Sustainable Multi-Agent Crowdsourcing via Physics-Informed Bandits

Mobile crowdsensing (MC) recruits mobile users to perform sensing tasks using their smartphones, enabling large-scale applications such as traffic monitoring and environmental sensing. A fundamental challenge is online worker recruitment under uncertainty, where the platform must learn workers' sensing performance while operating with a limited budget. Existing learning-based MC recruitment methods typically assume that each worker's sensing quality is stationary with a fixed mean over time. In practice, however, worker performance often improves with experience and eventually stabilizes, while the incurred sensing cost can be unknown in advance due to time-varying device and context states. In this paper, we study a budget-constrained online recruitment problem in which the platform selects one worker in each round, observes the sensing quality and incurred cost, where the expected sensing quality of each worker increases with experience and eventually converges to a plateau, and repeats until the budget is exhausted. We formulate this problem as a structured bandit model where each worker's expected reward evolves according to an unknown increasing-then-converging function of its participation count, and each worker has an unknown expected cost. We develop a cost-aware online learning framework that jointly learns evolving reward trajectories and heterogeneous costs, detects performance saturation, and allocates the limited budget to maximize long-term sensing utility. We provide theoretical performance guarantees and validate the proposed approach through extensive experiments, demonstrating consistent improvements over baselines that ignore experience-driven dynamics or assume known costs.

Crowdsourcing platforms coordinate large pools of online workers who strategically choose which contests to enter and how much effort to invest. This self-selection can leave important contests with too few participants or too little effort, while workers may regret entering contests that leave them worse off than available alternatives. We study how platforms can recommend contests to workers using self-selection in Tullock contests (SSTC), a two-stage model in which workers first choose contests and then compete within them. We introduce GRAF, a greedy polynomial-time framework that constructs self-selection outcomes by ordering workers according to a score vector, with guarantees of zero worker regret and platform optimality in special cases of SSTC. Because effective orderings are difficult to design under worker heterogeneity, we propose LLMScore, an LLM-driven evolutionary framework that automatically designs GRAF's scoring algorithm. LLMScore addresses two challenges: jointly optimizing platform utility and worker satisfaction, and evaluating worker regret when exact computation is intractable. Trained only on small instances of one setting, it transfers to larger and structurally different settings; moreover, its output is human-readable code that platform operators can inspect and modify. Across 1,000 synthetic instances spanning four settings, GRAF with LLMScore consistently achieves high-quality, often near-optimal, outcomes with low worker regret, benefiting both platforms and workers.

We study collaborative learning in multi-agent Bayesian bandit problems, where strategic agents collectively solve the same bandit instance. While multiple agents can accelerate learning by sharing information, strategic agents might prefer to free-ride and avoid exploration. We consider a setting with persistent agents that participate in multiple time periods. This is in contrast to most previous works on incentives in multi-agent MAB, which assume short-lived agents, namely each agent has a single decision to make and optimizes their expected reward in that single decision. As in the multi-agent MAB model with incentives, our model does not have monetary transfers, and the only incentives are through information sharing. We propose CAOS, a mechanism that sustains collaboration as a Nash equilibrium while achieving strong regret guarantees. Our results demonstrate that collaborative exploration can be sustained purely through information sharing, achieving performance close to that of fully cooperative systems despite strategic behavior.