The Imperfective Paradox in Large Language Models

The imperfective paradox provides a useful test of compositional semantic analysis. Recent work constructs an NLI benchmark and reports that models frequently infer completed telic events from progressive descriptions, attributing this behavior to a Teleological Bias. It further argues that prompting interventions cause a Calibration Crisis. We reexamine the benchmark and conclusions and show that it is substantially affected by conceptual and evaluation mis-specifications. We identify three conceptual mis-specifications. In particular, Aspectual Reduction affects the benchmark construction, analysis, experiments, and conclusions. Under a strict NLI standard, 76% of Group A instances do not explicitly rule out culmination. In our native-speaker annotation, 38% of Group A examples and 29% of the Group C examples were judged to permit an alternative interpretation. To control these issues and lexical variation, we construct Lexically Matched Minimal Pairs. At the evaluation level, we formulate event-semantic NLI as a Multi-step Reasoning Problem and assess both intermediate semantic decisions and final predictions. Our results show that models often do not affirm culmination but nevertheless accept the corresponding simple-past hypothesis, a pattern we characterize as Sufficiency Bias. We further show that prompting interventions produce a Decision Shift among labels without reliably improving the underlying semantic understanding and reasoning. Intermediate and oracle-guided analyses identify two additional failure modes: errors in compositional aspectual classification and Surface-form Attraction toward surface-associated answers. Our experiments on Qwen-7B with suitable prompts, GPT-5.4, and Qwen-72B provide initial evidence for the context sensitivity of aspectual classification and suggest that these models can achieve performance comparable to that of human annotators.

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to summarize and verify claims in critical sources that inform consequential decisions. Such claims are full of plural definites. If three of five patients improved after taking drug A, the claim the patients improved after drug A is not true, since two did not, yet its negation, the patients didn't improve after drug A, is not true either, since three did. In formal semantics, this truth-value gap is known as the Homogeneity Gap: both the plural definite and its negation are neither true nor false when the property holds for only a fraction of the plural referent. A model that cannot represent this gap turns mixed evidence into a clean verdict, an error that can be costly in high-stakes use. We introduce HomogeneityNLI, a diagnostic dataset of 1,000 minimal pair items crossing determiner, polarity, and group composition across ten logical conditions. Evaluating seven open-weight models, we uncover a pervasive Bivalence Bias: models assign plural definites their homogeneous truth conditions. In the zero-shot setting, no model recognizes the gap for both polarities in more than 15% of scenarios, and negated definites are judged False in 84% of cases. Explicit linguistic rules, chain-of-thought, and enumeration prompts produce unstable, model-specific effects that often entrench the bias. Our findings indicate that current open-weight LLMs acquire the truth conditions of plural predication but not its trivalent logic, and cannot yet be trusted to summarize or verify claims whose evidence is mixed.