Unequal Uncertainty: Rethinking Algorithmic Interventions for Mitigating Discrimination from AI

Fair machine learning (ML) methods help identify and mitigate the risk that algorithms encode or automate social injustices. Algorithmic approaches alone cannot resolve structural inequalities, but they can support socio-technical decision systems by surfacing discriminatory biases, clarifying trade-offs, and enabling governance. Although fairness is well studied in supervised learning, many real ML applications are online and sequential, with prior decisions informing future ones. Each decision is taken under uncertainty due to unobserved counterfactuals and finite samples, with dire consequences for under-represented groups, systematically under-observed due to historical exclusion and selective feedback. A bank cannot know whether a denied loan would have been repaid, and may have less data on marginalized populations. This paper introduces a taxonomy of uncertainty in sequential decision-making -- model, feedback, and prediction uncertainty -- providing shared vocabulary for assessing systems where uncertainty is unevenly distributed across groups. We formalize model and feedback uncertainty via counterfactual logic and reinforcement learning, and illustrate harms to decision makers (unrealized gains/losses) and subjects (compounding exclusion, reduced access) of policies that ignore the unobserved space. Algorithmic examples show it is possible to reduce outcome variance for disadvantaged groups while preserving institutional objectives (e.g. expected utility). Experiments on data simulated with varying bias show how unequal uncertainty and selective feedback produce disparities, and how uncertainty-aware exploration alters fairness metrics. The framework equips practitioners to diagnose, audit, and govern fairness risks. Where uncertainty drives unfairness rather than incidental noise, accounting for it is essential to fair and effective decision-making.

Machine learning models are widely used in clinical applications, social media, law enforcement and critical infrastructure. Verifying whether their outputs are biased against disadvantaged groups or individuals is crucial to ensuring they are fair and allowing their use in such settings. A rigorous risk assessment of possible fairness violations requires quantifying the uncertainty associated with selecting and estimating such models. Yet, this is rarely done in the literature, which focuses on identifying a single model with a suitable trade-off between predictive accuracy and fairness. In this paper, we move beyond point estimation and discuss frequentist and Bayesian approaches to uncertainty quantification for fair machine learning, with practical examples and implications for simulated and real data.

Machine learning systems increasingly make life-changing decisions about individuals, such as loan approvals, hiring, and cheating detection, raising a pressing question: how can individuals respond to negative decisions made by these opaque systems? While explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) has largely focused on algorithmic recourse -- helping individuals change their features to obtain a desired outcome -- the parallel problem of algorithmic contestability -- helping individuals review and correct erroneous algorithmic decisions -- has received far less attention, despite its central ethical and legal importance. We trace this neglect to the absence of clear formal definitions and a systematic operationalization of contestability as an algorithmic problem. To address it, we propose an operational definition of contestability as a natural complement to recourse: contestability starts from the presumption that a decision may be incorrect and focuses on identifying evidence to challenge and potentially overturn it, whereas recourse assumes the decision is valid and instead provides pathways for changing it. We show that standard XAI explanations, such as counterfactuals, LIME, or Anchors, even when combined with human intuitions about decision continuity or monotonicity, reveal only errors in the neighborhood of the individual, but provide insufficient grounds for overturning the decision at hand. Going thus beyond traditional XAI, we identify three types of evidence warranting reversal according to the decision maker's own ethical standards: predictive multiplicity, incorrect feature values, and neglected overruling evidence. We argue that these render decisions normatively indefensible and thus successfully contestable. Finally, we analyze how existing EU legislation connects to our framework and argue that individuals already hold some legal rights to these forms of evidence.