cs.LGOct 15, 2025

Probabilistic Prediction Markets with Intermittent Contributions

Authors: Michael Vitali, Pierre Pinson

Organizations: Dyson School of Design Engineering, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom · Halfspace, Denmark · Department of Technology, Management and Economics, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark · CoRE, Aarhus University, Denmark

Abstract

Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative game-theoretical frameworks, we place ourselves in a more general framework, based on prediction markets. There, independent agents trade forecasts of uncertain future events in exchange for rewards. We introduce and analyse a prediction market operating with a fixed pool of agents that (i) accounts for the historical performance, (ii) adapts to time-varying conditions, while (iii) accommodates intermittent forecast submissions. The proposed design employs robust regression models to learn the optimal forecasts' combination whilst handling missing submissions. Moreover, we introduce a pay-off allocation mechanism that considers both in-sample and out-of-sample performance while satisfying several desirable economic properties. Case studies using simulated and real-world data demonstrate the effectiveness and adaptability of the proposed market design.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Apr 5, 2026

TimeSeek: Temporal Reliability of Agentic Forecasters

We introduce TimeSeek, a benchmark for studying how the reliability of agentic LLM forecasters changes over a prediction market's lifecycle. We evaluate 10 frontier models on 150 CFTC-regulated Kalshi binary markets at five temporal checkpoints, with and without web search, for 15,000 forecasts total. Models are most competitive early in a market's life and on high-uncertainty markets, but much less competitive near resolution and on strong-consensus markets. Web search improves pooled Brier Skill Score (BSS) for every model overall, yet hurts in 12% of model-checkpoint pairs, indicating that retrieval is helpful on average but not uniformly so. Simple two-model ensembles reduce error without surpassing the market overall. These descriptive results motivate time-aware evaluation and selective-deference policies rather than a single market snapshot or a uniform tool-use setting.
Apr 22, 2026

Unlocking the Forecasting Economy: A Suite of Datasets for the Full Lifecycle of Prediction Market: [Experiments & Analysis]

Prediction markets are markets for trading claims on future events, such as presidential elections, and their prices provide continuously updated signals of collective beliefs. In decentralized platforms such as Polymarket, the market lifecycle spans market creation, token registration, trading, oracle interaction, dispute, and final settlement, yet the corresponding data are fragmented across heterogeneous off-chain and on-chain sources. We present the first continuously maintained dataset suite for the full lifecycle of decentralized prediction markets, built on Polymarket. To address the challenges of large-scale cross-source integration, incomplete linkage, and continuous synchronization, we build a unified relational data system that integrates three canonical layers: market metadata, fill-level trading records, and oracle-resolution events, through identifier resolution, on-chain recovery, and incremental updates. The resulting dataset spans October 2020 to March 2026 and comprises more than 770 thousand market records, over 943 million fill records, and nearly 2 million oracle events. We describe the data model, collection pipeline, and consistency mechanisms that make the dataset reproducible and extensible, and we demonstrate its utility through descriptive analyses of market activity and two downstream case studies: NBA outcome calibration and CPI expectation reconstruction.
Jul 7, 2026

When do prophets profit in prediction markets?

Prediction markets aggregate dispersed beliefs into prices that act as probabilistic forecasts of uncertain events. Classical theory establishes a clean equivalence between forecasting accuracy and trading profit, but only for the specific automated market maker (AMM) design. However, the largest exchanges today are based on central limit order books in which informed forecasters routinely lose money while uninformed strategies can profit on simple heuristics. We resolve this discrepancy by establishing a formal equivalence between predictive accuracy and profitability. For any strictly proper scoring rule SS, we exhibit a "proper" betting strategy that depends only on the forecaster's prediction p\mathbf{p} and the market price q\mathbf{q}, and earns positive expected profit whenever p\mathbf{p} outperforms q\mathbf{q} under SS and the market has sufficient liquidity. Moreover, this proper betting is essentially the only strategy with such robust profitability guarantee. The proof rests on a decomposition of expected profit that strictly generalizes the classical AMM guarantee and also explains how strategies can profit without an accuracy edge. Empirically, across thousands of forecasts by AI models, proper betting is the only strategy that reliably converts accuracy into profit, and we further identify systematic forecasting personas and show how the optimal proper strategy varies across them. A month-long live deployment on Kalshi achieves +80.33%+80.33\% return on investment with a Sharpe ratio of 3.353.35.