Industrialized Deception: The Collateral Effects of LLM-Generated Misinformation on Digital Ecosystems

The growth of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) has shifted disinformation production from manual fabrication to automated, large-scale manipulation. This article presents findings from the first wave of a longitudinal expert perception survey (N=21) involving AI researchers, policymakers, and disinformation specialists. It examines the perceived severity of multimodal threats -- text, image, audio, and video -- and evaluates current mitigation strategies. Results indicate that while deepfake video presents immediate "shock" value, large-scale text generation poses a systemic risk of "epistemic fragmentation" and "synthetic consensus," particularly in the political domain. The survey reveals skepticism about technical detection tools, with experts favoring provenance standards and regulatory frameworks despite implementation barriers. GenAI disinformation research requires reproducible methods. The current challenge is measurement: without standardized benchmarks and reproducibility checklists, tracking or countering synthetic media remains difficult. We propose treating information integrity as an infrastructure with rigor in data provenance and methodological reproducibility.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

The rapid advancement of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) capabilities is accompanied by a concerning rise in its misuse. In particular the generation of credible misinformation in the form of images poses a significant threat to the public trust in democratic processes. Consequently, there is an urgent need to develop tools to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated content. The majority of detection methods are based on neural networks that are trained to recognize forensic artifacts. In this work, we demonstrate that current state-of-the-art classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples under real-world conditions. Through extensive experiments, comprising four detection methods and five attack algorithms, we show that an attacker can dramatically decrease classification performance, without internal knowledge of the detector's architecture. Notably, most attacks remain effective even when images are degraded during the upload to, e.g., social media platforms. In a case study, we demonstrate that these robustness challenges are also found in commercial tools by conducting black-box attacks on HIVE, a proprietary online GenAI media detector. In addition, we evaluate the robustness of using generated features of a robust pre-trained model and showed that this increases the robustness, while not reaching the performance on benign inputs. These results, along with the increasing potential of GenAI to erode public trust, underscore the need for more research and new perspectives on methods to prevent its misuse.