A Communication-First Account of Explanation

Explaining why a specific outcome occurred, and which inputs deserve the blame or credit, is central to philosophical, scientific, and policy analysis. Existing tools split into two camps. The theory of actual causality (AC) gives principled verdicts, but only for toy-sized models, because computing them requires enumerating counterfactual scenarios. Scalable attribution methods like SHAP (or even causal SHAP) at least partially ignore the causal structure that generated the data, and can give answers that conflict with a careful causal analysis. We close this gap with Probabilistic Causal Impact (PCI). PCI builds on actual causality and on Pearl's notions of probability of necessity and sufficiency, but recasts the question of explainability as an estimation problem on a probabilistic causal model that is easily approximated via Monte Carlo. By specifying a distribution over "candidate explanations," a distribution over counterfactual values, and a scoring function, PCI provides tractable, causally grounded, graded explanations, generalizing AC and Pearl's probability of causation as degenerate cases. We evaluate PCI in synthetic and real-world examples, spanning consistency checks with AC, scaling experiments, complex continuous-valued dynamical systems, and a real-world deployed causal machine learning model trained on millions of datapoints.

Natural-language explanations are often treated as a unified interface for understanding model behavior, but different explanation sources may support simulation in different ways. This paper compares two families of explanations for question answering models: verbalized feature attributions and self-generated rationales. We evaluate them under a shared counterfactual simulation setting, using an LLM judge as predictor and measuring whether it can better predict a model's answers to follow-up questions when given its explanation. Across multiple instruction-tuned models, we analyze how explanation source, verbalization strategy, and feature granularity affect the simulatability of explanations. Our results show that explanation format and granularity affect simulatability: attribution-based explanations and self-generated rationales differ in how much they improve counterfactual prediction, with effects that vary across models and formats.

Explanations are central to causal reasoning, and cognitive science has long established that the human drive to explain is itself a mechanism for learning about causality. Despite this, learning from those abductive signals is largely ignored in artificial intelligence. While explainable AI (XAI) increasingly draws on causal models to generate explanations, the converse direction about what explanations can do for causality remains largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we propose xWhyL, a formal framework connecting causality and XAI by learning causal models from explanations. We develop a mathematical theory that translates explanations into a learning signal complementary to observational data, and demonstrate how it enables overcoming the limits of observational causal discovery. As explanations can be derived from incorrect beliefs and clash with data, a tension we call the Causal Tug-of-War, we prove conditions under which our framework rejects misspecified explanations rather than absorbing them. Our practical instantiation, Causal Interactive Learning (CIL), shows how expert explanations can efficiently support causal discovery and distinguish correct from incorrect explanations.