Improving Parametric Knowledge Access in Reasoning Language Models

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning at the expense of knowledge. We challenge this narrative by showing that reasoning models consistently outperform their instruction-tuned versions on pure knowledge recall tasks. These gains do not reflect newly acquired information, but rather an improved procedural skill in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. Structured prompting, which explicitly guides models through hierarchical traversal -- recovers most of the instruct-reasoning gap across five model families. A controlled RL experiment on unseen, non-extractable facts improves recall of held-out frequent but previously inaccessible facts, ruling out simple data exposure. On depth-stratified retrieval tasks, reasoning models exhibit superior traversal as retrieval depth grows. Layerwise activation analysis further shows that while factual representations maintain high cosine similarity between instruct and reasoning models, query representations diverge noticeably, indicating that reasoning primarily reshapes how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself. Finally, we find that distilled models often fail to match reasoning models on knowledge recall because they imitate self-correction without acquiring the exploratory behavior needed for hierarchical navigation. Together, these findings suggest that improving factual recall in LLMs depends not only on expanding what models know but also on teaching them to navigate it -- motivating future post-training methods that optimize traversal.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved remarkable success in LLM reasoning, but whether it can also improve direct recall of parametric knowledge remains an open question. We study this question in a controlled zero-shot, one-hop, closed-book QA setting with no chain-of-thought, training only on binary correctness rewards and applying fact-level train-test deduplication to ensure gains reflect improved recall rather than reasoning or memorization. Across three model families and multiple factual QA benchmarks, RL yields ~27% average relative gains, surpassing both training- and inference-time baselines alike. Mechanistically, RL primarily redistributes probability mass over existing knowledge rather than acquiring new facts, moving correct answers from the low-probability tail into reliable greedy generations. Our data-attribution study reveals that the hardest examples are the most informative: those whose answers never appear in 128 pre-RL samples (only ~18% of training data) drive ~83% of the gain, since rare correct rollouts still emerge during training and get reinforced. Together, these findings broaden the role of RL beyond reasoning, repositioning it as a tool for unlocking rather than acquiring latent parametric knowledge.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.