, and release the screening process, selected-paper metadata, and machine-readable SLOT labels at https://github.com/TreeAI-Lab/Awesome-RAG-Security.
Where Does Robustness Live? Neuron-Guided Adaptation for Retrieval-Augmented Language Models
Retrieval-Augmented Language Models (RALMs) have shown strong potential in knowledge-intensive tasks, yet they remain vulnerable when retrieved contexts are noisy or irrelevant. Robustness against such contexts requires two distinct capabilities: abstention when contexts are uninformative, and selective extraction when relevant evidence is buried in noise. Yet existing methods face two key limitations: they do not train separately for these two capabilities, and they adapt the model at a coarse layer- or module-level granularity, overlooking that only a small subset of neurons is strongly activated for a given input. We propose NeuRIT, a Neuron-guided Robust Instruction-Tuning framework built on a localization-first perspective. NeuRIT mines context-aware neurons associated with relevant and irrelevant context processing, and uses them as anchors to selectively adapt both the identified neuron groups and the layers in which they concentrate. NeuRIT then performs two-stage instruction tuning that teaches complementary behaviors: suppress generation when there is nothing to extract, and extract relevant evidence when there is. NeuRIT consistently outperforms strong baselines across diverse QA benchmarks and generator backbones. Our code is available at https://github.com/HYU-ARK-Lab/NeuRIT.
Eyes-on-Me: Scalable RAG Poisoning through Transferable Attention-Steering Attractors
Existing data poisoning attacks on retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems scale poorly because they require costly optimization of poisoned documents for each target phrase. We introduce Eyes-on-Me, a modular attack that decomposes an adversarial document into reusable Attention Attractors and Focus Regions. Attractors are optimized to direct attention to the Focus Region. Attackers can then insert semantic baits for the retriever or malicious instructions for the generator, adapting to new targets at near zero cost. This is achieved by steering a small subset of attention heads that we empirically identify as strongly correlated with attack success. Across 18 end-to-end RAG settings (3 datasets 2 retrievers 3 generators), Eyes-on-Me raises average attack success rates from 21.9 to 57.8 (+35.9 points, 2.6 over prior work). A single optimized attractor transfers to unseen black box retrievers and generators without retraining. Our findings establish a scalable paradigm for RAG data poisoning and show that modular, reusable components pose a practical threat to modern AI systems. They also contribute to interpretability research by revealing a strong link between attention concentration and model outputs.