When Do Language Models Endorse Limitations on Human Rights Principles?

Large language models are increasingly deployed in contexts requiring adherence to ethical and legal norms, yet their alignment with internationally recognized human rights standards remains underexplored. We introduce UDHRBench, a large-scale benchmark for operationalising the evaluation of large language model compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The dataset comprises 1,124 human rights confronting questions covering all 30 articles and 4,496 responses from four large language models (ChatGPT, Grok, Gemini, and Fanar), manually annotated by experts for alignment, with high inter-annotator agreement ($κ= 0.801$). Our analysis reveals systematic and non-trivial misalignments, showing that violations typically arise through seemingly rational reasoning: appeals to efficiency, risk management, or scientific neutrality, rather than explicit rejection of rights. We further propose an LLM-as-a-Judge framework for automated evaluation using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, achieving 89.8% weighted F1-score in detecting human-rights misalignment, alongside a novel Alignment Leniency Score that quantifies how judge models resolve ambiguous cases. The dataset, annotations, and code will be released as open-source resources (https://sina.birzeit.edu/UDHRBench).

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to contain biases in the process of integrating conflicting information when answering questions. Here we ask whether such biases also exist with respect to which language is used for each conflicting piece of information. To answer this question, we extend the conflicting needles in a haystack paradigm to a multilingual setting and perform a comprehensive set of evaluations with naturalistic news domain data in five different languages, for a range of multilingual LLMs of different sizes. We find that all LLMs tested, including GPT-5.2, ignore the conflict and confidently assert only one of the possible answers in the large majority of cases. Furthermore, there is a consistent bias across models and prompting languages in which languages are preferred, with a general bias against Russian and, for the longest context lengths, in favor of Chinese. The language preferences are consistent between models trained inside and outside of mainland China, though somewhat stronger in the former category. There is also a general tendency among models to prioritize information that matches the language used for prompting. We hope to make users and developers of multilingual LLMs aware of this category of biases, to spur further research on their causes and possible mitigation.

Researchers increasingly use human-derived bias constructs to study Large Language Models (LLMs), including social-cognitive constructs such as implicit bias and stereotype activation, and cognitive biases such as anchoring, framing effects, and confirmation bias. Such approaches offer alternatives to overt bias probes, particularly when direct questioning may obscure bias or when model behaviour appears normatively acceptable. However, adapting human bias constructs to LLMs introduces an inferential gap. Psychological instruments were developed to study human cognition and social behaviour, whereas LLM evaluations rely on probabilities, text completions, rankings, or simulated decisions. This paper critiques human-centered bias evaluation in LLMs. We show how this gap arises from mismatches pertaining to human-derived constructs, human-model differences, and evaluation contexts, which can blur distinct interpretations of model bias. We then introduce a framework providing an analytical lens for relating these elements to warranted interpretations, with attention to target constructs, operationalizations, scope of inference, and limits of human analogy.