Data Market Design through Deep Learning

Data acquisition is a major bottleneck for learning in real-time streams: analysts must decide on the fly which labels to purchase while respecting a rolling budget. However, existing online active learning rarely unifies pricing, information gain, and rolling budget constraints under concept drift. We introduce QueryMarket, a market-inspired framework that queries each incoming data point based on its estimated utility to the model and its price. Within this framework, we propose OVBAL (online variance-based active learning), which integrates data pricing with information-driven selection by estimating each sample's marginal utility via a D-optimality criterion with exponential forgetting and executing cost-aware purchases under rolling budget constraints. OVBAL yields a simple, fully online decision rule that adapts to nonstationary streams and heterogeneous label costs. Experiments on synthetic data and a real-world solar power generation forecasting task show that OVBAL is particularly effective under seller-centric pricing and yields a more favorable long-run error-cost trade-off in the real-world task under both pricing schemes.

Characterizing revenue-optimal auctions for multi-item, multi-bidder settings remains a fundamental open problem, with no known closed-form solution existing beyond restrictive binary-type instances. This has motivated interest in computational approaches to optimal auction design. In this paper, we introduce the first computational framework that directly tackles the dual problem for multi-item, multi-bidder auctions and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), generating certified revenue upper bounds. Our approach parametrizes Lagrange multipliers with a structurally guaranteed strict flow-conservation property using neural networks, enabling efficient optimization over feasible dual solutions via gradient descent. To bridge the gap between discrete computational methods and theoretical guarantees for continuous types, we develop a novel lifting technique that maps dual certificates from coarse discretizations to fine refinements. We prove that lifting gives valid revenue upper bounds for multi-item, multi-bidder auctions with continuous uniform valuations. Furthermore, we give a generalized lifting construction for arbitrary continuous distributions and demonstrate that these lifted duals converge to the revenue of the original continuous problem in the discrete limit. We validate this computational framework for the dual auction design problem by recovering known analytical mechanisms for canonical instances. For multi-item multi-bidder problems, our framework establishes a small gap between the optimal revenue and best-known DSIC mechanisms, providing computational certificates of near-optimality.

We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them. The principal may use any bounded outcome-contingent payment vector, and the agent's best response can make expected profit discontinuous in those payments. For every fixed number $m\ge2$ of outcomes, the minimax regret over $T$ rounds is of order $T^{m/(m+1)}$, up to logarithmic factors. The upper bound allows arbitrary action spaces and agent heterogeneity, without smoothness or monotone-surplus assumptions. Its key is an effective-dimension reduction that the benchmark can be normalized even when fixed tie-breaking is not shift invariant, after which revealed preference yields a monotone response map in payment-difference coordinates. A learning policy built on a Lipschitz parametrization of this map attains the rate using only observed outcome categories. The lower-bound construction accounts for how incentive losses accumulate across outcome dimensions. It shows that each additional contractible outcome creates a precise and unavoidable increase in the worst-case cost of learning.