Cybersecurity of Teleoperated Quadruped Robots: A Systematic Survey of Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Open Defense Gaps
Organizations: Department of Informatics, Bioengineering, Robotics and Systems Engineering (DIBRIS), University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
Abstract
Teleoperated quadruped robots are increasingly deployed in safety-critical missions -- industrial inspection, military reconnaissance, and emergency response -- yet the security of their communication and control infrastructure remains insufficiently characterized. Quadrupeds present distinct security challenges arising from dynamic stability constraints, gait-dependent vulnerability windows, substantial kinetic energy, and elevated operator cognitive load. This survey synthesizes peer-reviewed literature and vulnerability disclosures (2019--2025) to provide comprehensive analysis of cybersecurity threats, consequences, and countermeasures for teleoperated quadruped systems. We contribute: (i) a six-layer attack taxonomy spanning perception manipulation, VR/AR operator targeting, communication disruption, control signal attacks, localization spoofing, and network intrusion; (ii) systematic attack-to-consequence mapping with timing characterization; (iii) Technology Readiness Level classification exposing critical maturity gaps between field-deployed communication protections (TRL 7--9) and experimental perception/operator-layer defenses (TRL 3--5); (iv) comparative security analysis of six commercial platforms; (v) pragmatic deployment guidance stratified by implementation timeline; and (vi) eight prioritized research gaps with implementation roadmaps. Limitations: Platform assessments rely on publicly available information. Attack success rates derive from cited studies under controlled conditions and require domain-specific validation.
Figures & tables
| Solution Domain | Approach | Quadruped Limitation |
|---|---|---|
| UAV Security | GPS-centric localization protection | Quadrupeds often operate GPS-denied (indoors, urban canyons) |
| UAV Security | Hover-and-wait on communication loss | Quadrupeds cannot hover; must maintain active balance |
| Industrial Robot | Safety caging and exclusion zones | Quadrupeds operate in unstructured environments with humans |
| Industrial Robot | Emergency stop as primary safety | E-stop during dynamic gait causes uncontrolled fall |
| Wheeled Robot | Graceful degradation under delay | 50ms delay causes instability during dynamic locomotion |
| Wheeled Robot | Simple odometry for localization | Leg slip, terrain variation require complex state estimation |
| Aspect | Boston Dynamics Spot [ 1 ] | Unitree Go1/Go2/G1 [ 35 , 36 ] | Ghost Robotics Vision 60 [ 9 ] | ANYmal (ANYbotics) [ 39 ] | Xiaomi CyberDog [ 40 ] | DeepRobotics X30 [ 41 ] |
| Encryption | TLS 1.2+/HTTP2 | AES (fleet-wide) | None (critical) | Enterprise TLS | Cyclone DDS | Not disclosed |
| Authentication | JWT/ES256, X.509 | BLE (vulnerable) | None in protocol | Enterprise PKI | Default mi/123 | Not disclosed |
| Firmware Security | Signed hash trees | Limited | Not documented | Industrial cert. | Open source | Proprietary |
| Key Management | Per-device unique | Hardcoded fleet | Hardcoded in APK | Per-device | Not documented | Not disclosed |
| Physical Ports | Restricted | Open | Unauth. (critical) | Industrial sealed | Open access | Standard |
| Cloud Backend | Optional, controlled | CloudSail backdoor | Military networks | Enterprise cloud | Xiaomi servers | Proprietary |
| Survey | Quadruped | Teleop. | TRL | Attack-Conseq. | VR/AR | Platform |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Specific | Security | Assess. | Mapping | Attacks | Comparison | |
| Botta et al. (2023) [ 5 ] | ✗ | Partial | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | Limited |
| Verma et al. (2025) [ 42 ] | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Yaacoub et al. (2022) [ 20 ] | ✗ | Partial | ✗ | Partial | ✗ | ✗ |
| Hamdan & Mahmoud (2021) [ 43 ] | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | Partial | ✗ | ✗ |
| Li et al. (2025) [ 44 ] | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | Partial | ✗ | ✗ |
| Attack Layer | Attack Type | Mechanism | Target Component | Success Rate | Key References |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Visual/Perception | LiDAR Spoofing | Laser injection/relay | 3D perception | 75–92% | [ 52 , 53 ] |
| Camera Manipulation | Video injection/editing | Operator view | High | [ 61 ] | |
| Visual Odometry Attack | Keypoint manipulation | Ego-motion estimation | Variable | [ 62 ] | |
| Depth Perception Attack | Stereo matching exploit | Distance estimation | 80%+ | [ 61 , 54 ] | |
| VR/AR-Specific | Cybersickness Induction | Flicker/vection manipulation | Human operator | High † | [ 66 ] |
| HMD Side-Channel | Motion/gesture analysis | Operator privacy | 82–90% | [ 72 ] |
| Initial Attack | Primary Effect | Secondary Effect | Terminal Consequence | Time-to-Conseq. | Intervention Points |
| LiDAR Spoofing | Phantom obstacle or removal | Emergency stop on stairs / collision | Fall + platform damage | 500ms | Multi-sensor fusion, gait-phase protection |
| Cybersickness Induction | Operator disorientation | Delayed/wrong commands | Mission abort + operator incapacitation | 2–5 min | Real-time symptom detection, FOV adaptation |
| GPS Spoofing | Wrong position estimate | Path deviation | Entry to hazardous zone / mission failure | 10–60s | IMU/GPS consistency, VO fallback |
| MITM on Video | Delayed visual feedback | Operator overcorrection | Collision with obstacle | 1–3s | End-to-end encryption, latency monitoring |
| Control Command Injection | Forced gait transition | Loss of balance | Fall + potential human injury | 100ms | Command authentication, bounded control |
| Jamming during stairs | Communication loss | Autonomous fallback fails | Uncontrolled fall | 200ms | Multi-link redundancy, safe-stance mode |
| Defense Mechanism | TRL | Validation Status | Quadruped-Specific Validation | Deployment Barrier | Key Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1: Field-Deployed (TRL 7–9) — Immediately Deployable | |||||
| TLS 1.2+/DTLS Encryption | 9 | Industry standard, deployed on Spot | Yes (Boston Dynamics Spot) | None; 1–3ms overhead | [ 1 ] |
| X.509/JWT Authentication | 9 | Industry standard, deployed on Spot | Yes (Boston Dynamics Spot) | Certificate management complexity | [ 1 ] |
| Firmware Signing (Hash Trees) | 8 | Deployed on Spot, standard practice | Yes (Boston Dynamics Spot) | Requires secure boot chain | [ 1 ] |
| FHSS Anti-Jamming | 8 | Mature military/WiFi technology | No quadruped-specific testing | Synchronization during dynamic gait | [ 45 ] |
| Multi-Link Redundancy | 7 | Commercial UAV/military systems | No quadruped failover time validation | Sub-200ms failover not yet proven | [ 74 ] |
| Attack Class | Observable Signals | Metrics | Test Conditions | Instrumentation |
| LiDAR Spoofing | Point cloud anomalies, depth inconsistency, object hallucination | Detection rate (%), FP/hour, time-to-detection (ms) | Flat/stairs/outdoor; trot/walk gaits | LiDAR + RGB camera + IMU |
| FDIA | State estimation residuals, joint torque deviation, gait timing errors | TTD (ms), stability margin reduction (%), fall rate | Multiple gaits, varied terrain | Joint encoders + IMU + F/T sensors |
| Cybersickness | Head motion patterns, gaze instability, HRV changes | Symptom onset (min), SSQ score, task error rate | VR interface, 30+ min sessions | Eye tracker + head IMU + HRV monitor |
| Jamming/DoS | Link quality (RSSI), packet loss, latency spike | Recovery time (ms), control continuity (%), fall rate | Dynamic locomotion, stairs, multi-link | RF spectrum analyzer + robot telemetry |
| GPS Spoofing | Position jumps, IMU/GPS inconsistency, heading drift | Detection accuracy (%), max deviation (m) | Outdoor, dynamic motion | Multi-GNSS + IMU + VO |
| Command Injection | Unauthorized command detection, trajectory deviation | Detection rate (%), response latency (ms) | Teleoperation active, varied autonomy | Command logger + state monitor |
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity develops methods to protect digital and cyber-physical systems from attacks, vulnerabilities, data loss, and misuse.
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