Superficial Reflection or Genuine Thought? A Fine-Grained Cognitive Analysis of Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on complex tasks, yet their tendency to "overthink" leads to inefficiencies. Although "save-thinking" prompts are intended to mitigate this issue, we find that LRMs still frequently enter the "Still-thinking" mode instead of the expected "No-thinking" mode, especially on difficult queries. To analyze this behavioral divergence, we examine LRMs from three perspectives: confidence at the thinking-termination boundary, divergence in internal attention distributions, and attention allocation across prompt segments. We find that high perplexity is associated with later Still-thinking behavior, and that Still-thinking cases allocate more attention to the original question. Based on these observations, we propose an attention intervention method to regulate this behavior. While this intervention suppresses explicit thinking, it also causes a drop in accuracy, suggesting that the suppressed reasoning behavior is often useful for correctness. Our work provides confidence- and attention-level evidence for this behavior, highlighting the trade-off between instruction following, inference efficiency, and reasoning correctness.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) produce reasoning traces with non-linear structures, such as backtracking and self-correction, that complicate the evaluation and monitoring of the reasoning process. We introduce ReasoningFlow, a framework that captures the discourse structures of LRM reasoning traces into fine-grained directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). We develop and validate our annotation schema through careful manual annotation of 31 traces (2.1k steps), achieving high inter-annotator agreement, then scale to automatic annotation of 1,260 traces (247.7k steps) spanning three tasks (math, science, argumentation) and five models (Qwen2.5-32B-Inst, QwQ-32B, DeepSeek-V3, DeepSeek-R1, GPT-oss-120B). By analyzing ReasoningFlow graphs, we find: (1) LRMs exhibit structurally similar traces, despite being trained from different base models and potentially non-overlapping post-training data. (2) ReasoningFlow reveals diverse fine-grained reasoning behaviors (e.g., local verification, self-reflection, and assumptions) that can be used for better reasoning trace monitorability. (3) In LRMs, most of the erroneous steps are not used to derive final answers. (4) Mechanistic causal dependencies between steps do not reflect the language-level discourse structure. We release the dataset and code in: https://github.com/jinulee-v/reasoningflow.