Predicting Effects, Missing Distributions: Evaluating LLMs as Human Behavior Simulators in Operations Management

We introduce UnpredictaBench, an evaluation that tests the ability of large language models (LLMs) to capture true underlying distributions. As LLMs are increasingly used as substitutes for other entities (e.g., for humans in economic simulations), the tendency of many models to collapse towards a single plausible answer means a failure to capture the unpredictability of real systems. Recent work on improving output diversity is insufficient for this setting: simulation requires samples that are calibrated to a target distribution, not merely varied outputs. UnpredictaBench isolates a simplified but fundamental version of this problem: sampling outcomes from individual target distributions, including canonical statistical distributions, distributions induced by stochastic programs, and natural-language scenarios that describe random processes. We introduce 448 such problems together with KS@N, a general-purpose evaluation metric that quantifies how well a model outputs approximate black-box target distributions via the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test. This is the rate at which we fail to reject model samples of size N against ground-truth samples, with larger N indicating greater difficulty. Tested across open and proprietary models, we find a large spread in distributional capabilities. For instance, when models generate samples of size 100 (KS@100, our standard metric), scores range from near 0 to over 20%. No model is able to achieve over 40% at KS@100, showing significant headroom in distributional sampling as a capability. Although adding reasoning can somewhat increase scores, we find no immediate solution for this issue. UnpredictaBench shows that even simple distributional simulation remains challenging, making it a necessary first step toward using LLMs as stand-ins for complex systems. Project website and resources are available at https://unpredictabenchmark.github.io/.

LLMs are increasingly used to simulate human survey responses, but prior work has mainly evaluated replication using mean-level or aggregate agreement, offering limited insight into whether LLMs reproduce the variability of human behavior. We evaluate LLM-based survey replication at the distributional level using a non-public 2010 consumer choice experiment on Korean instant noodle purchases, a setting unlikely to overlap with model training data. We evaluate three response variables of differing statistical type: binary purchase incidence, categorical brand choice, and count purchase quantity. For each, we compare human and LLM responses at mean-level, pattern, and distributional alignment, and against reference baselines from the human data alone. LLMs reproduce condition-level patterns reasonably well but fail to capture distributional structure: for purchase quantity, no model beats a condition-insensitive baseline that simply matches the pooled human distribution. Because models that match human means well can still produce distributions further from humans than this baseline, mean-based evaluation alone can be actively misleading. Replication also varies with input configuration, with structured personas and multimodal inputs improving alignment while explicit reasoning prompting degrades it monotonically.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences. Yet how closely LLMs mirror human decision-making remains poorly understood. This gap is critical: misalignment could produce harmful outcomes in practice, while failure to replicate human behavior renders LLMs ineffective as social simulators. Here, we address this gap by replicating large-scale game-theoretic experiments and by introducing a systematic prompting and probing framework for machine-behavioral evaluation. We test three open models typically used to power agents (Llama, Mistral, and Qwen). Across 121 dyadic games spanning four classical game types, Llama reproduces human cooperation patterns with high fidelity, while Qwen aligns closely with Nash equilibrium predictions. Characterizing models through behavioral phenotyping, we find that humans and Llama share an envious decision profile, while Qwen and Mistral exhibit different profiles. An attention-based analysis of payoff salience reveals Llama processes payoff information in a structured, layer-dependent manner absent in Qwen and Mistral, suggesting a mechanistic basis for its closer alignment with human behavior. Population-level behavioral replication is achieved without persona-based prompting, simplifying the simulation process. Extending the experimental parameter space beyond the original human-tested games, we generate and preregister testable hypotheses for novel game configurations. Our findings demonstrate appropriately configured LLMs can replicate aggregate human behavioral patterns, exhibit human-like decision phenotypes, and enable systematic exploration of unexplored experimental spaces, offering a complementary approach to traditional behavioral research that generates new empirical predictions about human social decision-making.