UniRank: A Multi-Agent Calibration Pipeline for Estimating University Rankings from Anonymized Bibliometric Signals

With PRECISE, we extended Prediction-Powered Inference to produce bias-corrected estimates of ranking evaluation metrics by combining a small human-labeled set with a large LLM-judged set. PPI is provably unbiased regardless of the LLM judge's error profile. We make it applicable to hierarchical metrics like Precision@K, where annotations are per-document but the metric is per-query, by reducing the output-space computation from O(2^|C|) to O(2^K). On the ESCI benchmark, augmenting 30 human annotations with Claude 3 Sonnet judgments reduces the standard error of Precision@4 estimates from 4.45 to 3.50 (a 21% relative reduction). In a production system, our framework correctly identified the best of three system variants from 100 human labels and 2 hours of domain-expert annotation; A/B testing confirmed this ranking with +407 bps in daily sales.

What a frontier model recalls about a person or tool from its own weights -- before any retrieval step -- often shapes the first description a human sees, making that parametric corpus presence a measurement problem. Citations explain about a third of whether a model recognizes a researcher; we target the residual and build NameRank, a [0,1] recognition score: each of 4,685 entities in 54 cohorts is probed with one open-ended question across 36 models, and an independent judge returns a binary verdict against a curated gold -- did the model state a specific, non-guessable fact about this exact entity? -- so hallucination, context echo, and guesses earn nothing. Synthetic-null entities hold the floor near zero, and verdicts track the entity, not the model. One thesis organizes the findings: recognition is paid to named, indexable artifacts, not to credentials or titles. Every Olympic-style credential sits below a working-researcher baseline, because no named artifact ships with the medal, yet the ranking inverts at the marquee tier, where Nobel, Turing, and Fields laureates saturate the panel. For independent creators the tool out-ranks its maker, and the credential that does propagate is a named method or awarded paper. Being one of many named contributors to a celebrated artifact, by contrast, earns almost nothing -- the authors listed on a flagship model report or system card sit near the recognition floor -- because recognition attaches to the artifact's own distinctive name, not to the roster behind it. No bibliometric predicts recognition well; top-density institutions out-recognize peers at matched citations; and on 258 news events recognition loads on peak salience, not persistence. A self-report probe shows introspection reads a corpus prior, not its own knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) used as listwise rerankers in recommendation systems suffer from position bias when serializing candidate sets into prompts. We show this order sensitivity creates an exploitable attack surface: an attacker can promote a label-0 target into the top-$k$ solely by reordering candidates, without changing item content, labels, or model parameters. We introduce $\mathrm{promo}@k$ to quantify this vulnerability, measuring the fraction of label-0 targets that can be elevated into top-$k$ rankings via permutation. Evaluating across three domains (MovieLens, Amazon Books, and Amazon Fashion), $\mathrm{promo}@5$ reaches up to 0.57 at an attack budget of $R$ = 50 orderings. Furthermore, ordinary permutation stability predicts vulnerability without running the attack. While a bidirectional T5 encoder scorer reduces exposure, permutation-consistency regularization and architectural invariance effectively mitigate it. Pointwise scoring avoids the bias issue but degrades ranking quality. These results demonstrate that input candidate order in listwise LLM reranking is a security-relevant attack vector. Code and data are available at https://github.com/geoz-lab/position_bias_attack.