Grounded in the premise that high-level intelligence can emerge from low-level signal processing, we hypothesise a set of requirements necessary for artificial general intelligence. They characterise systems that learn by predicting spatially and temporally structured signals of initially unknown meaning, and draw on principles observed in cognitive neuroscience, from learning from an uninformed state to real-time liveness. To enable empirical testing and rejection of the hypothesis, we introduce a testbed of transparent, reusable tests, one per requirement. Failing a test exposes a violation of a requirement, but passing is not conclusive: a transparent testbed cannot detect systems engineered around its tests, and such systems can pass it without being intelligent. Passing is therefore meaningful only for systems developed without knowledge of the tests, and none has yet been reported. The testbed thus serves as a necessary-condition filter rather than as proof of progress toward general intelligence. Its reference implementation is publicly available.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: (a) Example of a 10-bit input x with four bits set. (b) Example of an input sequence.
Fig. 2: Iterative adaptation in discrete time. Following input xt , the system At issues the prediction xt+1∗ . Upon observing the realised input xt+1 , it updates in response to the error in the second bit and produces the next one-step-ahead prediction xt+2∗ .
General intelligence, of the kind that underwrites the full range of human cognitive achievement, is not a property of computational architecture alone. This paper advances a single thesis: the structural constraints on general intelligence occupy distinct levels of description and are mutually non-reducible, in the sense that the special-sciences tradition gives to that term. It follows that no single architectural advance, and no continuation of the scaling programme by itself, can produce artificial general intelligence (AGI), and that research programmes must be evaluated against the full constraint profile rather than against performance on any one benchmark. The thesis is developed through a method that reads general intelligence through four evidential lenses, AI systems research, anthropology, law, and economics, each anchored to a distinct level of description, supplemented by speculative fiction used as a disciplined heuristic in the context of discovery rather than the context of justification. Applying the method yields a taxonomy of twenty-three structural constraints organised into eight clusters; six are examined in depth and ordered as an ascending ladder of levels, with explicit bridges showing why progress at one level cannot carry to the next. The argument issues in five falsifiable predictions, each stated with a named benchmark family and a disconfirmation condition, converting a descriptive framework into a research programme with a longer horizon than the scaling hypothesis implies.
Subhomoy Bakshi
Lakshmikumaran and Sridharan Attorneys, New Delhi, India
In our book Why machines will never rule the world [13, 14] we argue that arti- ficial general intelligence is mathematically impossible. This is because the human beings and the processes which exhibit intelligence are complex systems whose be- haviour cannot be captured by the kinds of models that we can generate with or without computers. Proponents of contemporary machine intelligence respond with two lines of argument: a theoretical one, grounded in the universal approximation theorems for neural networks and the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle; and an em- pirical one, grounded in rapidly rising scores on standardized benchmarks. In this communication we examine and reject both responses. First, we show serious issues in the physicalist counter-argument based on the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle. Second, we review recent evidence to the effect that prominent benchmarks are compromised by training-data contamination, flawed test construction, and strate- gic optimization. Our central argument remains: That models required to perform cognitive behaviour in open-ended, thermodynamically complex and non-ergodic environments are not and will not become achievable.
Current large language models are extraordinary statistical engines. They compress vast amounts of text into useful patterns and can explain science, write code, imitate reasoning, and participate in philosophical conversation. Yet pattern mastery is not the same as general intelligence. A human infant begins with little explicit knowledge, but gradually discovers object permanence, cause and effect, other minds, bodily agency, and the persistence of the physical world. We make an argument that the path to artificial superintelligence (ASI) depends on a missing capacity we call situation perception: the ability to construct, revise, and act within internal simulations of possible worlds across latent time. perception requires at least three core components: abstract prediction, long-term compressed memory, and active learning guided by objectives. In this work, we analyse why modern large language models remain incomplete, and propose the appropriate tests for measuring progress and consequences of machines that can simulate futures, pursue self-directed goals, and possibly judge their own creators.
Ziqin Yuan, Jaymari Chua
School of Computer Science and Engineering The University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia