econ.THOct 17, 2025

The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance

Authors: Fasheng Xu, Xiaoyu Wang, Wei Chen, Karen Xie

Organizations: School of Business, University of Connecticut · Faculty of Business, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Abstract

Foundation model developers choose how open to make their models. Greater openness lowers downstream adaptation costs but can also make competing models easier to use. In a two-period model, an incumbent chooses its license fee and openness, a deployer adapts the model for users, and an entrant offers a competing model. Usage builds model-specific experience that lowers the deployer's future adaptation cost, creating a data flywheel that favors continued use of the incumbent. We identify conditions under which optimal openness falls and then rises as learning strengthens. The incumbent moves from full openness and a high fee to restricting openness for retention, then to a low fee that builds enough usage and experience to retain the deployer despite greater openness. A full-openness mandate can induce the incumbent to abandon this low-fee strategy. The higher fee can reduce first-period adaptation despite greater openness. An openness trap arises when this welfare loss exceeds the second-period gain from easier adaptation of the entrant's model. The trap can disappear when experience transfers across models. Full integration eliminates the fee between the incumbent and deployer but commits deployment to the incumbent, potentially forgoing a rival that is cheaper to adapt. Integration raises their joint profit, consumer surplus, and welfare when learning is sufficiently strong, but can lower them when learning is weak. A small usage subsidy can benefit both developers, the deployer, and consumers. It can instead induce a fee increase larger than the subsidy and reduced openness, raising the deployer's net payment per use and adaptation costs. The resulting reduction in adaptation lowers welfare even before subsidy expenditure is deducted. These findings connect AI policy to developers' pricing and openness responses and the portability of deployment experience.

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