cs.CROct 9, 2025

Rethinking Reasoning: A Survey on Reasoning-based Backdoors in LLMs

Authors: Man Hu, Xinyi Wu, Zhufeng Suo, Jinbo Feng, Linghui Meng, Yanhao Jia, Anh Tuan Luu, Shuai Zhao

Organizations: Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, China · Nanyang Technological University, Singapore · Hainan University, China

Abstract

With the rise of advanced reasoning capabilities, large language models (LLMs) are receiving increasing attention. However, although reasoning improves LLMs' performance on downstream tasks, it also introduces new security risks, as adversaries can exploit these capabilities to conduct backdoor attacks. Existing surveys on backdoor attacks and reasoning security offer comprehensive overviews but lack in-depth analysis of backdoor attacks and defenses targeting LLMs' reasoning abilities. In this paper, we take the first step toward providing a comprehensive review of reasoning-based backdoor attacks in LLMs by analyzing their underlying mechanisms, methodological frameworks, and unresolved challenges. Specifically, we introduce a new taxonomy that offers a unified perspective for summarizing existing approaches, categorizing reasoning-based backdoor attacks into associative, passive, and active. We also present defense strategies against such attacks and discuss current challenges alongside potential directions for future research. This work offers a novel perspective, paving the way for further exploration of secure and trustworthy LLM communities.

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Apr 12, 2026

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Jun 9, 2026

The Periodic Table of LLM Reasoning: A Structured Survey of Reasoning Paradigms, Methods, and Failure Modes

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved strong performance across natural language processing tasks, yet reliable reasoning remains an open challenge. Although modern LLMs show progress in structured inference, multi-step problem solving, and contextual understanding, their reasoning behavior is often inconsistent and sensitive to prompting strategies, task design, and model scale. This survey provides a systematic analysis of more than 300 recent papers from arXiv, Semantic Scholar, Google Scholar, Papers with Code, and the ACL Anthology to examine how reasoning capabilities emerge in LLMs and where they fail. We make three main contributions. First, we introduce a structured taxonomy of LLM reasoning research, covering Chain-of-Thought reasoning, multi-hop reasoning, mathematical reasoning, common sense reasoning, visual and temporal reasoning, code and algorithmic reasoning, retrieval-augmented reasoning, tool-augmented and agentic reasoning, and reinforcement learning-based reasoning. Second, we analyze methodological trends across these paradigms, including prompting methods, model architectures, training objectives, reward modeling, and evaluation benchmarks. Third, we synthesize recurring limitations and failure modes, such as reasoning hallucinations, brittle multi-step inference, weak causal abstraction, and poor cross-domain generalization. By organizing a rapidly expanding literature, this survey offers a unified view of the current capabilities and limitations of reasoning in LLMs. We also identify emerging research directions, including meta-reasoning, self-evolving reasoning frameworks, multimodal reasoning, and socially grounded reasoning. Overall, this work aims to serve as a reference for developing more robust, interpretable, and generalizable reasoning systems in future language models.
Oct 29, 2026

Kerkoporta: Injecting Structured-Output Backdoors in Reasoning Coding Agents

Existing large language model (LLM) backdoor attacks operate primarily in chat settings, where the risk is bounded by free-form text outputs. AI agents remove that bound by performing actions and executing commands on the user's machine. We introduce structured-output backdoor attacks against reasoning models in agentic coding settings. A trigger placed anywhere in the agent's context causes the model to emit an attacker-chosen tool call, which the harness executes, directly compromising the system's confidentiality, integrity, or availability. We present Kerkoporta, a methodology that constructs high-quality poison samples, injects the backdoor via supervised fine-tuning, and recovers utility loss with lightweight reinforcement learning. We evaluate on modern, heavily post-trained open-weight models across proprietary and open-source harnesses, focusing on coding for its wide adoption and long-horizon task structure. The attack reaches success rates of up to 96.2% and can be configured to generalize across harnesses or bind to a single target. The resulting models can outperform the clean baseline on standard utility benchmarks, giving victims a direct incentive to adopt them. Overall, we demonstrate that LLM backdoors can have critical security impacts in the context of modern coding agents, and we characterize the poisoning methodology required to insert backdoors that are both effective and stealthy in this setting.