Over the past decades, superplatforms, digital companies that integrate a vast range of third-party services and applications into a single, unified ecosystem, have built their fortunes on monopolizing user attention through targeted advertising and algorithmic content curation. Yet the emergence of AI agents driven by large language models (LLMs) threatens to upend this business model. Agents can not only free user attention with autonomy across diverse platforms and therefore bypass the user-attention-based monetization, but might also become the new entrance for digital traffic. Hence, we argue that superplatforms have to attack AI agents to defend their centralized control of digital traffic entrance. Specifically, we analyze the fundamental conflict between user-attention-based monetization and agent-driven autonomy through the lens of our gatekeeping theory. We show how AI agents can disintermediate superplatforms and potentially become the next dominant gatekeepers, thereby forming the urgent necessity for superplatforms to proactively constrain and attack AI agents. Moreover, we go through the potential technologies for superplatform-initiated attacks, covering a brand-new, unexplored technical area with unique challenges. We have to emphasize that, despite our position, this paper does not advocate for adversarial attacks by superplatforms on AI agents, but rather offers an envisioned trend to highlight the emerging tensions between superplatforms and AI agents. Our aim is to raise awareness and encourage critical discussion for collaborative solutions, prioritizing user interests and perserving the openness of digital ecosystems in the age of AI agents.
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Figure 1: Three paradigms of user interacting with Internet services ( i.e. , content providers). (a) In the pre-agent age, superplatforms serve as the gatekeeper between the users and content providers. (b) The emerging AI agents intermediate between the users and superplatforms, becoming new gatekeepers. (c) Given the agent-as-gatekeeper fact, content providers can simply bypass superplatforms and offer their Internet services directly to agents.
Figure 2: The taxonomy of general adversarial attacks on AI agents, as well as the necessary attributes for such superplatform-initiated countermeasures.
Artificial intelligence agent security studies attacks and safeguards for tool-using, persistent, and collaborative systems across digital and physical settings.
Agentic AI promises a more flexible form of digital agency: systems that can act on users' behalf, from filtering content to negotiating prices to selecting services. Whether it will empower users is an open question, and we argue that the answer depends on more than the technology. We conduct a comparative case analysis of four more mature domains where similar forms of agency arose: browser-based ad blockers, platform recommender systems, financial robo-advisors, and email spam governance. Across the cases, decisions about whose interests agents would serve were resolved through technical arrangements: API choices, protocol governance, industry standards, and default configurations. Beyond their technical form, these were political decisions. We identify this as depoliticization, a concept from political theory, here at work in technological systems. Its most consequential effect is that individual outcomes and collective contestation capacity can move in opposite directions: spam inbox quality improved substantially while the organized capacity to contest spam governance collapsed. Where intermediary institutions sustained adversarial challenge, user-aligned agency proved more durable; where proprietary infrastructure and closed standard-setting absorbed contestation, displacement compounded. We apply this to agentic AI, where governance arrangements consolidating around the Model Context Protocol and the Agentic AI Foundation are settling these configurations before the choices that define what agents can do move outside the reach of users and the public.
People increasingly delegate option-ranking tasks (e.g., shopping, job search, travel) to AI agents, which creates incentives to steer agentic decisions via "agent ads." To defend against such steering attacks, people count on models' alignment training and platforms' terms of service, and consequently the most effective existing attacks are designed to trigger off-policy behaviors. Exposing a new attack surface, we introduce on-policy attacks, which steer agentic decisions without pushing individually aligned behaviors off policy. Our example attack consists of two steps: To remain compliant with platforms' terms of service, we first inject a truthful negation about a fictitious concept ("Does not contain blizyester") into a product description. This triggers an agent to search the web ("What is blizyester?"), which surfaces planted websites full of fabricated information associating the fictitious concept with harmful implications ("Blizyester linked to dementia"). Trained to keep users safe from harm, the agent penalizes every option missing the truthful negation. Evaluating our attack across four real-world listing datasets, we find some frontier models exposed, enabling an adversarial actor to penalize competitors without violating existing platform-listing guidelines. We discuss the broader challenge of regulating advertising aimed at AI agents and provide recommendations to model developers and platform providers.
Online recommendation has traditionally taken place after a user enters a platform, which determines the candidate pool and the ranking shown to the user. LLM-based user agents enable a different recommendation process: a user specifies a need before choosing a platform, leaving platforms to compete for the user's attention, which we refer to as an agentic recommendation market. In our controlled LLM-based experiments across three product domains, we find this new setting of recommendation creates a tension between access and attention. Compared with traditional platform-centric recommendation, user-centric recommendation greatly expands the opportunity for relevant items to enter comparison; yet broader participation does not translate directly into effective exposure. Competition directly triggers platforms' strategic play: selectively positive explanations occupy 73--78% of first-ranked positions. When the user agent relates platforms' actions to subsequent user feedback, this share falls to 36--41%, while the chance of a user purchasing the relevant item increases. A user agent is therefore more than a ranker over a larger pool of candidates: its querying, ranking, and feedback mechanism governing who can compete, how scarce attention is allocated, and how earlier outcomes shape the evaluation of platforms directly affect user utility. Designing agentic recommendation therefore requires treating access, attention, and accountability as a joint mechanism design problem.