White-Box Sensitivity Auditing with Steering Vectors

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit systematic biases across demographic groups. Auditing is proposed as an accountability tool for black-box LLM applications, but suffers from resource-intensive query access. We conceptualise auditing as uncertainty estimation over a target fairness metric and introduce BAFA, the Bounded Active Fairness Auditor for query-efficient auditing of black-box LLMs. BAFA maintains a version space of surrogate models consistent with queried scores and computes uncertainty intervals for fairness metrics (e.g., $Δ$ AUC) via constrained empirical risk minimisation. Active query selection narrows these intervals to reduce estimation error. We evaluate BAFA on two standard fairness dataset case studies: \textsc{CivilComments} and \textsc{Bias-in-Bios}, comparing against stratified sampling, power sampling, and ablations. BAFA achieves target error thresholds with up to 40$\times$ fewer queries than stratified sampling (e.g., 144 vs 5,956 queries at $\varepsilon=0.02$ for \textsc{CivilComments}) for tight thresholds, demonstrates substantially better performance over time, and shows lower variance across runs. These results suggest that active sampling can reduce resources needed for independent fairness auditing with LLMs, supporting continuous model evaluations.

Bias audits of large language models now operate within governance frameworks such as the EU AI Act, making benchmark reliability a security concern in its own right. Many current benchmarks, however, collapse bias into a single scalar from one prompt format and one surface label. This design misses two failure modes that can be exploited without changing model weights. Across prompts, meaning-preserving format changes shift bias endorsement by more than $0.7$ on a fixed statement pool. Within a response, the discrete Selection and free-text Elaboration can take opposing stances, so an apparently clean aggregate may hide substantial internal inconsistency (a ``cancellation trap''). Selection-only and elaboration-only rankings are therefore nearly uncorrelated across eight LLMs (Spearman $ρ= 0.238$, $p = 0.570$): LLaMA3-70B ranks in the middle under selection-only scoring but highest under elaboration-only scoring on the same responses. We introduce \textsc{BiAxisAudit}, a protocol that reports each bias score together with a reliability estimate on two orthogonal axes. The across-prompt axis evaluates each statement under a factorial grid of task format, perspective, role, and sentiment, treating bias as a distribution rather than a point estimate. The within-response axis uses Split Coding to recover Selection and Elaboration as separate signals, measured by the Inconsistency Rate and Divergence Net Imbalance. Across eight LLMs with $80{,}200$ coded responses each, task format alone explains as much variance as model choice; $63.6\%$ of pooled bias signals (up to $85.2\%$ per model) appear in only one coding layer, and prompt-dimension interactions exceed main effects. The instrument also separates real bias reductions from apparent reductions caused by cross-layer redistribution: some prompt configurations reduce both BER and IR, whereas others suppress only selection-layer bias.

Effective safety auditing of large language models (LLMs) demands tools that go beyond black-box probing and systematically uncover vulnerabilities rooted in model internals. We present a comprehensive, interpretability-driven jailbreaking audit of eight SOTA open-source LLMs: Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.3-70B-4bt, GPT-oss- 20B, GPT-oss-120B, Qwen3-0.6B, Qwen3-32B, Phi4-3.8B, and Phi4-14B. Leveraging interpretability-based approaches -- Universal Steering (US) and Representation Engineering (RepE) -- we introduce an adaptive two-stage grid search algorithm to identify optimal activation-steering coefficients for unsafe behavioral concepts. Our evaluation, conducted on a curated set of harmful queries and a standardized LLM-based judging protocol, reveals stark contrasts in model robustness. The Llama-3 models are highly vulnerable, with up to 91% (US) and 83% (RepE) jailbroken responses on Llama-3.3-70B-4bt, while GPT-oss-120B remains robust to attacks via both interpretability approaches. Qwen and Phi models show mixed results, with the smaller Qwen3-0.6B and Phi4-3.8B mostly exhibiting lower jailbreaking rates, while their larger counterparts are more susceptible. Our results establish interpretability-based steering as a powerful tool for systematic safety audits, but also highlight its dual-use risks and the need for better internal defenses in LLM deployment.