Zero-Day Attack Detection
Latest papers
8 papers1 paper in the last four weeks, against 1 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.
Synthetic variants of known attacks, including feature-space adversarial perturbations, are sometimes used as stand-ins for unseen ("zero-day") attacks when evaluating machine-learning network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). We test whether this proxy holds. On the corrected CIC-IDS2017 release we train Random Forest, XGBoost, a 1D-CNN and an FT-Transformer and compare, at a fixed 1% false-positive rate over five seeds, detection under constrained perturbations of known attacks (gradient-based and black-box attacks on 42 attacker-controllable features) with leave-one-attack-family-out (LOAO) detection, where an entire family is absent from training. Detection under the strongest perturbation we tested, with budgets of at most 0.2, stays between 90.9% and 99.7%, yet mean detection of held-out families falls to 76.2% (RF), 40.2% (XGBoost), 25.8% (1D-CNN) and 22.8% (FT-Transformer). Robustness exceeds LOAO detection for every model (gaps of 24 to 72 percentage points, 23 to 66 when robustness is also averaged over families; Holm-adjusted p 0.00096), and the two measures agree at most on a coarse ranking of the models. An exact mixed-integer evasion search confirms the tree ensembles' scores. Benign-only anomaly detectors and a simple multi-class open-set baseline do not close the gap. A temporal split on 5 seeds (3 of the 4 models) leaves the gap in place. On CSE-CIC-IDS2018 the gap recurs for every model (16 to 68 points). On these benchmarks and under this threat model, a robustness score should not be read as a zero-day score, and the two should be reported separately. Code and per-seed results are publicly available.
Jev-IDS: System One Models for Network Intrusion Detection
Machine-learning Network Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) depend on substantial labeled datasets and task-specific training, whereas Large Language Models (LLMs) detection can analyze flow records directly but incurs higher inference cost and latency, with less constrained outputs. This paper presents JEV-IDS, an open experimental general NIDS based on the Jev System One Model (SOM) to detect zero day intrusions Under label scarcity. JEV-IDS serializes one flow per request and asks JEV two questions: a binary attack probability and a finite-choice traffic category. Our results show that, at k=1, JEV was 4.8 times faster and 3.8 times cheaper than GPT-5.6 Luna, with 1.5 times higher novel-attack recall; it also produced 15 times fewer false alarms than a low-data Random Forest. Across 5,400 decisions on a 300-flow NSL-KDD pilot split, JEV achieved F1-Score 0.859, precision 0.941, recall 0.790, and novel-attack recall 0.838. Increasing k to 2 reduced its F1-Score to 0.839.
A Unified Siamese Learning Framework for Zero-Day Anomaly Detection and Classification in Optical Networks
A multi-similarity Siamese neural network unifies zero-day anomaly detection and one-shot classification in optical networks, achieving over 99% accuracy and instant adaptability across lightpaths and unseen anomaly types without any retraining.
UNAD+: An Explainable Hybrid Framework for Unknown Network Attack Detection
The detection of previously unseen network attacks remains a major challenge for intrusion detection systems. Although supervised learning methods often perform well on known attack classes, they are limited when new attack types are not represented in the training data. Unsupervised methods are more suitable for detecting zero-day attacks, as they do not require labelled attack samples, but they often suffer from high false positive rates, which limits their real-world usefulness. This paper presents UNAD+, an enhanced framework for unknown network attack detection derived from the previously proposed Unknown Network Attack Detector (UNAD). UNAD+ combines a benign-only unsupervised ensemble with Weighted Majority Voting (WMV), a supervised refinement stage trained on pseudo-labelled detections, and a post hoc explainability layer that provides both local and global explanations. The framework was evaluated on the CICIDS2017 and NSL-KDD benchmark datasets. The results show that UNAD+ improves on the original UNAD framework, achieving F1-scores above 98% across the benchmark datasets while significantly reducing false positives and enhancing transparency and deployment suitability through integrated explainability.
GMA-SAWGAN-GP: A Novel Data Generative Framework to Enhance IDS Detection Performance
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is often calibrated to known attacks and generalizes poorly to unknown threats. This paper proposes GMA-SAWGAN-GP, a novel generative augmentation framework built on a Self-Attention-enhanced Wasserstein GAN with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP). The generator employs Gumbel-Softmax regularization to model discrete fields, while a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP)-based AutoEncoder acts as a manifold regularizer. A lightweight gating network adaptively balances adversarial and reconstruction losses via entropy regularization, improving stability and mitigating mode collapse. The self-attention mechanism enables the generator to capture both short- and long-range dependencies among features within each record while preserving categorical semantics through Gumbel-Softmax heads. Extensive experiments on NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CICIDS2017 using five representative IDS models demonstrate that GMA-SAWGAN-GP significantly improves detection performance on known attacks and enhances generalization to unknown attacks. Leave-One-Attack-type-Out (LOAO) evaluations using Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) and True Positive Rate at a 5 percent False Positive Rate confirm that IDS models trained on augmented datasets achieve higher robustness under unseen attack scenarios. Ablation studies validate the contribution of each component to performance gains. Compared with baseline models, the proposed framework improves binary classification accuracy by an average of 5.3 percent and multi-classification accuracy by 2.2 percent, while AUROC and True Positive Rate at a 5 percent False Positive Rate for unknown attacks increase by 3.9 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively, across the three datasets. Overall, GMA-SAWGAN-GP provides an effective approach to generative augmentation for mixed-type network traffic, improving IDS accuracy and resilience.
A Novel Solution for Zero-Day Attack Detection in IDS using Self-Attention and Jensen-Shannon Divergence in WGAN-GP
The increasing sophistication of cyber threats, especially zero-day attacks, poses a significant challenge to cybersecurity. Zero-day attacks exploit unknown vulnerabilities, making them difficult to detect and defend against. Existing approaches patch flaws and deploy an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Using advanced Wasserstein GANs with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP), this paper makes a novel proposition to synthesize network traffic that mimics zero-day patterns, enriching data diversity and improving IDS generalization. SA-WGAN-GP is first introduced, which adds a Self-Attention (SA) mechanism to capture long-range cross-feature dependencies by reshaping the feature vector into tokens after dense projections. A JS-WGAN-GP is then proposed, which adds a Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence-based auxiliary discriminator that is trained with Binary Cross-Entropy (BCE), frozen during updates, and used to regularize the generator for smoother gradients and higher sample quality. Third, SA-JS-WGAN-GP is created by combining the SA mechanism with JS divergence, thereby enhancing the data generation ability of WGAN-GP. As data augmentation does not equate with true zero-day attack discovery, we emulate zero-day attacks via the leave-one-attack-type-out method on the NSL-KDD dataset for training all GANs and IDS models in the assessment of the effectiveness of the proposed solution. The evaluation results show that integrating SA and JS divergence into WGAN-GP yields superior IDS performance and more effective zero-day risk detection.
ThreatFormer-IDS: Robust Transformer Intrusion Detection with Zero-Day Generalization and Explainable Attribution
Intrusion detection in IoT and industrial networks requires models that can detect rare attacks at low false-positive rates while remaining reliable under evolving traffic and limited labels. Existing IDS solutions often report strong in-distribution accuracy, but they may degrade when evaluated on future traffic, unseen (zero-day) attack families, or adversarial feature manipulations, and many systems provide limited evidence to support analyst triage. To address these gaps, we propose ThreatFormer- IDS, a Transformer-based sequence modeling framework that converts flow records into time-ordered windows and learns contextual representations for robust intrusion screening. The method combines (i) weighted supervised learning for imbalanced detection, (ii) masked self-supervised learning to improve representation stability under drift and sparse labels, (iii) PGDbased adversarial training with scale-normalized perturbations to strengthen resilience against feature-level evasion, and (iv) Integrated Gradients attribution to highlight influential time steps and features for each alert. On the ToN IoT benchmark with chronological evaluation, ThreatFormer-IDS achieves AUCROC 0.994, AUC-PR 0.956, and Recall@1%FPR 0.910, outperforming strong tree-based and sequence baselines. Under a zero-day protocol with held-out attack families, it maintains superior generalization (AUC-PR 0.721, Recall@1%FPR 0.783). Robustness tests further show slower degradation in AUCPR as the adversarial budget increases, confirming improved stability under bounded perturbations. Overall, ThreatFormer- IDS provides a unified, deployment-oriented IDS pipeline that balances detection quality, zero-day behavior, robustness, and explainability.
Collaborative Zone-Adaptive Zero-Day Intrusion Detection for IoBT
The Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) relies on heterogeneous, bandwidth-constrained, and intermittently connected tactical networks that face rapidly evolving cyber threats. In this setting, intrusion detection cannot depend on continuous central collection of raw traffic due to disrupted links, latency, operational security limits, and non-IID traffic across zones. We present Zone-Adaptive Intrusion Detection (ZAID), a collaborative detection and model-improvement framework for unseen attack types, where "zero-day" refers to previously unobserved attack families and behaviours (not vulnerability disclosure timing). ZAID combines a universal convolutional model for generalisable traffic representations, an autoencoder-based reconstruction signal as an auxiliary anomaly score, and lightweight adapter modules for parameter-efficient zone adaptation. To support cross-zone generalisation under constrained connectivity, ZAID uses federated aggregation and pseudo-labelling to leverage locally observed, weakly labelled behaviours. We evaluate ZAID on ToN_IoT using a zero-day protocol that excludes MITM, DDoS, and DoS from supervised training and introduces them during zone-level deployment and adaptation. ZAID achieves up to 83.16% accuracy on unseen attack traffic and transfers to UNSW-NB15 under the same procedure, with a best accuracy of 71.64%. These results indicate that parameter-efficient, zone-personalised collaboration can improve the detection of previously unseen attacks in contested IoBT environments.