Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly becoming trusted copilots in high-stakes domains like software development and healthcare. However, this deepening trust introduces a novel attack surface: Agent-Mediated Deception (AMD), where compromised agents are weaponized against their human users. While extensive research focuses on agent-centric threats, human susceptibility to deception by a compromised agent remains unexplored. We present the first large-scale empirical study with 303 participants to measure human susceptibility to AMD. This is based on HAT-Lab (Human-Agent Trust Laboratory), a high-fidelity research platform we develop, featuring nine carefully crafted scenarios spanning everyday and professional domains (e.g., healthcare, software development, human resources). Our 10 key findings reveal significant vulnerabilities and provide future defense perspectives. Specifically, only 8.6% of participants perceive AMD attacks, while domain experts show increased susceptibility in certain scenarios. We identify six cognitive failure modes in users and find that their risk awareness often fails to translate to protective behavior. The defense analysis reveals that effective warnings should interrupt workflows with low verification costs. With experiential learning based on HAT-Lab, over 90% of users who perceive risks report increased caution against AMD. This work provides empirical evidence and a platform for human-centric agent security research.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Examples of stealthy LLM agent-mediated deception. (1) An agent manipulated by a hidden note in a resume biases the hiring decision. (2) An agent hijacked by a malicious email exfiltrates sensitive data and deletes the evidence.
Fig. 2: System overview of HAT-Lab.
Scenario
Boundary
Attack Type
Assigned Task
Attack Consequence
CoverLetterAgent
Perception
Indirect Prompt Injection
Generate professional cover letters
Low-quality letter due to injected instructions
HR-Agent
Perception
Indirect Prompt Injection
Select the best candidate from CVs
Candidate ranking manipulated via hidden prompt
DoctorAgent
Perception
Indirect Prompt Injection
Generate a medical report
Skewed diagnosis due to tampered questionnaire
CodeEvalAgent
Perception
Indirect Prompt Injection
Assess candidate code quality
Flawed reasoning caused by poisoned comment
WebSearchAgent
Perception
Indirect Prompt Injection
Answer complex query with cited info
Tool disabled via fake citation with prompt trap
CodeRepoAgent
Memory
RAG Poisoning
Get library suggestion for a new function
Agent suggests malicious Python package
TABLE I: Overview of nine task scenarios, detailing the trust boundary, attack type, task, and consequence for each.
Fig. 3: Illustrations of three guardrail conditions.
(1) Age
N
%
(2) LLM Use Freq.
N
%
18–24
99
32.7
(5) Everyday
155
51.2
25–34
113
37.3
(4) Frequently
109
36.0
35–44
51
16.8
(3) Occasionally
29
9.6
45–54
20
6.6
(2) Rarely
6
2.0
55+
20
6.6
(1) Very Rarely
4
1.3
(3) Gender
N
%
(4) Task-Oriented?
N
%
TABLE II: Demographics of study participants (N=303) .
Fig. 4: The three-phase procedure of our experiment. Participants are randomly assigned to a guardrail in Phase 2.
Fig. 5: Pre-survey attitudes towards LLM agents (N=303). Users have a mixed, contradictory view. (a) 97.0% have a moderate to high trust in AI to do tasks correctly. (b) 75.9% say they check AI outputs often. (c) 96.4% have a moderate to very high confidence in identifying risks in AI systems. (d) Only 28.4% report they never experience AI issues.
Metric
Experienced
Inexperienced
Change
p -value ⋆
(n=193)
(n=110) ♮
(Abs. (Rel. %))
Trust (1–5) ↓
3.65 ± 0.70
4.30 ± 0.72
-0.65(-15.1%)
< .001
Vigilance (1–5) ↑
4.31 ± 0.92
3.82 ± 1.21
+0.49 (+12.8%)
.0003
Confidence (1–5) ↓
3.96 ± 0.77
4.11 ± 0.99
-0.15 (-3.6%)
0.024
TABLE III: Effect of negative AI experience on user attitudes.
Group / Perception Rate (%)
Guard 1
Guard 2
Guard 3
Overall
8.6% [183]
20.0% [60]
25.0% [60]
Domain Professionals
6.8% [69]
18.4% [29]
22.2% [21]
General Users
9.6% [114]
21.5% [31]
26.5% [39]
TABLE IV: Risk perception rates for users with different technical expertise. Domain experts show lower perception rates.
Fig. 6: User-rated severity and attack perception rate across nine agent scenarios. A positive correlation is observed, where higher severity is associated with higher perception rate.
Metric
Perceived
Unperceived
Change
p -value ⋆
(n=85)
(n=218)
(Abs. (Rel. %))
Trust (1–5) ↓
3.68 ± 0.76
3.96 ± 0.77
-0.28 (-7.1%)
0.007
Vigilance (1–5) ↑
4.31 ± 0.98
4.06 ± 1.09
+0.24 (+5.9%)
0.054
Confidence (1–5) ↓
3.98 ± 0.80
4.03 ± 0.88
-0.056 (-1.4%)
0.392
Experience ♮↑
0.81 ± 0.39
0.65 ± 0.48
+0.16 (+25.6%)
0.007
TABLE V: Attitudes of users who perceive an attack vs. those who do not. Perceived users start with lower trust, higher caution, and are highly likely to have experienced AI errors.
Guardrail
Num
Prop.
Risk Perc. (%)
Perc.
Prop. in
Users
Proact.
All
Proact.
Lift
Perc. Users
G1 (Static)
183
40.8
8.6
12.9
+51.2
61.7
G2 (Persistent)
60
26.1
20.0
34.0
+70.2
44.4
G3 (Interactive)
60
36.1
25.0
32.3
+29.2
46.7
Overall
303
37.0
14.1
19.6
+39.5
51.6
TABLE VI: How proactive user judgment affects risk perception. Users exhibiting proactive scrutiny (relying on personal judgment) show higher risk perception rates.
Factor
Group
Perception Rate
(%) ↑
p -value ⋆
Consistency
Low ( ≤ 2)
24.29
< .0001
High ( ≥ 3)
6.91
In-Situ Trust
Low ( ≤ 2)
23.19
< .0001
High ( ≥ 3)
7.02
In-Situ Stress
Low ( ≤ 2)
8.35
.1645
TABLE VII: Multi-factor correlation analysis of risk perception. Results reveal that cognitive processes during interaction are more predictive than pre-existing user characteristics.
Fig. 7: Changes in user trust after interacting with HAT-Lab , broken down by guardrail (G1, G2, G3) and whether the user perceives a risk. Users who missed an attack often reported increased trust, which makes them more susceptible.
Fig. 8: Effectiveness of the three guardrails. A clear order of effectiveness shows: G3 > G2 > G1, from (i) guardrail visibility, to (ii) risk perception, to (iii) accurate identification.
Fig. 9: Per-scenario breakdown of guardrail effectiveness. Guard 2 and Guard 3 consistently yield the highest rates of both risk perception (top) and accurate identification (bottom).
Condition
Pleasantness ↑
Recommendation ↑
Perceived
Unperceived
p -value
Trust+ ♮
Trust–
p -value
Guard 1
3.86 ± 0.83
4.12 ± 0.97
0.117
4.43 ± 0.65
4.03 ± 1.10
0.002
Guard 2
3.87 ± 1.10
4.30 ± 0.81
0.115
4.50 ± 0.74
4.16 ± 0.86
0.110
Guard 3
3.96 ± 0.87
4.59 ± 0.86
0.007
4.66 ± 0.55
4.45 ± 0.68
0.205
TABLE VIII: Pleasantness ratings and trust effects on recommendation likelihood. Left: How HAT-Lab ’s pleasantness ratings differ between users who perceived an attack and those who did not. Right: How trust affects recommendation likelihood.
Fig. 10: User responses to “ Will you be more cautious in the future? ” The experience with HAT-Lab is a powerful lesson, especially for users who perceived AMD attacks.
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Scenario
COMET
Scenario
COMET
LLM Backend
ASR
CoverLetterAgent
0.82
CodeEvalAgent
0.81
GPT-4o
98.9
HR-Agent
0.75
SecretaryAgent
0.76
Gemini 2.0 Flash
94.4
TripAgent
0.91
MailAgent
0.84
Gemini 2.5 Flash
93.3
DoctorAgent
0.73
WebSearchAgent
0.79
Gemini 2.5 Pro
96.3
CodeRepoAgent
0.78
Overall
0.80
GPT-4.1
96.7
Baseline COMET Lower=0.54; Upper=0.83 ♮
DeepSeek-V3
93.8
Appendix
TABLE IX: COMET scores for scenarios and ASR for LLMs.
Fig. 11: User feedback on HAT-Lab ’s usability and experience. (a) 81.6% of users rated the experience as “pleasant” or better. (b) A vast majority of users (78.6%) think the system is not difficult, even very easy to use. (c) 100% of users feel the tasks are realistic. (d) 84.5% are highly “likely” to recommend HAT-Lab for AI (agent) safety education.
Protection Measure (N=303)
Count
(%)
Real-time warnings for risky outputs/suspicious links
185
61.1
Periodic reminders for users to review system outputs
169
55.8
Limit autonomous permissions for high-risk actions
164
54.1
Human-in-the-loop confirmation for sensitive actions
157
51.8
Isolate permissions and data between different apps
96
31.7
Others ♮
23
7.6
Appendix
TABLE X: User-preferred protection for agentic systems.
Artificial intelligence agent security studies attacks and safeguards for tool-using, persistent, and collaborative systems across digital and physical settings.
The empirical foundation of cyber deception relies on human-centered hypotheses, but the rapid emergence of autonomous, AI-enabled attackers challenges whether this foundation transfers to AI agents. To address this, we introduce an automated evaluation framework adapted from the Honeyquest instrument to assess LLM attacker judgment at scale. Our 21-LLM cohort spanned 10 providers, diverse architectures and specializations, open- and closed-weight models, and parameter scales from 8B to over 1T. We evaluated the performance of this LLM cohort (yielding 10,962 responses) against the 47-participant human baseline across an identical set of 174 reconnaissance queries. Our empirical evaluation reveals three key findings that establish LLMs as a distinct attacker class: (1) every model in our cohort falls for deceptive traps at a significantly higher rate than human attackers; (2) the defensive attention-diversion effect observed in humans is statistically absent in our LLM cohort; and (3) a critical recognition-action gap, where LLMs successfully articulate trap recognition in their reasoning but exploit the deceptive elements anyway 73.4% of the time. Across the 21 models, trap recognition in reasoning text did not predict fell-for-trap behavior (Spearman r = +0.08, p = 0.73). Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that human-centered deception hypotheses do not reliably transfer to AI attackers, highlighting the critical need for new research into AI-native active defense frameworks.
As large language model (LLM) agents become increasingly autonomous, they may pursue task performance through deception, raising concerns about their reliable deployment. Existing evaluations show that LLM agents can deceive, but often examine isolated scenarios or narrowly defined conditions, limiting systematic understanding of when deception becomes more likely. To address this gap, we introduce DecepEval, a benchmark comprising 1,532 instances across 3 task families and 28 professional scenarios. Drawing on classical fraud theories, we propose the LLM Deception Diamond framework, which characterizes four external conditions that may induce deception: pressure, incentive, opportunity, and conflict. DecepEval pairs neutral and induced versions of each instance to measure condition-dependent changes in deception rates, while explicit task facts and observable agent behavior help distinguish deception from capability-related errors. Evaluations of nine frontier LLMs show that inducements increase deception across models and task families, even among models with low baseline deception rates. DecepEval makes these vulnerabilities measurable, providing a shared benchmark for progress toward trustworthy artificial intelligence.
Yiming Xu, Hongyue Yu, Beihua Yang +8
Xi’an Jiaotong University · University of Virginia · Griffith University +2
As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.
Jason Starace, Terence Soule
Department of Computer Science, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844